

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA¹



RWANDA DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION COMMISSION

Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program

TRACER Study

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¹ This document was initially produced in October 2004 but updated to reflect the study finding. Comments are more than welcome and send them to gbrmdhn@yahoo.com

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Finally, it should be noted that although the study was commissioned by the RDRC, it was carried out as an independent and objective research project. It reflects an interpretation of views of a sample of 941 ex-combatants. But the findings do not necessarily reflect the views of the RDRC. All conclusions reached and recommendations made are of the author alone, and may not necessarily be shared by any other members of the team. Thus the shortcomings, omissions, generalization and prejudices that there may undoubtedly be within the study are of the author.

Map of Rwanda



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AG	Armed Group
BNK	Basic Needs Kit
CDC	Community Development Committee
CPA	Politico-Administrative Committee
DC	Discharge Center
DDMS	Demobilization Data Management System
DD&R	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRP	Demobilization and Reintegration Program
EDRP	Emergency Demobilization Project
ERP	Emergency Rehabilitation Project
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
GLR	Great Lake Region
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HIV/AIDs	Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immunity Deficiency System
ID	Identity Card
IDA	International Development Agency
IGA	Income Generating Activity
MDRP	Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDRF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MOLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affaire
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission to Congo
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PDOP	Pre-demobilization Orientation Program
PIM	Project Implementation Program
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPO	Program Provincial Officer
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>
RDF	Rwanda Defense Force
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program
RG	Reintegration Grant
RSA	Recognition of Service Allowance
STD	Sexual Transmitted Disease
TCC	Technical Coordination Committee
TCG	Technical Coordination Committee

TS	Technical Secretariat
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNICEF	United Nations Child's Fund
TSS	Transitional Subsistence Support
VCT	Voluntary Counseling and Testing
VSW	Vulnerability Support Window

Executive Summary

Background

The demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants represent a great challenge for Rwanda. Since it constitutes an integral part of the overall transformation from a war-torn to a reconstructed country, this process is shaped by both the opportunities and constraints that is currently unfolding in present-day Rwanda. The RDRP Stage II (2001-2005) targeted to demobilize 20,000 soldiers from the national army (RDF) and about 25,000 members of armed groups (AG) including 2,500 child soldiers over a period of three years from neighboring countries particularly from Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC).

By the end of December 2004, the demobilization of the ex-RDF and the reinsertion of the ex-FAR were on track with figures standing at 16,592 (83%) and 12,290 (82%), respectively. The demobilization of members of ex-armed groups, however, stood at a dismal 4,509 (20%) for adults and 554 (22%) for children while the objective of demobilizing ex-RDF combatants appears to be achievable as scheduled, the same cannot be said about armed groups and child soldiers, unless the current repatriation trend radically changes.

Key finding

One-fourth ex-combatants are residing in urban area compared to one tenth who originated from urban areas. At least four points can be mentioned as to why urbanization is picking up in Rwanda. First, the main reason for settling in urban is related to economic pull effect for the very few job opportunities that can be utilized by ex-combatants. Second, most of the first stage combatants initially joined the army from neighboring countries usually had no extended family network in rural areas and are the vulnerable group and prefer to reside in urban area. Third, land distribution was completed before some ex-combatants were demobilized; hence they missed the opportunity of getting land. Fourth, a lot of Rwandese left their country to avoid atrocities and some of them joined the army. After their demobilization they found out that their land had been taken over by fellow Rwandese and is nearly impossible to get it back.

Most of the ex-combatants are young which is consistent with the overall profile of the society with mean age of 33. The majority age (49.7 percent) ranges 31 – 40 followed by 21 - 30 numbering (37.3 percent). Ex combatants from RDF and Ex-AG are young (21-30) and comprises 88 and 69 percent respectively while that of EX-FAR is only 14 percent. Eight out of ten (86 percent) can read and write and only fourteen percent of the ex-combatants are illiterate.

The majority of respondents 444 (49.7 percent) fell into the age range of 31 – 40 followed by 21 - 30 age category numbering 333 (37.3 percent). Ex-combatants from RDF and Ex-AG are young (21-30) and comprises 88 and 69 percent respectively while that of EX-FAR is only 14 percent. Since the majority is in the working age range it is relatively easy to re-train them in different skills. Their young age put them in an advantageous position in relation to other war torn societies. It will make a significant difference if they are re-trained in different life skills. Such intervention will expedite their reintegrate process into the receiving community.

Education and vocational training can do a lot to boost self-confidence and respectability to redirect the individuals' energy to useful activities and to build hope for the future. The field finding showed the ones with low education background when they got life skill training were employed. Furthermore, training can be therapeutic and help to reduce trauma caused by the loss of family members and friends. Ex-combatants could begin to recover from their experiences, and could find new identity during the training process and build meaningful and productive life.

Besides, ex-combatants show commitment, discipline and motivation which by itself are a positive attitudinal trend which current is earning former combatants status among their communities. Even though ex-combatants do not have formal professional skills, they are well educated compared to the average person in Rwanda and more qualified when it comes to community-orientation and social behavior. Former combatants are slowly entering the hierarchal administration apparatus in their areas of settlements. For example, in Rural Kigali the former combatants are actively working in the following structures:

- Provincial level 4 out of 48
- District level 22 out of 50
- Sector level 300 out of 1390
- *Akagari* (Cellule) level 3678 out of 12260

The ex-combatants are perceived as part of the community. They enjoy a lot of goodwill from their communities. They live together in an ordinary way like their compatriot. The field finding pointed out that there is no discrimination against any group who had participated in the war which stands out of the communities they are residing. This is a testimony that slowly but surly former combatants are reintegrating into the mainstream of the society.

Post conflict economy generally is seriously constrained by the lack of skilled manpower. Demobilized combatants are currently encountering significant difficulty entering into a shattered economy that has little absorptive capacity, particularly in the Rwanda's medium- and large-scale formal sector. The private sector has not picked up as expected and the public sector is overstaffed and the area where ex-combatants are

working is in the informal sector and needs to be promoted because now the municipalities of the province or other town authorities are chasing vendors and other petite-traders from the street.

Currently the median child birth for ex-combatants is three and when broken down 20 percent accounts for two; 16 percent for one; 15 percent for three and 9 percent for 4. Taking the young age of ex-combatants it seems necessary to sensitize them on family planning. Poverty is often considered to be a key factor in causing strong demographic growth and high fertility rate.

According to the study's findings, ninety eight percent of the ex-combatants who initially went to *Byumba* province are still residing there. The main reason for not moving from the province is due to the economic opportunities the province is offering. *Byumba* is bordering Uganda and a sizeable number of ex-combatants are actively engaged in cross border petty-trades. There are also job opportunities in tea plantation or small-scale factories functioning in the province. *Gisenyi* province who borders Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is also attracting a sizeable number of former combatants. For example, nearly one fourth of those who initially resided in the province moved to DRC in search of job and other economic opportunities.

The province of *Gitarama* and *Kigali Ngali* are located near the capital city *Kigali*. A number of ex-combatants commute on a daily base to the city to earn a living. It was clear from the discussion with the Provincial Project Officers (PPOs) that ex-combatants hardly come to the provincial offices and is hard to track them down. Nearly three-fourths of those who initially resided in *Umutara* continue living there. The main reason for their stay is that relatively they can get land easily compared to other provinces. Newcomers currently occupy the *Akagera* National Park bordering Tanzania and ex-combatants are benefiting from this opportunity. Besides, the area is good for cattle rearing and since ex-combatants' majority background is rural they might have gone there to eke out a living in sectors such as animal husbandry.

Cross border operation is serving former combatants as a life line for those who are residing in the provinces bordering neighboring countries. Many ex-combatants are currently residing in urban areas. The main reasons for their reluctance lie in the fact that during their stay in the army they were used to new services, which most of them were unaccustomed prior to joining the army.

After getting rid of the incompetent government substantial improvements have taken place in different economic and service sectors but the speed of development is not fast enough to meet the expectations created during the combat era. Three out of five ex-combatants were expecting demobilization and when demobilized they readily

accepted it. But after getting demobilized 55 percent said that their expectation did not match reality.

During the long years of army life combatants had built up strong expectations of 'decent life'. They believed that all problems would be solved once the decadent regime in Rwanda is changed. But once the country ousted the incompetent government the majority of ex-combatants still are facing problems in gaining livelihood, and their expectation of a reasonably decent livelihood is vanishing in front of their eyes. As one key informant put it:

"Life in the bush was normal but after the country made peace with itself ex-combatants are living in an economic jungle in which they have little understanding or clue".²

In order to understand what kind of environment ex-combatants resides in, they were asked to describe their homes and its environs. The descriptions of the home environment assessment were also supplemented by many of the community focus groups interviews. Nearly four out of five live in mud house followed by permanent housing 14 percent. In the in-depth interview conducted with key informant, housing problem (shelter) stands out as a crucial issue because, if some one doesn't have an address he is considered nobody and not part of a community. Shelter is a status symbol to ex-combatants; hence it is not surprising that a lot of ex-combatants who got vulnerability support spent the grant they got to build house which bought them social status in the process.

According to field finding ex-combatants are slowly catching up in having a house of their own and once associated with a permanent residence it is a matter of time that their reintegration will follow. Nearly half of the ex-combatants own their own home. But when ex-combatants were asked to rate their housing situation with that of their neighbors slightly more than half said worse, but should be seen as a subjective response. There is no hard evidence that shows ex-combatants are worse off.

In the field study findings there is a clear indication of psychosocial problems faced by ex-combatants. When ex-combatants were asked, "do you often have difficulty with dreams and flashbacks"? More than two out of five responded positively showing that they might be suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). One key informant who preferred to remain anonymous shared his experience with the author,

"During the flashback he sees a battle recurring, begins to hear sounds of battle, and feels hot, sweaty, and terrified". This is very hard ordeal to live with day-in-day out.

² Personal communication with the author August 2004, Kigali City.

The other crucial problem is related to disabled ex-combatants, usually the mentality of most disabled ex-combatants is that since they are war related victims the government should cater for their livelihood. Thus, it is a good idea to support disabled ex-combatants in variety of projects that can be exemplary in showing ex-combatants that they can also be engage in income generating activities and be self-reliant. Currently more than 6,000 disabled ex-combatants need economical and psychosocial support and 350 to 400 severely disabled combatants, who are residing in *Kanombe* hospital for more than 10 years, require permanent help.

PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

1. INTRODUCTION

The cessation of hostilities or at least the ebbing of widespread-armed conflict provides an opportunity for war-torn peoples and countries to rebuild their societies, economies, and polities, and to start reforms and restructuring. Nations transitioning from conflict to peace face an immense challenge in making transition from military to civilian life. Ex-combatants must shift into newly formed national militaries or be reintegrated into civilian lives. Nations that endured civil conflict, as did Ethiopia, Liberia, Eritrea, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, ...etc., require highly effective programs for demobilization and reintegration, not only as part of transition towards peace, but also to ensure that in the post-conflict stage peace agreements bring stability and development.

The human impact of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has been appalling. Although reliable figures are unavailable, the overall number of casualties in the last ten years may well reach two million, exceeding that of any other contemporary conflict.³ The internal movement and exile of large populations have also affected the GLR in general. By the turn of the last century as many as 10 million people has either been internally displaced or sought refuge in another country. These displaced populations often live in squalid conditions characterized by a lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence of basic health and education services.

The economic impact is impossible to quantify but the following aggregate data provide a snapshot of recent developments in the GLR. In 2000, gross national income in the GLR was estimated to be US\$250 per capita, compared to US\$470 per capita for sub-Saharan Africa. Having annual growth rates above those of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, the GLR has lagged behind markedly throughout the 1990s. On top of this, displaced populations in general and ex-combatants in particular tend to be at a greater risk because of sexually transmitted infections, including Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immunity Deficiency System (HIV/AIDS).

As a result of previous civil wars, lack of political rights, or as a means to gain political power, most countries in the GLR have been confronting insurgencies perpetrated by irregular forces. While these groups vary in size and fighting capabilities, they inflict economic destruction and had uprooted large populations. These armed groups are often based outside their country of origin and sometimes receive support from the

³ 2002 World Bank, Africa region 'Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration' Environmental, Rural and Social Development Department

host country or simply escape host government control. The presence of armed groups who are based in a neighboring country often increase insecurity and forces governments to intervene outside their territory, risking inter-state disputes.

In the GLR, as in other conflicts economic interests are also intertwined with warfare. Several governments and armed forces are said to have commercial interests in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The presence of large uprooted population outside their country of origin provides opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks or to profit from humanitarian aid, and to recruit new members, by force if necessary. The presence of significant populations of different ethnic groups across national borders further complicates the conflicts. As the continuation of a conflict taking place in any given country's territory depends on the actions of neighboring governments as well as of armed groups that ignore state boundaries, a long-term strategy to restore security in the region needs to address these supra-territorial linkages.

Years of conflict have led to an enlargement of government and irregular forces throughout the GLR. Their demobilization and reintegrating of former combatants is a pre-condition for enhancing the prospects for recovery and sustainable and boost development. Demobilization and Reintegration Programs (DRPs) put focus on former combatants, who are mostly able-bodied, young men and women. In most post-conflict situations, a number of other groups (including female-headed households, orphans, refugees and displaced persons...etc) may be more vulnerable and have fewer economic opportunities.

In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), consisting mainly of Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda to escape persecution during the pre-independence period and the post-independence years got organized as Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) to liberate Rwanda from decadent rule. The armed resistance continued until the signing of the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords. However implementation of the Accords was hindered by then governing regime in Rwanda. The death of President Habyarimana in a plane crash in April 1994 unleashed a campaign of mass killings. More than one million *Tutsis* and moderate *Hutus* were killed and more than three million Rwandans were displaced and fled to refugee camps in the DRC.

Fighting between the RPA and the Forces *Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) resumed shortly after the assassination of the President. By mid-July 1994, the RPA forces expelled the FAR and the militia executing the genocide (*Interahamwe*) from the country and brought the war and genocide to an end. Among the crowd of fleeing refugees were many who were associated or implicated with *genocidaires*. This group included former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and the *Interahamwe* (a *Hutu* militia). Using the refugee camps as staging and recruiting grounds, and allegedly receiving

support from DRC President Mobutu, the *genocidaires* launched attacks into Rwanda. This continuing security problem led the Government of Rwanda to support the rebel movement of Laurent-Désiré Kabila to oust Mobutu.

The Government of Rwanda then backed the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) to oust Kabila when he failed to live up to his promises of the Arusha Peace Accords. The Rwandan Patriotic Army then entered the DRC to disarm the *genocidaires* and to end the support they were allegedly receiving from Kabila. Following the Lusaka Accords in July 1999 and the Pretoria Agreement in July 2002, Rwanda announced its complete withdrawal of troops in October 2002.

Even ten years after the Rwandan genocide was militarily brought to an end, the legacy of insecurity continues to jeopardize the consolidation of peace in Rwanda and the GLR. Combatants associated with the defeated ex-FAR and the Interahamwe militia, still aligned together as the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), continues to operate in the eastern DRC and Burundi.

Since its establishment in 1997, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) have aimed at implementing a double strategy – the actual demobilization itself and supporting the national strategy for reconciliation and peaceful co-existence. The reintegration component of the DDR program is envisioned to be an integral part of an overall national reconciliation and reconstruction strategy.

This includes the consolidation of the political process and security, which forms the basis for viable post war national recovery program. The demobilization and reintegration program in Rwanda attempts to support former combatants reintegrate into their communities so as to positively contribute towards peace building and economic development.

TABLE 1: DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF EX-COMBATANTS DEMOBILIZED AS OF JUNE 2004

No	Province	Ex-RDF Stage 1	Ex-RDF Stage 2	Ex-armed Group	Ex-Far	Total	Percentage
1.	Kigali City	5661	3462	146	1941	11210	22.38
2.	Gisenyi	1149	1965	1005	1775	5894	11.77
3.	Kibungo	2299	1282	89	1260	4930	9.84
4.	Kigali-Ngali	2290	1164	329	868	4651	9.29
5.	Ruhengeri	691	2038	890	898	4517	9.02
6.	Butare	2097	938	349	1006	4390	8.76
7.	Gitarama	1360	934	282	1006	3582	7.15
8.	Byumba	809	979	185	1100	3073	6.14
9.	Cyangugu	476	589	372	932	2369	4.73
10.	Umutara	1239	555	21	248	2063	4.12
11.	Kibuye	296	626	355	607	1884	3.76
12.	Gikongoro	325	287	295	617	1524	3.04
	Total	18,692	14, 819	4,318	12, 258	50, 087	100.00

The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) are being implemented in two Stages. Stage I took place from 1997 to 2001 and demobilized 18,692 Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers (2,364 of which were children). While there were significant achievements, many technical and political problems slowed down program implementation progress. The first stage of the RDRP was compromised by external political and financial factors as well.⁴

The persistent insecurity on Rwanda's DRC frontier and Rwanda's associated military engagement in the DRC, as well as the incorporation of 15,000 ex-FAR in the RPA, impeded the Government's ability to reduce the overall size of the RPA and defense expenses. In this context, donors limited their financial assistance to the program in response to the deployment of RPA forces in the DRC. The resulting lack of financial resources limited the program's ability to provide adequate reintegration assistance to demobilized RPA ex-combatants as well as to former FAR combatants who were not integrated into the RPA.

In addition to the points mentioned above, Stage I of the program was also hampered by significant internal technical and management shortcomings. The technical capacity of the RDRC was insufficient to ensure the quality of program implementation. For example, inadequate pre-demobilization counseling generated unrealistic expectations among ex-combatants, a micro-credit scheme was implemented poorly, and a village that was established specifically for disabled ex-combatants has proven to be unsustainable. In addition, essential technical assistance was not forthcoming and donors were not adequately informed on implementation modalities and progresses.⁵

Lessons learned from Stage I were integrated into the design of RDRP Stage II, which commenced in December 2001 saw a revamping of the program to incorporate and eventually to be brought within the MDRP framework, a process that is still continuing. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program stage II (2002-2005) targeted the demobilization of 20,000 soldiers from the national army (RDF) and about 25,000 members of armed groups (AG) including 2,500 child soldiers over a period of three years from neighboring countries particularly from the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC). By the end of June 2004, demobilization of the ex-RDF and the reinsertion of the ex-FAR were on course with figures standing at 15,203 (76%) and 12,258 (82%), respectively.

The Government of Rwanda (GoR) asked the World Bank to lead efforts to revamp the program of demobilization and reintegration by providing financial assistance (the

4 2001, Kees Kingma 'Strategic Assessment of Demobilization Issues prepared for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'

5 World Bank document, March 25, 2002 'Technical annex for proposed credit to the republic of Rwanda for an emergency demobilization and reintegration program'

"Credit"), initiate international resource mobilization efforts, and coordinate donor support to Stage II of the RDRP. For the second stage of the RDRP, the Government envisages the demobilization and reintegration of 20,000 RPA soldiers and 25,000 members of armed groups returning from outside the country (including the 1,735 recently demobilized from *Mudende* and *Nkumba*)." In addition, the program provided reinsertion assistance to 15,000 Ex-FAR who returned before Stage II as well as economic reintegration assistance to an estimated 12,000 RPA and FAR ex-combatants who did not receive adequate assistance during Stage 1 of the program and who remain economically vulnerable.

The Rwanda Government as a commitment to peace and its Poverty Reduction Strategy, through its arm RDRC has embarked on arduous task of demobilization and reintegration program of ex-combatants. A dynamic, participatory process was initiated that aims at transforming existing or potential destructive conflicts into sustainable peace built upon justice, equality, trust and tolerance that foster the full development of human potential. Here co-existence means more than merely living peacefully side-by-side because co-existence also involves communication, interaction and co-operation among the individual residing together.

In addition, coexistence means the skills and determination that an individuals or a community need to initiate a relationship in an experience of trauma or history of division. This can only be re-dressed if individuals first recognize each other's status and rights as human being and work hard to live by the rule of law within an inclusive visionary for the community's future development; and to foster the implementation of economic, social, cultural or political development across communities.

The main objectives of the reintegration assistance are laid out in Reintegration Program of the Commission technical annex, which highlights the following points:

- To facilitate and support the return of ex-combatants into their home communities or preferred communities of return;
- To assist ex-combatants become productive members of their communities;
- To properly utilize potentials of the ex-combatants for social and economic reconstruction of the country;
- To promote social acceptance and reconciliation; and
- To reduce fiscal impact [large defense budgets] by providing alternative employment support options for demobilized combatants.⁶

Although RDRC has commissioned a number of studies, so far no systematic tracking and monitoring of reintegrating ex-combatant into the mainstream of the society was

⁶ 2002, Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission 'Technical assistance for emergency demobilization and reintegration program' Kigali Rwanda.

conducted. Currently only anecdotal evidence regarding the situation of these ex-combatants is available. While existing mechanisms and processes can be utilized to deal with the remaining problems once a DDR program ends, formulating a transitional reintegration program usually needs to be based on a sound study. The main focus of the study is geared towards adult ex-combatants. The Commission will conduct separate studies for the special target group namely disabled ex-combatants, women ex-combatants and child ex-combatants and reports are expected early 2005.

In the final phase of the RDRC it is obvious that operations will be more heard and less visible as the support programs for ex-combatants tail-off and ends. Additional community-based and inclusive (or non-targeted) interventions still need to be provided once the RDRC targeted assistance comes to an end. This can only be implemented in harmony with the **overall National Recovery of Poverty Reduction Strategy of the country**.

In the next phase of transition the RDRC needs to revisit its planning imperatives so as to be more in harmony with the social and economic problems faced by the ex-combatants in particular and the country as a whole. Currently, the Commission is at a stage of winding up the program (June 2005) and it is the right time to design a transition strategy and exit-option for the program with the support of partner organizations and stakeholders for the whole demobilization and reintegration process. Thus, it is an appropriate time to conduct a Tracer Survey of former combatants so that it can guide the Commission how to go about its tasks in time of transition.

In order to grasp the complexity of the problem and tackle reintegration properly, the study places the reintegration process against the background in which the Government of National Unity found itself at the end of the genocide, and in the stage of recovery and developments which have been unfolding ever since.

1.1 Country Background

Geography and Demography

Rwanda is located in the center of Africa and borders with Central Africa and East Africa, between the 1st and 3rd degrees latitude south. Rwanda, despite its proximity to the Equator, enjoys a climate ranging from tropical to temperate due to its high altitude. Rainfall varies with altitude and ranges from 1400 to 1800 mm per annum at the Congo Nile basin, and only from 800 to 900 mm in the east of the country where rain is rare, and the dry season starts earlier and lasts longer than in the west. Due to temperature, rainfall, and evapo-transpiration the agricultural lands are spread across 10 different agro-climatic zones.

The mountainous relief of Rwanda, and the human pressure exerted on its soil (which does not allow fallowing) re-assures erosion across the whole territory, especially in the western part of the country, which is very hilly and receives up to 1800 mm of rainfall per year. Rwanda's total surface area is 26,338 sq. km and with a population of 8,200,000 in 2003 which gives a population density of 311 people per sq. km. The arable area is 13,850 sq. km, which means that there are 592 people per sq. km of arable land, thus making Rwanda the most densely populated country in Africa.⁷ The country's demography shows a rapid increase of 2.9 percent, which could bring the population to 16 million in the year 2020. The population is composed of very young people: the average age is 21 years; about 60 percent of the population is below 18 years.

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Rwanda

Ranked 159th poorest nation in the world⁸ Rwanda is a predominantly rural. More than 90 percent of the Rwandan population is subsistent farmer. Agricultural activities remain traditional and use very little technology and are strongly dependent on the natural rainfall.⁹ For several decades, the country has been characterized by structural poverty related to:

- Negative growth in the years 1980-1990 during which economic growth (2 percent on average) was at a lower rate than demographic growth;
- Scarcity of natural resources, identified as those resources most likely to finance the take-off of the national economy;
- Economic policy is excessively based on subsistence agriculture with a view to self-reliance in food security which had contributed to limiting, not only the professional qualification of producers, but also the level of exchange between regions and the opening up to non agricultural occupations;

⁷ 2003 Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affaire, 'Labor-intensive Local Development Program, Program Document'.

⁸ UNDP World Human Development Report (2004), Human Development Indices Ranking

⁹ Ibid

- The fragility of macro-economic conditions: heavy debt servicing, weak capacity of exportation, deficits and dependence on external aid;
- Short-sighted management which has limited the training of the population, with negative effects on the development of human resources and on the diversification of occupations in the country such that 48 percent of the Rwandans are illiterate.

Shelter and capital stock were reduced both in the household and small business sectors. To date, poor households were not able to replenish their livestock holdings. Part of the country are still facing a serious lack of infrastructure as a result of destruction during the war and the movement of people into areas that were previously sparsely populated. Networks of social links in rural and urban areas have been damaged either by war or genocide.¹⁰ About 107,000 people are in prison awaiting trial for genocide-related crimes, imposing a large economic burden both on the state and particularly on the female and child headed households.

The experience of violence, including the systematic use of rape, has traumatized a high proportion of the population and their physical and mental health continues to be severely affected.¹¹ The prevalence of HIV/AIDs has increased dramatically in part as a consequence of large-scale population movements and the use of rape as a weapon. The prevalence is 11.2% nationally and 10.8% in rural areas, compared to a rate of 1.3% in rural areas in 1986. As a result of these factors, human resources have been drastically reduced. In 1995, 79% of core civil servants had not completed secondary education; this proportion fell to 51% by 1998.

Decentralization Process

In May 2000, the Government of National Unity officially adopted the decentralization policy as its strategy for recovery and development. This policy encompasses all strategies aimed at gradually bringing Rwandans to address the problem of poverty themselves, which affects more than 65 percent of the population.¹² The strategic goals of the national policy are as follows:

1. To make the local population aware of their responsibility and mobilize them to take part in initiation, preparation, executing, and monitoring of decision and plans which relate to them by taking into account the local needs, priorities, capabilities and the resources in transferring power, authority and resources of the central government to the decentralized administration and the lower level;
2. To reinforce responsibilities and transparency in Rwanda while making the local leaders directly responsible to their communities and by establishing a

¹⁰ 2002 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper'

¹¹ 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper'

¹² 2003, Ministry of Local Government 'Labor-intensive Local Development Program'

- clear connection between the taxes paid by the people and the services financed by these taxes;
3. To reinforce sensitivity and capacity of intervention of the capacity of intervention of the Public Administration in the local environment while placing planning, management and control of the activities at the point where these services are provided and while enabling the local leadership to develop the structures and organizational capacity to take into account their environment and the local needs;
 4. To develop sustainable economic planning and management capabilities at the local level which will serve as a motor for planning, mobilizing and execution of the social, political and economic development in order to reduce poverty; and
 5. To reinforce efficiency and effectiveness in services by moving the responsibilities for planning and management from the central government to the point where needs are felt and services are provided.

The RDRP made it clear in its guiding principle that it would rely only on existing government structures so as to build sustainable capacities beyond the program's duration by enhancing the government structures.¹³ For example, strengthening the decentralized structures of government namely CDCs/CPAs are done along this line.

1.2 Research Methodology

Objectives of the study

The purpose of the study is to allow policy makers and service providers to investigate how well ex-combatants are reintegrating into the main stream of the society. Since its founding, RDRC is filling a socio-economic profile of all combatants in its discharge centers. But once combatants were demobilized neither baseline study nor updating of the list of combatants was done by the Commission's staff be it in the provinces or head office. To bridge this gap and establish Baseline Study that can be used as a springboard for planning of any future study, it is obligatory to know the whereabouts of ex-combatants who were demobilized since 1997. A Tracer Study generated on the Monitoring and Information System (MIS) was used to launch the current study.

A random selection of 2000 (5% of the population) individual ex-combatants from MIS list of the Commission provided longitudinal dimension to the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants and is expected to guide policy makers:

- Assess factors, which either contribute to the process of reintegration or, alternatively, hinder the reintegration of ex-combatants;

¹³ 2002, RDRC 'Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Project Implementation Manual'

- Assess ex-combatant participation in RDRC-funded reintegration opportunities and issues related to access to, participation in income generating activities and implementation of the programs by different service providers;
- Assess the relevance of the programs designed to facilitate reintegration;
- Assess the response of ex-combatants to their new economic, social and political environment following demobilization;
- Assess the socio-economic status of those ex-combatants who got their Basic Need Kit (BNK) and Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) programs;
- Assess whether the environment is conducive to and offers window of an opportunity for ex-combatants to eke-out a living and thus help their reintegration into the mainstream of the society;
- Assess impact of the different interventions designed by the Commission in partnership with other institutions to help ex-combatants reintegrate into mainstream of the society;
- Assess the ex-combatant participation in reintegration opportunities funded by parallel partners, who are within the RDRC reintegration framework and issues related to access and their participation in the programs;
- Assess the socio-economic needs of ex-combatants so as to be able to design intervention mechanism for the transition period;
- Assess issues, which the ex-combatants are facing in their transition state from combatants to civilians so as to fit it into the bigger picture of poverty reduction strategy of the country;
- Assess the way resources, services, employment and other opportunities are distributed;
- Assess and document changes in the socio-economic status of former combatants; and
- Assess the degree to which ex-combatants identify with, and were actively engaged in economic and social-based groups and/or network.

The main purpose of this study is to present findings of demobilization and reintegration processes, which were undertaken from 1997 to 2004 by the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). The finding [positive and negative] will provide the basis on which the Commission will be able to pinpoint the key problems for reintegrating ex-combatants into the mainstream of the society and finally be able to design exit-strategy for the overall demobilization and reintegration program and in the end give some recommendations for further action.

The author uses the term integration or reintegration to mean a complex business, that is, a process through which people who have developed different conceptions and attitudes in diverse circumstances are brought together to be part of a society. They can act or react in ways, which may help or hinder their reintegration emanating from action taken to resolve the problems created by their very differences. It is not

necessarily a conflict resolution process. But it might also be a question of assisting particular groups to re-adjust or to reassert their place in society. But this must be achieved in a process during which the whole community learns to live with differences, to understand and accommodate diversity. By meshing the diversified experiences gained while fending for survival, thus they can live once again a 'normal' life. Therefore the words integration and reintegration will be used interchangeably throughout the study.

Significance of the Study

The main objective of the Tracer Study is to gain knowledge through a randomly selected group of ex-combatants as to how they are faring since being demobilized and their subsequent embarkment on a reintegrating process. The finding of the Tracer Survey will be used as baseline information which will also be used to track patterns and measure changes in community dynamics, challenges of perceptions, attitudes, and behavior as part of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy during the reintegration process of ex-combatants. The follow up study will be conducted one year after the current Tracer Study.

The assessment will not only focus on challenges and deficiencies but also centers on community' resourcefulness that are capable of supporting reintegration. Side by side with the current study the Commission has also conducting a pilot in house study in rural, urban and semi-urban areas (*Kigali City, Gisenyi and Kibungo*) where there is bigger caseload of ex-combatants to assess and understand the community dynamism in the process of ex-combatant's reintegration.

The purpose of the focus group discussions was to obtain an in-depth understanding of the impact of the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants on the socio-economic and cultural life of the communities. Conversations to explore the communities' perceptions, attitudes, behavior and awareness of the reintegration processes were held. Opportunities of livelihoods, especially of the ex-combatants were asked. The Community Dynamics study finding is also incorporated into the Tracer Study.

The success of reintegrating ex-combatants in war-torn societies depends to a large extent on the climate of peace or violence prevailing in the community into which ex-combatants are expected to reintegrate. The pivotal aim is to understand and to find ways and means to enhance and develop community dynamics so as to restore confidence both in the ex-combatants and community abilities, strengths, and in the end to boost existing capabilities of peaceful co-existence.

Triangulating techniques were done among different sources of information collected by the Commission. Such an assessment will also shade light on the pace and potential of ex-combatants towards self-reliance as opposed to expecting handouts from government and/or donors.

Preliminary findings were presented to stakeholders debriefing session on the fall of 2004. Comments and observations were received and the finding of the study was presented to a workshop to designs an Exit Option [Transition Period] for the Commission. The finding highlighted the overall achievements/drawbacks of the RDRC program and it is hoped that it will add to the broader understanding regarding reintegration and settlement processes of ex-combatants in the GLR in general.

Research Techniques

The basic research techniques employed for the Tracer Survey was field research (quantitative) and was supplemented by collecting secondary data from sector ministries, provincial administrations and studies conducted by partner organizations whose activities closely corresponds with that of RDRP. The Community Dynamics Study (qualitative) used three qualitative instruments, namely focus group discussion, key informants and observation to collect primary data.

The analytical model of the study for qualitative and quantitative includes three interrelated and interdependent spheres: economic, social, and psychological reintegration. The aim of the study is to identify and analyze variables [origin, gender, age, experience, education and skills; living conditions and marital status] that influence reintegration within each dimension. Comparisons are made between host community and ex-combatants by analyzing these variables.

The absorptive capacity of the society when receiving a considerable additional number to its indigenous population in the form of returnees depends mainly on two factors. Firstly, the availability of land is vital; given that most of the resettlement endeavors of ex-combatants in Rwanda is taking place in rural areas. Access to land is seen as a pre-condition to successful reintegration process. In this context the success of integration depends on how far ex-combatants were able to negotiate and settle down in rural areas and become self-sufficient farmers. The following questions are raised to explore the issue of land availability:

- What are the consequences when ex-combatants are not able to settle in rural areas?
- What political decisions, such as government policy on land issues and question of land distribution, influence in the long-run the prospects of economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants in rural areas?

Secondly, the potential of the labor market pre-determines, demand for labor against economic growth, and the pressure faced by different population groups looking for either work or economic opportunities. The potential of the labor market can be developed with the help of appropriate political strategies aiming at absorbing and utilizing the potential of ex-combatants. A central issue for ex-combatants is to access the labor market, both in terms of employment opportunities and the recognition of different experience gained by ex-combatants during their stay in the army to generate employment.

Research Setting and Study Population

The Commission has a list of all former combatants by province in its server of Management Information System (MIS) that was filled by former combatants while taking life orientation in the Discharge Center (DC). As the study was kicking off the Commission was able to demobilize 50,087 combatants. The list of ex-combatants was not updated and thus it was not known how many are residing in each province. This reality forced the Commission to conduct a Tracer Survey. Systematic sampling was used to select the population for the Tracer Survey. In order to conduct the study every Kth number of the population 5 percent (2000) was selected randomly from the total caseload listed in the MIS.

Data Sources and Types

Intensive literature review was done so as to have a broader picture of the program and to understand the dynamics of the program. This study builds on and utilizes information gathered from existing different reports and studies commissioned by RDRC and in house studies done by the Commission. In order not to duplicate what was studied regarding reintegration, the author used previous studies, but with the aim to be more analytical than descriptive. The primary data was generated using a semi-structured questionnaire.

Questions in the survey instrument were organized under the following broad topics:

- Demographic background and social origins;
- Experiences from army and exile exposure;
- Expectations of an acceptable lifestyle and the extent to which these have been realized;
- Relationship with host community;
- Present economic situation; and
- Present social and psychological situation.

The Tracer Survey studies from Eritrea and Sierra Leone were used as background and other African experiences of reintegrating demobilized combatants was also properly scrutinized so as to provide a context into which the RDRC study is to be assessed.

Data Collection Techniques

Primary data has been obtained using quantitative techniques. A largely structured questionnaire was administered for 941 ex-combatants. Initially the questionnaire was designed in English and later translated into *Kinyarwanda*. In order to have common understanding of the study, the Program Provincial Officers (PPOs) and the interviewers were trained together on how to conduct the Tracer Study. Most of the interviewers were deliberately selected to be former combatants and this approach helped a lot in the data collection process, for they understand the psychic of their former colleagues and gave them an easy communication access. Three day intensive discussion was conducted with the interviewers so as to grasp the content of the questionnaires.

The over all length of time to train and prepare interviewers for field deployment took one week. The questionnaire was pre-tested on 23 July, 2005 in Kigali City by selecting 200 former combatants. After going through all the questionnaires and accommodating the feedbacks obtained from the interviewee appropriate amendments were made. The full-fledged work of filling in the questionnaire started on 2nd of August. The questionnaire was designed to generate data on background information; the experience of demobilization; life during and after armed struggle, and the process of social, cultural and economic integration and psychological adjustment (see annex 2).

Sample Framework

From the caseload of 50,087 former combatants 2,000 were randomly selected. Each face-to-face interview sessions lasted approximately one hour. Thirty-nine interviews administered the task and all interviews were done in *Kinyarwanda*. The data collection took twenty days. Twelve data capturers were used to enter the primary data into a Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) program and were closely supervised by a Statistician and an assistant RDRC monitoring and evaluation staff. The data entry process took two weeks and cleaning up the data entered took another week. The first zero draft was presented by mid of October 2004. The translations of open-ended questionnaires were done.

TABLE 2: SAMPLE SIZE BY PROVINCE

Province	Sample size Selected	Percentage	Total Population	Percentage
Kigali City	380	19.00	11210	22.38
Gisenyi	248	12.40	5894	11.77
Kigali Ngali	212	10.60	4930	9.84
Butare	211	10.55	4651	9.29
Ruhengeri	192	9.60	4517	9.02
Kibungo	163	8.15	4390	8.76
Gitarama	152	7.60	3582	7.15
Byumba	123	6.15	3073	6.14
Cyangugu	97	4.85	2369	4.73
Umutara	87	4.35	2063	4.12
Kibuye	74	3.70	1884	3.76
Gikongoro	61	3.05	1524	3.04
Total	2000	100.00	50, 087	100.00

Field Work

During the fieldwork numerous problems were encountered. Since the interviewees were selected randomly from the overall population of ex-combatants and when an individual ex-combatant was singled out among his/her peer group usually s/he was reluctant to come forward for an interview. From other countries' experiences the Commission was aware of such a problem might crop-up in the process and had done preparatory work before the start of the study. Utmost effort was placed in creating awareness of the Tracer Study, so that ex-combatants could actively and meaningfully participate in the study. The Chairman of the Commission conducted a series of interview with Radio Rwanda, which was subsequently followed by other members of the Commission.

In order to facilitate the Tracer Survey activities and address immediate problems, four members of the Commission; namely the Operation Head, Reintegration Head, Assistant Monitoring and Evaluation head and Reintegration Planner were assigned as supervisors. Each supervisor was assigned three provinces and after one-week fieldwork the PPOs were called to assess the progress of the fieldwork. In the meeting all administrative issues regarding the fieldwork were assessed and each PPO benefited from the exchange of experience. This approach helped to iron out some of the problem encountered during the fieldwork.

The fieldwork was conducted throughout the country [twelve provinces], although it should be noted that some places were not easily accessible and with the shortage of time the interviewers were not able to interview all the ex-combatants residing in the provinces. It also happened that in some areas the majority of the randomly selected interviewees were from ex-FAR or ex-Armed Groups and under the guise of different pretexts avoided the interviewers. However, with the progress of time and following numerous reassurances and via word-of-mouth, of those who avoided interview in the first instance many come forward.

Of all the provinces Kigali-City proved to be the most difficult within which to conduct the survey. It was very hard trying to trace selected ex-combatants. From anecdotes collected during the fieldwork some ex-combatants had changed their names and were incognito as far as the study was concerned. However, the team learned that many ex-combatants were working with security firms as guards and so the PPO head of Kigali city approached different security firms actively working in Kigali City.

Despite intensive effort, this tactic also failed to bear fruit and she was unable to identify ex-combatants selected in her province. But it also proved difficult to track economically active ex-combatants in Kigali City, as they were reluctant to be priced away from their work. Given that many work throughout the week, it was not possible

to interview ex-combatants from the suburbs of Kigali City for ex-combatants commute to the city in search of casual work to the city on daily base.

1.3 Report Structure

Outline of the Report

Demobilization and reintegration programs take place at the level of state, community, family and the individual thus affecting all layers of society, specifically the social, economic, and political contexts. The Tracer Survey finding is presented in two parts. Part one starts with chapter one and comprises the context in which the study is taking place and comprises mainly country background, research methodology. In order to put the study into a broader perspective chapter two charts out the demographic profile of ex-combatants. Chapter three elaborates on demobilization and its effect and includes living condition of ex-combatants. It shows also the challenge faced by ex-combatants among which housing and land acquisition being the problematic issues encountered. Chapter four assess the support mechanisms put in place. The area of focus is training, counseling, business, and medical interventions.

Part two starts with chapter five and centers around economic reintegration. In order to assess the economic reintegration of ex-combatants support packages given by the commission and their impact is re-visited. Besides the above points, employment opportunities and welfare assessment of ex-combatants is presented. Chapter six examines the social reintegration of former combatants. To review social reintegration measures the following main points were raised namely: social network, community interaction and co-operation; psychosocial issues were analyzed. Social Capital being the glue that keeps any society together was investigated in chapter seven raising the following points, trust and solidarity; social cohesion and inclusion; empowerment and political action. The conclusion and recommendation of the Tracer Survey is presented in chapter eight. The final section consists of the bibliography and tracer questionnaire.

Research Limitations

The time allocated for awareness creation and preparation of fieldwork was short and discrepancies were observed and as a result time was lost to trace individual ex-combatants. Since their discharge the list of ex-combatants was never updated and thus not related to the field's reality. PPOs had no knowledge of the where about of their beneficiaries in their respective provinces. When ex-combatants changed address they did not necessarily pass this information onto the relevant provincial offices and it was not known how many had actually moved. Although confidentiality was assured from the beginning, some ex-combatants were reluctant to come forward for an interview. Beside some respondents were not sensitized on the necessity and urgency of conducting Tracer Survey and it was not easy to secure acceptance for interviewing ex-combatants.

The study is based on quantitative data and triangulation can not be done with the qualitative study of community dynamics because the qualitative study was done only on three provinces.

In some provinces authorities in the ministries were not informed about the Tracer Survey and had created problems during the early period of the fieldwork. In the urban areas ex-combatants are trying to eke out a living and they did not have time for interviews. Problems of bad roads and long distances to where the ex-combatants were residing added to the time pressure to deliver field findings thus forcing the interviewers to focus only on areas that are easily accessible.

1.4 Research Team

The research team comprised of 39 interviewers, 12 PPOs, 12 monitors and evaluators, and four supervisors. In order to facilitate the fieldwork four vehicles were hired and were deployed according the need of the field work. The commission also hired the expertise of Comlavi Dzigbodi Jondoh, a statistician who had worked on the project for one month.

CHAPTER TWO: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

2. PROFILE

According to the household survey 2000 – 2001 finding Poverty in Rwanda is extensive, over 60 percent of individuals and 57 percent of households live below the poverty line. More than two in five people do not meet their dietary requirements. Poverty is more firmly established in rural areas than in urban areas and has a far greater impact on female-headed households, particularly those headed by widows or divorcees, than on others. Inequality runs deep, with the richest 10 percent of the population holding approximately 50 percent of the national wealth compared with 50 percent of the population sharing just 15 percent of the wealth. The analysis of Tracer Study is interpreted in light of the findings of the household survey.

In the year 2000, the Rwandan population was estimated at 8,343,000 inhabitants.¹⁴ Studies carried out show that the Rwandan population experienced very rapid growth since 1940s in particular. From 1,595,400 inhabitants in 1934, it rose to 2,694,990 in 1960, 4,831, 527 in 1968 and 7,157,551 in 1991. The unfortunate events of 1994 naturally led to a drop in numbers and significantly altered the structure of the population.¹⁵

In accordance with the theory of demographic transition this rapid growth rate of the population is the result of low mortality rate while fertility remains high.¹⁶ Although the Rwandan population is by and large young but with regard to age structure differences are observed at province level. In some provinces the population is either relatively old or young. The study on poverty reduction paper 2003 characterizes the city of *Kigali* and the provinces of *Gisenyi* and *Ruhengeri* having young population each with a mean age 19.9, the province of *Gikongoro* has the highest mean age of 22.4 years, followed by *Gitarama* and *Butare*, with 22.1 years respectively.

Based on the date of their demobilization the study had categorized the ex-combatants into three groups. Namely groups one is 1997 to 2001, groups two 2002 and groups three 2003 – 2004. The random distribution of the stages is 401, 310 and 181 respectively. If categorized according to their forces it is: RDF=38, RPA =531, ex-FAR= 245 and ex-armed group 75. Majority members of RDF and Ex-armed group are in their early twenties numbering 66 and 69 percent. Only 14 percent of the ex-FAR are in their early twenties.

¹⁴ MINECOFIN, Socio-demographic survey, Department of Statistic, 1996. Projections.

¹⁵ 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Statistic Department 'Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (2000-2001)'.

¹⁶ Demographic transition: passage birth rates from high to low levels in a population over time. The lowering of the mortality rate ordinarily precedes the lowering of the fertility rate, giving rise to rapid population growth during the transition period.

The economic context in which individual's efforts of re-integration take place could better be understood by presenting first the profile of the concerned categories. The demographic characteristics presented include sex, age, and length of stay in the army, present location, marital status and children. Since the number of female ex-combatants captured in the random selection is small and not weighted only nine out of 893 were interviewed. In order to conduct a significant analysis of their reintegration process the Commission will conduct a separate study. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) with *Ndabaga* had recently conducted a study and some of the findings are incorporated into the Tracer Survey study.¹⁷

2.1 Origin and Place of Residence

Currently, Rwanda has an arable land potential estimated at 1,385,000 ha, some of this is marginal lands completely unfit for agriculture. Wetlands represent 165,000 ha of land area. Farms are very small and are continuously evolving towards micro-fragmentation. Due to the function of demographic density distribution of the lands is very unequal.¹⁸ The size of farms is not only a function of the population explosion but it is also the result of the current Rwandan system of land tenure with the prevalence of the common law which is characterized by a mode of inheritance primarily focused on the land property. Each descendant is entitled to a patch of land. Mind-sets being difficult to change, the splitting up of plots continue at an accelerated pace and is becoming an issue.

Nearly 70 percent of the 1,385,000 hectares of land are mostly run as family farms. These farms are not profitable. The families' farms are present on all types of marginal lands even those designated for non-agricultural use. This results in households living under the chronic poverty line, hardly reaching food self-sufficiency. This fight for survival stagnate the Rwandan agrarian systems within a non-evolutionary framework. Simultaneously agriculture is a mixture of speculation without any utilization of intensified farming methods and without diversification of production. This arrangement of land distribution also has an obvious impact on the settlement pattern of ex-combatants.

As shown in table 3 one-fourth ex-combatants are residing in urban area compared to one tenth who originated from urban areas. At least four points can be mentioned as to why urbanization is picking up in Rwanda. First, the main reason for settling in urban is related to economic pull effect for the very few job opportunities that can be utilized by ex-combatants. Second, most of the first stage combatants initially joined the army from neighboring countries and usually had no extended family network in rural areas and are the vulnerable group. Third, land distribution was completed before some ex-

¹⁷ The principal researcher Dr, Vanessa had kindly made available the study and the Tracer Study had benefited from its findings.

¹⁸ 2003, Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs 'Labor-Intensive Local Development Program'

combatants were demobilized; hence they missed the chance of getting land. Fourth, a lot of Rwandese left their country to avoid atrocities and some of them joined the army. After their demobilization they found out that their land had been taken over by fellow Rwandese and is impossible to get it back.

TABLE 3: PRESENT LOCATION OF EX-COMBATANTS BY THEIR ORIGIN

Present Location		Place of Origin			Total
		Urban	Semi-urban	Rural	
Urban	Count	79	20	119	218
	% Within Origin	89.8	32.8	16.3	24.8
	% of Total	9.0	2.3	13.5	24.8
Semi-urban	Count	3	34	26	63
	% Within Origin	3.4	55.7	3.6	7.17
	% of Total	0.3	3.9	3.0	7.17
Rural	Count	6	7	585	598
	% Within Origin	6.8	11.5	80.1	68.0
	% of Total	0.7	0.8	67	68.0
Total	Count	88	61	730	879
	% Within Origin	100	100	100	100
	% of Total	10.0	6.9	83.05	100

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptote. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	481.2	4	0.000
Likelihood Ratio	352.3	4	0.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	263.8	1	0.000
N of Valid Cases	879		

a. 1 cell (11.1%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.37.

There is enormous population pressure and there is practically no uncultivated land apart from the protected zones and wetlands. The rural population has had no other choice but gradually to cultivate more of these wetlands and often in an unsustainable way without concern for environment balance, resulting in negative environmental impacts.

2.2 Age, Education, and Skills

Reintegration process encompasses risks and potentials. Ex-combatants normally need substantial assistance in finding a secure livelihood, since they often lack professional or formal skills other than the use of weapons. A sharp decline in the living conditions of former soldiers and increased frustration could endanger the current peace and stability of the country. On the other hand, demobilization is an important pre-condition for sustainable human development, opening up the possibility of investment, in the social sectors, creating confidence and paving the way for development. Moreover, the commitment, discipline and motivation of most ex-

combatants, if properly harnessed, could play a major role in the processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation, which is currently taking off in Rwanda.

TABLE 4: LEVEL OF EDUCATION AT DEMOBILIZATION BY CATEGORIZATION

Level of education at demobilization*					Ex-combatant by their Categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Can read and write	5.6%	7.0%	6.1%	6.2%	13.3%	7.7%	2.1%	7.3%	6.2%
Primary	52.2%	54.1%	57.8%	54.7%	36.7%	56.9%	48.1%	63.6%	53.9%
Lower Secondary	22.6%	23.7%	22.4%	22.9%	20%	22.9%	25.3%	14.5%	22.9%
Higher Secondary	12.8%	6.6%	5.4%	8.3%	23.3%	8.6%	8.9%	10.9%	9.4%
Vocational	6.70%	7.8%	6.1%	6.9%	6.70	3.4%	15.2%		6.9%
University		0.8%	2%	0.9%		0.5%	0.4%	3.60	0.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100%	100%	100%

According to the fieldwork finding (table 5) most of the ex-combatants are young which is consistent with the overall profile of the society with mean age of 33. The majority age (49.7 percent) ranges 31 – 40 followed by 21 - 30 numbering (37.3 percent). Ex combatants from RDF and Ex-AG are young (21-30) and comprises 88 and 69 percent respectively while that of EX-FAR is only 14 percent. Four out of five (86 percent) can read and write and only fourteen percent of the ex-combatants are illiterate.

TABLE 5: AGGREGATED AGE GROUP OF EX-COMBATANTS AND THEIR CATEGORIZATION

Age group *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Less than 20		0.3%	0.6%	0.3%		0.4%			0.2%
21-30	27.9%	38.4%	56.4%	40.9%	65.8%	41.1%	14.3%	69.3%	37.1%
31-40	54.1%	50.0%	39.2%	47.8%	31.6%	46.7%	66.9%	26.7%	49.9%
41-50	14.2%	10.0%	1.7%	8.6%	2.6%	9.4%	14.7%	4.0%	10.1%
51-60	3.5%	1.0%	1.7%	2.0%		2.3%	3.3%		2.2%
More than 60	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%	0.4%		0.2%	0.8%		0.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The majority of respondents 444 (49.7 percent) fell into the age range of 31 – 40 followed by 21 - 30 age category numbering 333 (37.3 percent). Ex-combatants from

RDF and Ex-AG are young (21-30) and comprises 88 and 69 percent respectively while that of ex-FAR is only 14 percent four out of five (86 percent). Since the majority is in the working age range, it is relatively easy to re-train them in different skills. Their young age put them in an advantageous position in relation to other war torn societies. It will make a significant difference if they are re-trained in different life skills. Such intervention will expedite their reintegrate process into the receiving community.

In the past, Rwanda has had higher rates of primary enrolment than many African countries, but much lower rates of secondary and tertiary enrolment. However, the data on literacy reveal substantial deficiencies even at the basic levels of education. The Poverty Reduction Strategy estimates the rate of literacy at 47.8 percent for women and 58.1 percent for men.¹⁹ Education at secondary and higher levels is extremely low. 33 percent of the population of 15 years and above has no education, and 60 percent have only primary education. 7.1 percent have post-primary or secondary education, and only 0.4 percent has some tertiary education.

TABLE 6: EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY EDUCATION AND SKILL

Employment status at present		Education + Skills						
		No educ + Voc Skill	No educ + no Voc Skill	Primary Edu + Voc Skill	Primary Edu + No Voc Skill	Secondary Edu + Voc Skill	Secondary Edu + No Voc Skill	Other
Yes	RDF	3	1	0	1	4	4	0
		5.8	.8	.0	.3	4.7	2.5	.0
	RPA	8	4	18	18	16	16	7
		15.4	3.3	16.8	5.9	18.6	9.9	12.1
	FAR	0	0	6	4	2	10	4
		.0	.0	5.6	1.3	2.3	6.2	6.9
	AG	2	1	2	1	2	2	0
		3.8	.8	1.9	.3	2.3	1.2	.0
No	RDF	2	6	2	8	1	4	2
		3.8	5.0	1.9	2.6	1.2	2.5	3.4
	RPA	30	82	50	165	44	63	10
		57.7	67.8	46.7	54.5	51.2	39.1	17.2
	FAR	4	9	23	80	14	55	33
		7.7	7.4	21.5	26.4	16.3	34.2	56.9
	AG	3	18	6	26	3	7	2
		5.8	14.9	5.6	8.6	3.5	4.3	3.4

Education and vocational training can do a lot to boost self-confidence and respectability to redirect the individuals' energy to useful activities and to build hope for the future. The field findings showed also the ones with low education background

¹⁹ 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty reduction Strategy Paper'

when they got life skill training got employment. Furthermore, training can be therapeutic and help to reduce trauma caused by the loss of family members and friends. Ex-combatants begin to recover from their experiences, and find a new identity during the training process and build meaningful and productive life.

Besides, ex-combatants show commitment discipline and motivation which is a positive attitudinal trend which is earning them status among their community. Even though ex-combatants do not have formal professional skills, they are well educated compared to the average person in Rwanda and more qualified when it comes to community-orientation and social behavior. Former combatants are slowly entering the hierarchal administration apparatus in their area of settlement. For example, in Rural Kigali the former combatants are actively working in the following structures:

- Provincial level 4 out of 48
- District level 22 out of 50
- Sector level 300 out of 1390
- *Akagari (Cellule)* level 3678 out of 12260

Eighty five percent of the combatants got their education before joining the war. But currently the majority (80%) is not continuing his/her studies after they got demobilized. The small numbers (only 6%) who are continuing their studies are pursuing formal education. Nearly two-third of the ex-combatants claimed that they have no skills. The one who got skill training after their demobilization were 28.6 percent. If broken down into categories show, crop (farming/cultivation) animal husbandry is 31.1 percent followed by driving/mechanic 20.2 percent; trade 8 percent, carpentry/craftsmanship 15.6 percent, trade 8 percent and construction 7.8 percent.

TABLE 7: EX-COMBATANTS' SKILL AND ITS CATEGORIZATION

Do you have skill?					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	41.8%	36.5%	32.6%	36.9%	45.9%	36.4%	41.4%	36.5%	38.2%
No	58.3%	63.5%	67.4%	63.1%	54.1%	63.6%	58.6%	63.5%	61.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Generally post conflict economy is seriously constrained by the lack of skilled manpower. Demobilized combatants are encountering significant difficulty in entering a shattered economy that has little absorptive capacity, particularly in the Rwanda's medium- and large-scale formal sector.

The reconstruction of any country and the regeneration (and growth) of the economy usually require a training system that complements development imperatives which

are market responsive and stimulates increased production, particularly at micro level. Usually lack of human resource and institutional capacity is a major bottleneck in all sectors of Rwanda that wish to expand delivery of the services and program support for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

The first break through to the current constrain could be to initially target capacity-building measures for former combatants geared toward life skills. But these measures should not substitute the longer-term human resource development and capacity-building programs that are envisaged to be undertaken by Rwandan government with the support of various donors. The main aim of designing such interventions is to unblock specific implementation bottlenecks in the proposed programs, while complementing long-term on-going development programs.

Rwanda currently is importing skilled human resources from the region and is suffering from scarce skilled human capacity and there is an urgent need to invest in skill training. At present many technicians, such as mechanics, are imported from neighboring countries. Therefore there is a chance for Rwandese people to increase their incomes by learning these trades. In the long run since nine out of ten ex-combatants are in retrain-able age and could be skilled, Rwanda should become a net exporter of skills within the region rather than a net importer and there is a good opportunity for the country to be a service rendering nation with its given security and stability in the region.

2.3 Marital Status and Children

Seven out of ten combatants were married followed by those who are single (26.8%) and widowers 1.6 percent. Compared to other countries experience the divorce rate in Rwanda is nearly zero. According the anecdotes collected from key informants, majority of Rwandese profess Catholicism and may be this has an influence in the divorce rate. It is recently noted that the tendency for men is to move out and move in with another woman, also legal advantageous for divorcee. This is a recent trend done not to share property with former partner and is a reason to not openly asking for divorce. Nearly two third of the sample were married once. The majority 99 percent of the fighting force were male and only one percent were women.

Rwanda has no tradition of conscripting women into the armed forces. Nonetheless, a few hundred women voluntarily entered the resistance and were demobilized in the process of trimming the fighting force. They are less than 1 percent of all combatants [only 338]. Despite their small number they had played a significant role during the armed liberation era. There is a favorable atmosphere to promote gender in current Rwanda because in current Rwandan politics, it can be seen there is government's commitment to gender mainstreaming at least rhetorically.

This positive trend must be captured to exploit the momentum to benefit women in general and former combatants in particular. As eloquently put by the chairman of the demobilization and reintegration program, Jean Sayinzoga “stressed the necessity of paying particular attention to women” and further elaborated that the Commission through its “Vulnerability Support Window” (VSW) assisted 73 out of the 111 (66%) female ex combatants Stage I as a policy of positive discrimination and assigned social reintegration officer to closely follow the issue.

But other countries experience show that the participation of women recruited during the war, especially in guerrilla movements, is often unofficial or unacknowledged. Actors usually limit the number of women given ex-combatant status, arguing that their role during the struggle does not entitle them to that of combatant rank; and female ex-combatants often have to rely on men to confirm their grade or status. Abducted girls by fighting parties are often used to provide logistical support or logistical sexual service. The very sexual nature of many girls’ experience of war makes its very expression a taboo. Most girls’ who had undergone such ordeal prefer to return as civilians and do not want to identify with the fighting forces.

The small number of women known to have been demobilized in Rwanda is unlikely to be an accurate reflection of the real numbers of women associated with armed groups. As elaborated in the study done by the save the children UK, nine women returned to Rwanda (*Gisenyi*) via UNHCR as civilian. There is a need to follow this trend so as not to live behind female ex-combatants not accessing their benefit. But this tracing must be sensitive so that not stigmatize female ex-combatants and will be detrimental to their reintegration back into the society.

The MDRP Secretariat holds that women in Rwanda are “being underreported by combatant groups at the front end of the process, and that more needs to be done to encourage women combatants to present themselves, and to properly identify and incorporate women into national DDR processes.”

In addition to prioritizing women in the disbursement of the VSW, the RDRC describes several other steps it is taking to support them, including:

1. Ensuring women’s needs are met in demobilization centers;
2. Ensuring benefits for ex-combatants are equal, and equally accessible;
3. Encouraging implementation partners to facilitate women’s participation in reintegration activities;
4. Strengthening the gender-awareness and capacity of staff;
5. Including women in community-level counseling activities; and
6. Monitoring the impact of the demobilization program on women.

It is worth revisiting the screening modalities put in place by the Commission to make sure that all females who had participated in the war as fighting force or accompanying individuals are not left behind from getting reintegration benefits. Verification units composed of gender sensitive men and women will provide clarification about debatable cases in the future. Local communities if involved in screening could also help in reaching reasonable decisions.

Fertility Rate

In Rwanda fertility rates were falling before the genocide, partly because of public action in support of family planning, and partly because the shortage of land delayed the early age of marriage. The average rate of fecundity is 5.8 for women between 15 and 49; this has fallen slightly since the early 1990s, though it has not fallen for women between 20 and 24 years.²⁰

Currently the median child birth for ex-combatants is three and when broken down 20 percent accounts for two; 16 percent for one; 15 percent for three and 9 percent for 4. Taking the young age of ex-combatants it seems necessary to sensitize them on family planning. Poverty is often considered to be a key factor in causing strong demographic growth and high fertility rate.

There are two types of explanation concerning fertility, one based on cultural and the other on economic factor. The cultural factor which view high fertility as a result of ignorance or submission to the rules and customs, mainly to religion. The economic approach puts the factor of reproduction behaviors to be governed by conscious, calculated interests of those involved. The basic idea is simple: children generate greater benefits for the parents (or parent) than the cost of raising them in the long term.

Pattern of Settlement

In Kigali City the number of ex-combatants selected for the study was 380 (19%). Interviewers were not able to locate all selected and only interview 49 percent. In urban areas ex-combatants are actively working hard to eke-out a living, thus are not keen to avail time for an interview that tax a lot of their valuable time. The other reason collected from hearsay is that initially former combatants' flocked to urban areas thinking they can make a decent living there but after some time they realize [the hardest way] that towns are not a place to start a living at least initially. After a while they start going back to their roots – rural – where most of them have extended families or support networks, or for those who lack such networks, given their rural background, they find it the better alternative than continuing the urban hectic life.

²⁰ 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty reduction Strategy Paper'

TABLE 8: SAMPLE SIZE BY PROVINCE

Province	Sample Size	Interviewed	Deceased	Moved	Total Located	Total not Located
Kigali City	380 (19%)	152	17	16	185 (48.68%)	195 (51.32%)
Gisenyi	248 (12%)	113	7	28	148 (59.68%)	100 (40.32%)
Kigali Ngali	212 (11%)	91	8	15	114 (53.77%)	98 (46.23%)
Butare	211 (11%)	114	7	10	131 (62.09%)	80 (37.91%)
Ruhengeri	192 (10%)	103	3	11	117 (60.94%)	75 (39.06%)
Kibungo	163 (8%)	73	6	7	86 (52.76%)	77 (47.24%)
Gitarama	152 (8%)	63	7	7	77 (50.66%)	75 (49.34%)
Byumba	123 (6%)	82	13	25	120 (97.56%)	3 (2.43%)
Cyangugu	97 (5%)	48	4	8	60 (61.86%)	37 (38.14%)
Umutara	87 (4%)	32	12	20	64 (73.56%)	23 (26.44%)
Kibuye	74 (4%)	38	6	8	52 (70.27%)	22 (29.73%)
Gikongoro	61 (3%)	32	6	10	48 (78.69%)	13 (21.31%)
Total	2000 (5%)	941	96	165	1202 (60.10%)	798 (39.90%)

Key informants residing in Kigali City and who want to remain anonymous elaborated that some ex-combatants are going under different names, which makes it very hard to trace ex-combatants. As shown in table 8 more than 14 percent of the interviewed moved inside or outside of the country and it presumed bigger number had moved in search of job when they failed to make a living especially in urban areas. The number of deceased is significant and is more than 8 percent.

The ranking of poverty in the PRSP of provinces confirms that *Gikongoro*, *Kigali-Ngali*, *Butare* and *Ruhengeri* are relatively poorer compared to others. But all the provinces of Rwanda share certain features. All areas have seen reductions in household incomes. Rural areas, with the exception of parts of *Umutara*, have experienced loss of livestock and declining soil fertility. All areas are still affected by the consequences of the genocide, with the portion of widow-headed households varying from 13% in *Gikongoro* to 28% in *Butare*.²¹

However, there are important differences between provinces. Such like *Ruhengeri* and *Gisenyi*, are of high agricultural potential but were badly affected by insecurity till 1999 and many people are without housing. Some, like *Kibungo* and *Umutara*, had very large inflows of population and therefore have a deficit of infrastructure, and are facing environmental pressure. Finally, other provinces, such as *Kigali-Ngali*, *Butare* and *Gikongoro* are suffering from chronically low incomes arising from density of population, relative aridity and soil acidity.²²

According to the study's findings, ninety eight percent of the ex-combatants who initially went to *Byumba* province are still residing there. The main reason for not

21 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty reduction Strategy Paper'

22 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty reduction Strategy Paper'

moving from the province is due to the economic opportunities the province offers. *Byumba* is bordering Uganda and a sizeable number of ex-combatants are actively engaged in cross border petty-trades. There are also job opportunities in tea plantation or small-scale factories functioning in the province. But economic opportunity is usually not coming cheap and 16 percent of the ex-combatants who were residing in the province died. Even though there is no solid evidence to the cause of their death it is presumed to be HIV/AIDs and taking the location of the province bordering Uganda it seems valid inference.

Gisenyi province is also bordering with Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Nearly one fourth of those who initially resided in the province moved to DRC in search of job. From anecdotes collected by the interviewers and ascertained by the PPO *Gisenyi*, ex-combatants do cross-border activities through out the day, so it was very hard to get an opportunity for an interview. More than fifty individuals who were located initially were not interviewed; firstly the time available for fieldwork was limited and secondly the ex-combatants were not keen to avail them selves at the expense of earning their livelihood.

The province of *Gitarama* and *Kigali Ngali* are located near the capital city *Kigali*. A number of ex-combatants commute on a daily base to the city to earn their living. It was clear from the discussion with the PPOs of the province that ex-combatants hardly come to the provincial offices and are hard to track them down. Nearly three-fourths of those who initially resided in *Umutara* continue living there. The main reason is they relatively can get land easily compared to other provinces. Newcomers currently occupy the *Akagera* National Park bordering Tanzania and ex-combatants are benefiting from this opportunity. Besides, the area is good for cattle rearing and since the majority background of ex-combatants is rural they might have gone there to eke out a living in animal husbandry.

As the household survey 2000-2001 indicates poverty is more pronounced in *Gikongoro* (77.2%), *Butare* (73.6%), *Kibuye* (72.5%), *Kigali Ngali* (70.9%) and *Ruhengeri* (70.3%); to a lesser degree it affects *Byumba* (65.3%), *Cyangugu* (64.3%), *Gitarama* (53.7%), *Gisenyi* (53.5%), *Kibungo* (50.8%) and *Umutara* (50.5%). In *Kigali*, the poverty affects 12.3% of its residents. Usually when inhabitants of any community realize that they cannot sustain themselves the able bodies migrate to support their families and this is what is happening in *Gikongoro*.

2.4 Experiences

When the process of demobilization and ultimately reintegration starts, there is usually a dilemma that emerges with adapting to a new way of life and nearly two third of the combatants stayed more than five years. If broken into categories the trends emerge as follows results, ex-RDF 47%, ex-RPA 65%, ex-FAR and ex-AG 32.4 %.

TABLE 9: EX-COMBATANTS ARMY SERVICE

For how many years did you stay in the army?				Ex-combatants categories					
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Five or less	45.8%	37.9%	36.7%	40.1%	52.6%	35.3%	44.1%	67.6%	41.2%
Plus 5 years	54.3%	62.1%	63.3%	59.9%	47.4%	64.7%	55.9%	32.4%	58.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Expectations of a decent life, especially among veteran ex-combatants are very high because most of their adult life was spent in combat life. Thus, longevity and legacy of war have profound political, economical and social implications but after spending more than five years in the bush it is not easy to get adjusted and start livelihood afresh.

Usually knowledge and skills acquired through life and work experiences, which are not formally attested through any educational or professional certification or are not recognized. The knowledge and skills acquired includes instruction-based learning, provided by any institution [such as the army], which has not been examined through any public examination systems. It can also include those undervalued elements of formally provided education, which are not encompassed in current examinations of the study. It is wise to re-visit the experience of ex-combatants, which were accumulated by learning and performing, and can have a positive impact, if properly harnessed.

Among the selected sample, 36 percent are private; L/CPL 27 percent; CPL 17 percent; SM and S/SGT 4 percent; From LT down to WO11 comprises 3 percent and officers are one percent. Only 29 percent have any non-combat occupation in the army.

The break down of the job is as follows:

Security	=	39
Logistic	=	36
Health	=	30
Public administration	=	29
Teacher	=	23
Driver	=	17

Social affaire	=	13
Communication	=	10
Others	=	58

In current Rwanda, the public sector is over staffed and the private sector is still very weak to absorb the new job entrants thus the informal and self-employment is expected to play a pivotal role in generating employment for the population in general and ex-combatants in particular. If they are to tap the potential of informal sector growth, the ex-combatants require a comprehensive package of assistance that will help overcome a number of shortcomings resulting from their years in the field experience. When the author visited some market places he saw the municipality authority chasing away the street vendors. It must be understood that the informal sector is the motor of the economy and should be properly harnessed and promoted so as to have a positive impact. Simply chasing away the informal sector will not solve the problem.

CHAPTER THREE: DEMOBILIZATION AND ITS EFFECT

3. INTRODUCTION

The Government of Rwanda through its arm Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) implemented the First Stage of demobilization 1997-2001. Under Stage One a total of 18,692 RPA soldiers (of whom 2,364 were child soldiers) were demobilized in four phases between September 1997 and February 2001. This First Stage was co-financed by the government, various donors through a UNDP-administered trust fund, and UN agencies. The government did not request financial assistance from International Development Agency (IDA) for this stage.

The RDRP Stage II (2001-2005) targeted to demobilize 20,000 soldiers from the national army (RDF) and about 25,000 members of armed groups (AG) including 2,500 child soldiers over a period of three years from neighboring countries particularly from Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC). The demobilization of the ex-RDF and the reinsertion of the ex-FAR were on course with figures standing at 15,203 (76%) and 12,258 (82%), respectively by the end of June 2004. The demobilization of members of ex-armed groups, however, stood at a dismal 4,446 (20%) for adults and 554 (22%) for children. While the objective of demobilizing ex-RDF combatants appears to be achievable as scheduled, the same cannot be said about armed groups and child soldiers, unless the current repatriation trend radically changes.²³ But the focus of the study is to assess how demobilized combatants since 1997 are fairing in relation to the communities of return.

The demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants represent a great challenge for Rwanda. Since it constitutes an integral part of the overall transformation from a war-torn to a reconstructed country, this process is shaped by both the opportunities and constraints that exist in present-day Rwanda. It presents chances for ex-combatants to succeed, but at the same time it is a burden to a government who is coping up with genocide survivors and has meager resource at its disposal to cope up with different demands.

After years of active duty as regular soldiers, freedom fighters, guerrillas or rebels, ex-combatant go through an orientation phase in the Discharge Centers (DC) that guide them to start new life as civilian and unarmed members of a society. Demobilization is the process by which the ties binding combatants are severed from a formal or informal military structure. Furthermore, demobilization is also the first step towards reintegrating ex-combatants back into civilian society or recruiting combatant into a new legitimate military force.

²³ 2004 RDRC, 'Second Quarterly Report of Rwanda Demobilization and reintegration Program

The presence of a large number of ex-combatants creates a serious threat to peace-making and reconciliation efforts. In war-torn societies addressing demobilization and reintegration processes of combatants properly is an important pre-condition for lasting peace and stability. The longevity of conflicts influences demobilization and integration efforts in a variety of ways. Demobilization programs, if implemented properly play an important role in reviving the economy and providing positive impetus on the social development of a country. So success of demobilization determines the chances of permanent peace and sustainable development of any post-conflict country.

Having served in the military for many years, ex-combatants are socialized mainly to military principles and hierarchical structures and have often lost self-initiative. Military training makes combatants follow orders without asking too many questions. It is very important to address frequently this dis-orientation so that former combatants could be rehabilitated and could reinforce reintegrating into civilian life. It must also be remembered that once peace accord is reached there is often an outburst of high expectations generally by the whole population, and combatants in particular, that peace will automatically lead to recovery. These often-unrealistic expectations if not dealt wisely might lead to the risk of bitter disappointments and the danger of regression to conflict.

Demobilization is a complex process in which basically each ex-combatant has to find a new civilian life, and re-establish his/her root in society. Upon demobilization, the ex-combatants lose their only source of formal or informal income. Different experiences have also indicated that in their pre-reintegration stage demobilized combatants are usually in a vulnerable situation until they boldly face reality, start fending for themselves and start generating income. During this period (the "reinsertion" phase), ex-combatants require TSN to cover their families' basic material needs.

The objective of this transitional assistance is to enable ex-combatants to return to their community and to sustain themselves and their families for a limited period immediately following demobilization. Initial assistance may consist of allowance given as cash; voucher; or in-kind transfers for shelter, medical care, food and clothing over a period ranging from several months to two years.²⁴

Three out of five ex-combatants were expecting demobilization and when demobilized they readily accepted it. But after getting demobilized 55 percent said that their expectation did not match reality. During the long years of army life combatants had built up strong expectations of 'decent life'. They believed that all problems would be solved once the decadent regime in Rwanda is changed. But once the country ousted

²⁴ World Bank publication 1999, 'The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview'.

the incompetent government the majority of ex-combatants are still facing problems in gaining livelihood, and their expectation of a reasonably decent livelihood is vanishing in front of their eyes. As one key informant put it:

*“Life in the bush was normal but after the country made peace with itself ex-combatants are living in an economic jungle in which they have little understanding”.*²⁵

TABLE 10: EXPECTATION AND REALITY AFTER GETTING DEMOBILIZED

After demobilization did your expectation match reality?					Ex-combatant's Categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	39.7%	44.5%	50.6%	44.9%	47.4%	43.6%	42.7%	41.3%	43.4%
No	60.3%	55.5%	49.4%	55.1%	52.6%	56.4%	57.3%	58.7%	56.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

3.1 Living condition

After getting rid of the incompetent government substantial improvements have taken place in different economic and service sectors but the speed of development is not fast enough to meet the expectations created during the combat era. Another fact that must be taken on board is that returning ex-combatant often feels guilty for not having been able to meet the high expectations of their family or relatives who had missed their support for so long time. According to Rwandan custom the expectations of his/her family were that s/he should be taken care, especially in their old age.

TABLE 11: EX-COMBATANTS' HOUSING SITUATION BEFORE AND AFTER COMBAT

How do you rate your housing situation to the one you had before joining combat?					Ex-combatant's Categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
The same	11.3%	12.8%	16.2%	13.4%	13.9%	11.1%	13.8%	21.6%	12.8%
Now, it is better	25.9%	37.8%	33.5%	32.4%	44.4%	25.5%	40.8%	36.5%	31.5%
It was better before	57.2%	46.4%	46.2%	49.9%	30.6%	60.1%	40.0%	36.5%	51.3%
Other	5.6%	3.0%	4.0%	4.2%	11.1%	3.3%	5.4%	5.4%	4.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

To further understand their social environment ex-combatants were asked to compare their current housing situation to that before they joined combat; nearly half responded, “It was better before” (table 11). This shows that ex-combatants are still

²⁵ Personal communication with the author August 2004, Kigali City.

well behind their standard of living before combat. If broken down is, ex-RDF = 57 percent ex-RPA = 58, ex-FAR = 50 percent and ex-AG = 49 percent.

3.2 Life in the Bush and After

Many of the psychosocial problems seen after the ebbing of civil conflict/war is a consequence of living with war, violence, trauma, human rights violations and poor living conditions over a protracted period of time. In the field the combatants more or less had created a common goal that shaped a common psychic. In the Rwandan society money and possessions currently is creating differences among ex-combatants who during the combat-era were sharing all military up and down and other needs together which demands relying on one another to organize their livelihood and which results in developing a common goal. But in their new situation [after demobilization] ex-combatants are drifting apart, because some of them are qualified and find work more easily than their colleagues. Now it is rather difficult to develop common ideas and to plan for the future together. At present, when self-initiative activities are mainly demanded for reintegration it is obvious some to feel lost in the process of reintegration process.

When asked why they joined the combat 16 percent responded to avoid persecution. But 16 percent of the ex-AG joined combat to earn a living. Forty one percent of ex-FAR joined the army as a professional soldier (table 12). Ex-combatants were also asked to elaborate more on their negative responses on their living condition but since it was an open ended it needs initially reinterpretation and recoding and will be presented when it is available. Nearly Eight out of ten members of ex-AG said, "Life in the bush was bad".

TABLE 12: WHY EX-COMBATANTS JOIN THE ARMY

Why did you join the military? *					Ex-combatant's Categories				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Caught in the middle of the war	4.8%	4.2%	6.6%	5.2%	7.9%	3.2%	4.1%	18.7%	5.0%
Following friend or relative who had joined	3.8%	4.5%	3.3%	3.9%	10.5%	3.0%	4.1%	6.7%	3.9%
To avoid persecution	18.5%	13.9%	15.5%	15.9%	18.4%	23.7%	4.5%	1.3%	16.3%
For a living	5.5%	4.5%	5.0%	5.0%	5.3%	1.1%	10.7%	16.0%	5.2%
Political persecution	11.3%	11.9%	14.4%	12.5%	5.3%	17.1%	4.1%	5.3%	12.0%
Cross-Border incursions	3.5%	1.6%	3.3%	2.8%	10.5%	2.8%	1.6%	2.7%	2.8%
For military profession	16.0%	21.0%	13.8%	16.9%	5.3%	7.5%	40.6%	16.0%	17.2%
Displaced from one's place	11.0%	11.3%	8.3%	10.2%	2.6%	13.0%	4.5%	16.0%	10.5%
Other reason	25.8%	27.1%	29.8%	27.6%	34.2%	28.4%	25.8%	17.3%	27.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

3.3 Housing

In order to understand what kind of environment ex-combatants reside in, they were asked to describe their home and its environ. The descriptions of the environment were also supplemented by many of the community focus groups interviews. Table 9 shows what type of house ex-combatants are live in. Nearly four out of five live in mud house followed by permanent housing 14 percent (table 13). In the key informant conducted with the author housing problem (shelter) was pin-pointed out as a crucial issue. For if some body doesn't have an address he is considered nobody and not a part of a community. **Shelter is a status symbol to ex-combatants; hence it is not surprising that a lot of ex-combatants who got vulnerable support spent the grant they got to build house and bought them social status in the process.**

Successful reintegration into civilian society is a long-term process, which requires different forms of support. Key problems that are commonly encountered by the demobilized combatants are securing a sustainable livelihood, finding adequate housing, reintegrating socially and coping with physical disabilities. These problems are distinct in their urgency and apply to different groups. But securing a livelihood and finding housing are highly pressing problems encountered by the vast majority of the ex-combatants and the population in general.

TABLE 13: TYPE OF HOUSE YOU ARE LIVING IN BY EX-COMBATANTS TABULATION

House type	Which armed group or Front did you join?				Total
	RDF	RPA	FAR	Armed group	
Mud house	75.7	80.0	78.5	64.9	78.1
Permanent	10.8	14.5	11.6	16.2	13.7
Sheeting	5.4	2.1	2.9	5.4	2.7
Other	5.4	2.3	7.0	13.5	4.7
Homeless	2.7	1.1			0.8
	100	100	100	100	100

According to table 14 ex-combatants are slowly catching up in having a house of their own and once associated with a permanent residence it is presumed that their reintegration will slowly follow. Nearly half of the ex-combatants own their own home. If broken down in terms of the ex-combatant's categories: ex-RDF 47 percent, ex-RPA45 percent, ex-FAR 65 percent and ex-AG is only slightly lower 37 percent.

When ex-combatants were asked to rate their housing situation with that of their neighbors slightly more than half said worse, but should be seen as a subjective response. There is no hard evidence that show ex-combatants are worse off.

TABLE 14: HOUSE OWNERSHIP OF EX-COMBATANTS BY THEIR CATEGORIZATION

Who owns the house you are currently living in? *					Ex-combatants categorization				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
My parents	10.3%	12.3%	23.5%	15.4%	16.2%	11.5%	11.6%	35.1%	13.7%
Landlord	23.9%	22.3%	22.3%	22.9%	29.7%	28.5%	13.6%	13.5%	23.2%
My friend	5.0%	4.2%	1.7%	3.6%		4.5%	3.7%	4.1%	4.1%
It is owned by my relatives	5.8%	5.8%	5.6%	5.7%		5.9%	5.4%	9.5%	5.8%
Government owned	2.0%	1.0%	1.1%	1.4%	2.7%	2.1%	0.4%		1.5%
I own it	51.1%	52.4%	43.6%	49.0%	48.6%	44.6%	65.3%	36.5%	49.8%
Other	1.8%	1.9%	2.2%	2.0%	2.7%	2.8%		1.4%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

3.4 Land Acquisition

The most important valuable asset for a poor/rich rural household is land. The size and fertility of land holdings was one of the most important factors determining the categories of poverty into which households were classified in. Although land is bought and sold in Rwanda, there has been persistent doubt about its legal status, partly because legislation has sometimes imposed unrealistic minimum limits on land size. Population density is today well above 350 people per square km.²⁶

In rural Rwanda, arable land is allocated on the basis of membership of a particular community. Membership is based either on common descent or residence. Access to arable land in terms of ownership or usufruct and is regarded as an inalienable right of every recognized member of the communities concerned. Nevertheless former combatants who returned to their villages found it difficult to obtain land and as a consequence agricultural opportunities were not utilized thus ex-combatants are congregated in urban areas. Many ex-combatants remained in towns because they have no access to land, posing both demographic and structural generated service providing problems.

First, farm holdings have become smaller due to limited land availability and increasingly fragmented. Second, cultivation is currently pushed into the bottom of valleys and fragile, marginal lands on steep slopes previously used for pasture and/or wood lots. Third, mainly households now rent land, particularly households owning little land or those with large families; and finally, fallow periods have become shorter and cultivation periods have grown longer, leading to a decline in soil fertility and erosion.²⁷

TABLE 15: CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Did you change your home address after demobilization?					Ex-combatants categorization				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	19.8%	14.5%	17.8%	17.4%	23.7%	20.9%	11.1%	13.5%	17.7%
No	80.2%	85.5%	82.2%	82.6%	76.3%	79.1%	88.9%	86.5%	82.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Ex-combatants were asked to rate the problems they are facing after they got demobilized. They rated shelter as number one hindering problem to their reintegration endeavor. This shows that they are realistic in putting their problems into perspective. When the author was discussing with key informant he was

²⁶ 1999, Baechler, G 'Violence through environmental discrimination' Academic Kluwer

²⁷ 1996, Clay, Kampayana and Kayitsinga 'Inequality and emergence of non-farm employment in Rwanda

informed an ex-combatant with out an address [that is without a shelter] is no body. He cannot get married and as an outcome has no family and status in his/her community.

Most of the ex-combatants who were taking training course with GTZ program when asked by the author to narrate the most problematic issue they are facing since their demobilization;²⁸ the majority responded; “It is shelter” and this go in line with the finding of the field work. In the focus group discussion the issue of shelter is emphasized and was put in nutshell as follows:

“Some of these [ex-combatants] were fighting to free the country, the others were fighting to keep the country in bondage... it is therefore painful to see those who were freeing the country from bondage, living badly off with no shelter, no address! Scavenging for scrap metal or working as porters while the others are relatively ok.”

Whereas expression of such sentiments was far and between, it would be prudent to track perceptions, especially negative perceptions engendered by disparities in economic status even within the ex-combatants themselves and not only between ex-combatants and the communities, in the framework of national unity and reconciliation.

²⁸ Personal communication with the author in Gisenyi, October 19 2004

CHAPTER FOUR: SUPPORT MECHANISMS

4. INTRODUCTION

Violence and war leave behind much more damage than is met by our naked eye. The visible consequences – the dead and the wounded combatants; raped and bereaved refugees and the displaced – and the material damage to infrastructure are social catastrophes that should be addressed immediately. But the deep damage to victim's attitude are equally important [to set them right], because they leave scars on the human mind in the form of trauma, guilt and hatred which usually triggers thirst for revenge if not properly tackled/addressed. When the social capital is eroded and ethnic or regional tensions prevail then reintegration is far more complex and difficult to achieve.

There are at least two main reasons why the reintegration of former ex-combatants is an important task for the foreseeable future in Rwanda. First, ex-combatants have several special needs. Because they have a specific background (loss of social ties, little experience in organizing a livelihood etc), particular attention is needed for demobilized combatants. Second, Rwanda's political stability and development process depend to a large extent on the successful reintegration of former combatants. They can pose danger to peace and stability if they are unable to obtain a decent livelihood and if post-war reality does not meet their expectations. In this case former combatants could turn to banditry and jeopardize the country's peace and stability.

So far the RDRC has designed different forms of support mechanism for former combatants. Initially, there has been a 'safety net' cash payment for demobilized RPA soldiers. All combatants demobilized in Stage II of the RDRP received a Basic Needs Kit (BNK). RPA combatants demobilized in Stage II additionally receive Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA). The RSA was also extended to ex-FAR combatants. The RDRC had distributed all package benefit to all stage one combatants. If there is a need of extra support for the stage one group falls in line with the government's poverty reduction strategy thus government programs are currently increasingly comprehensive and well planned. Simple handouts of cash are slowly being replaced with a variety of different cash and non-cash activities. The support approach for exit-strategy for the Commission need to be more flexible that take into account not the situation of the combatants' dependants only but also should polestar the local community needs also.

4.1 Training

Generally a post-conflict economy is seriously constrained by the lack of skilled manpower. Demobilized combatants are encountering significant difficulty entering a shattered economy that has little absorptive capacity, particularly in medium- and large-scale formal sector. The reconstruction of the country and the regeneration (and growth) of the economy usually requires a training system that complements development imperatives which are market responsive and stimulates increased production particularly at micro levels.

Since school-based technical training lasts for two to three years, it is too long for the majority of the ex-combatants. Because of their age and their need for rapid results to, short-term life skill training courses outside the school system are necessary. Even an increased demand for labor in the formal sector will be insufficient to absorb the rapidly growing number of unemployed persons. Thus, opportunities for income generation will be mainly in agriculture, rural non-farm activities and self-employment in micro enterprises or small businesses.

TABLE 16: SKILL TRAINING AFTER DEMOBILIZATION CATEGORIZED BY THEIR GROUP

Did you get skill training after demobilization? *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=889
Yes	32.7%	26.9%	24.6%	28.1%	31.6%	32.3%	22.7%	25.3%	29.0%
No	67.3%	73.1%	75.4%	71.9%	68.4%	67.7%	77.3%	74.7%	71.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptote. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	30.3	8.0	0.0
Likelihood Ratio	28.9	8.0	0.0
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.9	1	0.0
N of Valid Cases	877		

a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .59.

Vocational training has to prepare ex-combatants for these fields. Improving the human capacity of Rwanda through skill development is the basis for the reconstruction of the economy in the medium and long terms.

As elaborated in Table 16 the vast majority of ex-combatants are in need of vocational training to develop skills, which will help them to earn a decent living. Training villagers in basic social work could assist in creating self-help groups. Besides construction, training based on self-help groups can be provided to enhance the social capital of the community. In order to have an impact the assistance should be

combined with innovative income generating activities for the community. More flexible training courses should be offered which are appropriate to prepare the trainees for self-employment.

TABLE 17: EX-COMBATANTS SKILL TRAINING GTZ/DEM PROJECT

Province	Ex-combatants	Course	Status
Gisenyi			
PAGI	50	CEFE	Got certificate
GPAGI	25	Association	Got certificate
PAGI	25	CEFE	Completed got no certificate
PAGI	25	CEFE	Under training
CEPRA	25	Construction	Under training
TOTAL	150		
BUTARE			
FAAB	50	CEFE	Got certificate
FAAB	25	Association S	Got certificate
FAAB	25	CEFE	Completed got no certificate
FAAB	25	CEFE	Under training
CFJ-NYANZA	25	Construction	Under training
TOTAL	150		
KIBUNGO			
RWAMAGANA	50	CEFE	Completed got no certificate
KAYONZA	25	Technical training	Under training
ETO-KIBUNGO	65	Technical training	Under training
TOTAL	140		

SOURCE: GTZ/DEM. PROJECT AS OF 21/10/2004

Technical training should be combined with basic training in business-related skills (e.g. bookkeeping, management). Additional training in the evening or during weekends could be organized for those who have started micro and small enterprises. In its initial stage the training designed by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) is commendable and is making a difference in the livelihood of the ex-combatants.

In each province there is a vocational training center and it is worth exploring to see how it can be used to develop the skills of ex-combatants. Short-term training-of-trainers could be integration to the vocational training projects. Especially in the rural areas, where the lack of trainers is in its highest, the number of participants can be increased by training additional trainers for subsequent training thus to avoid the pull effect of urban training centers. But in order to complement the Poverty Reduction Strategy employment opportunities and the potential for self-employment should be studied.

Studies ought to include sectoral, regional and areas-specific employment patterns, current unemployment and underemployment, wages and incomes. Micro-level analysis could be carried out with the support of provincial staffs of line ministries to identify the potential of different income-generating activities and the related needs for skills and training. Every province offers different social and economic opportunities and if properly utilized can be a resource that can be tapped to help reintegrate former combatants back into the mainstream of the society.

In addition to the above-mentioned points a systematic follow-up is advisable to obtain information about the whereabouts of the ex-combatants who have already been trained and to assess the impact of training made available by RDRC.

4.2 *Counseling*

Counseling and guidance aim at providing services for ex-combatants to find jobs and to ease their fear about uncertainty a future offers. Providing a general orientation after demobilization is a must in order to cope-up with reality. The enormous stress experienced among ex-combatants after the demobilization can at least be put as follows. Initially many face unemployment and an unsure economic future. This may be exacerbated by hardships associated with social reintegration into civilian life. The estrangement of families and different life styles and values might create a heavy psychological burden in their process of reintegration back into the society.

Demobilized combatants thus face a number of problems: in general, they need to have access to psychosocial support to help adjust the difficult transition process to civilian life, which is not easy to accomplish. On top of this many ex-combatants also have to deal with physical disabilities. In addition, the well being of ex-combatants is affected by the loss of friends or family members during the war and/or of being genocide survivors. Most combatants experienced constant danger during the war and many suffered physical injury or mental disability. Besides, scattered social ties and the lack of an economic base also intensify the trauma and resulting depression. When ex-combatants feel lack of self-confidence and/or support, they could decline into a process of feeling isolated.

Prior to their discharge, ex-combatants receive information about civilian life, rights and duties, opportunities and constraints by resource persons organized by the Commission. The purpose of the orientation is to provide initial essential information to help ex-combatants re-adjust to civilian life. During the discharge orientation care is taken not to create unrealistic expectations of what the government, RDRP, and other partners can provide in terms of services/assistance. But unfortunately once ex-combatants were demobilized there was hardly any psychosocial support given or referral services developed.

Psychosocial support which is an integral part of economic and social reintegration need to relate ex-combatants ability to deal with the trauma of their recent past. It is always advisable to give counseling and guidance to ex-combatants after they had gone through a reality check that is, when ideas, expectations, fear and hopes have been confronted with realities in the place of their settlement then it will have real impact on their coping mechanism.

The demobilized combatants often need counseling and guidance initially, because of potential unemployment and an unsure economic future and second, due to their experiences during the war, for example, the loss of family members and/or friends, persecution and/or torture. Rwanda, like most other war-affected countries, was not prepared for large-scale traumatic stress so there is usually a need to train local people to effectively engage in sustainable activities that fit with the culture, traditions and beliefs of the society. Counseling training should have immediate, mid and long-term components, grounded in local educational and training structures, and prepare trainees for their future work.

TABLE 18: PSYCHOSOCIAL SYMPTOM OF EX-COMBATANTS BY THEIR CATEGORIES

Do you often have difficulty with dreams/flashback? *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	44.8%	42.9%	44.8%	44.1%	60.5%	46.5%	36.5%	44.0%	44.1%
No	55.3%	57.1%	55.2%	55.9%	39.5%	53.5%	63.5%	56.0%	55.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In the field study findings there is a clear indication of psychosocial problems faced by ex-combatants (table 18). When ex-combatants were asked, “do you often have difficulty with dreams and flashbacks”? More than two out of five responded positively showing that they might be suffering possibly from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Life does not always prepare us for traumatic events. Following exposure to traumatic events individuals might develop full-blown PTSD, or lesser forms of this condition - with symptoms ranging from nightmares to headaches; flashbacks, withdrawing from people, profound sadness, anxiety, anger, guilt, fatigue, pessimism.

PTSD can be viewed as a fear of the unpleasant memories of the traumatic event that repeatedly intrude into one's awareness. Intrusive recollection can occur in the form of thoughts, images, or perception. These intrusions are unwelcome, uninvited, and painful. Flashbacks are a particularly upsetting form of re-experiencing a traumatic

event, in this case -war experience. One key informant who preferred to remain anonymous shared his experience with the author,

"During the flashback he sees a battle recurring, begins to hear sounds of battle, and feels hot, sweaty, and terrified". This is very hard ordeal to live with day-in-day out.

There is an acute dearth of qualified staff that can deal with PTSD problems of ex-combatants. The provincial office is working closely with the social workers of the Ministry of Local Government but it had just started in August. Identifying the problem and start addressing the issue of PTSD is one step in the right direction.

But there is a need to institutionalize the intervention starting from the head office. Currently counseling in the head office or provincial offices generally follows an informal approach. In other words when an ex-combatant needed advice it is provided by the social or economic reintegration officer in the head office of the Commission or PPO in the provincial offices.

No professional counseling help directed at facilitating psychosocial coping mechanism currently takes place as there are no professional counselors. The author learned from RDRC staff that counseling was only part of a teacher's training program in the academic stream. In other words, use was made of pedagogic counseling approaches, which was not designed for traumatized adults or children. Further, counseling is provided to assist ex-combatants select occupational options, i.e. vocational guidance within the limitations of the menu driven approach of the RDRC.

Due to the long-standing negligence of psychosocial and mental health care in most post-conflict countries the population usually addresses their problem by going to local healers. War displacement; fears of insecurity; persistent poverty and premature death are life stresses, which have caused an array of complaints and symptoms. Some of them can be handled adequately with the help of existing coping strategies such as help of healers, whereas others are so serious that they are not easily managed by traditional methods.

Moreover, people when they feel distress [as physical pain] usually go to health facilities. The health staff who usually have limited knowledge of mental health or psychosomatic illness often send the people home saying they are physically fine and offering no other explanation or even sometimes prescribe incorrect drugs. People may then go to healers who provide an explanation [true or wrong] and provide treatment for what is perceived as the root cause of their problem. These causes often reside in the realm of magic-religious forces such as witchcraft, sorcery, the evil eye, possession by evil spirits, or punishment by God or Allah.

The diverse and often violent experiences of armed conflict have profound effects on ex-combatant's development and well-being. The word psychosocial simply underlines the dynamic relationship between psychological and social effects, each continually influencing the other. Psychological effects are those, which affect emotion, behavior, thoughts, memory, learning ability, perceptions, and understanding. Social effects refer to altered relationships caused by death, separation, estrangement and other losses, of family and community breakdown, damage to social values and customary practices, and the destruction of social facilities and services.

First-line counseling represents the first opportunity of getting counseling support for ex-combatants outside their family circle and friends. First-line counseling need to be provided at each district by volunteers from different associations, and local and international NGOs found in the country. According the caseload of ex-combatants the Ministry of Health should train councilors towards ameliorating the problem at hand. Minimum first-line counseling task includes:

- *Basic counseling and advice:* listening to ex-soldiers experiences and providing reintegration advice; meeting with community leaders/members regarding reintegration problems and economic opportunities;
- *Information and referral:* providing information and advice on availability and access to specialized counseling and services; recognizing needs for specialized counseling, including signals of serious psychosocial problems;
- *Assisting peer group and community activities:* advising on group formation and peer and community group activities in support of reintegration; mediation assistance in local conflicts, e.g. on land issues.

The first-line counselors are addressing many of the problems encountered by ex-combatants when they start re-adjustment and pursue options to make a living and start to reintegrate into civilian life. However, there will also be a need for more specialized counseling in areas such as psychosocial and family counseling; living with HIV/AIDs; the needs of the war-disabled and the specific needs of women ex-combatants, female family members of ex-combatants and child soldiers.

The RDRC program should start provide technical and financial resources as appropriate to strengthen functional systems within the relevant governmental and non-governmental service providers at district and sub-district levels so as to live behind a sustainable structure once it is through with its entrusted task.

If properly utilized, community leaders and family elders, are in a position to effectively assist with psychosocial problems that require family or community mediation. Currently there is a need to strengthen the referral system already functioning intermittently. Programs need to be designed in close co-operation with

traditional self-help mechanism build on culturally appropriate coping strategies including the use of rituals and cleansing ceremonies if need arises.

But, all assistance needs to begin with building awareness within communities and encouraging them to assist their members having problems within their community. There is a need to organize workshops that envisages the participation of traditional community leaders, elders and healers, initially to create awareness and then to increase their capacity in understanding and handling such problems. If sensitized they might refer people needing assistance that the community cannot assist further.

Unfortunately, most of the time these leaders might not have enough knowledge to assist ex-combatants in an adequate or appropriate manner. For example, they have little knowledge about alcoholism [which is common among ex-combatants]. They might punish an alcoholic person for abusing the community but know nothing about how to help him/her control his/her drinking. They might fine or punish a man for rape or defilement but not know how to offer counseling and support to the victim.

Community leaders are part and parcel of the culture, they often support the negative social stigma attached to mental illness. Most families of patients feel that the stigma also affects the whole family that may be perceived as curse from almighty [that is why ex-combatants do not openly admit they have psycho-social problems]. Sometimes the mentally ill can be considered as toys one can tease, and the plight of a patient may be interpreted wrongly as the punishment by God for a sin committed by the family.

Thus, public education should be pushed to reach large numbers of people who can obtain information about psychosocial problems HIV/AIDs, legal and human rights, or any numbers of issues that will help them cope with their predicament. It educates those who have been through extremely stressful events about what types of reactions are normal and common. This is important because many people especially in developing countries are afraid that when they are having problems such as struggling with nightmares after a war, they may end with a chronic psychosis, walking in ragged clothes and talking to him/her self. Public education also teaches the community how to recognize unusually severe responses that require extra attention. In humanitarian crises public education can be used to quell rumors and help the community develop a more realistic view of the situation.

For the current Rwanda reintegration project public education could involve:

- Education of citizens on how to help those in the community who may be more vulnerable because they lost a family member or their possessions.
- Psycho-educational workshops on alcohol use, child rearing, helpful styles of communication, mental disorders, and other mental health issues.

- Community campaigns through posters, leaflets, or group activities that promote positive mental health and child rights campaigns.
- Using media such as TV and radio to heighten public awareness about types of behavior that are not well known or understood, such as abuse of physically or mentally disabled individuals.
- Public awareness of the relationship between specific physical disorders and mental disability (malaria, meningitis, HIV/AIDs) or between disabilities that are mistaken for retardation in school can also be increased.
- With regard to preventing violence of all types, toward children, spouses, the elderly and the disabled, young people can be trained in methods of conflict resolution as a way of settling disagreements.
- The use of educational material that promotes positive values, morals, and self-help can be presented in by using drama and story telling, that have the capacity to engage a larger or specialized audience.

One of the main mandates entrusted to the Commission is to provide counseling and guidance for ex-combatants who are looking for work, or in need of general orientation, seeking credit, or having family problems. But unfortunately all the counseling conducted so far is not properly recorded or documented either in the head office or at provincial offices. All that is available are anecdotes and it is very hard to plan counseling programs that meet the needs of ex-combatants. From similar experience of other countries the sources of psychosocial problems are diverse. Counseling is thus needed in terms of social support, information and practical guidance for reintegration, but also in terms of psychological treatment of war trauma who demand specialized counselors.

Support areas that need enhancement

Although the need for a psychosocial follow-up is acknowledged by the Commission, but because of limited human resource available in the Commission the rate of counseling activities is rather limited. Members of the commission both in the head office and provincial offices should be trained on basic counseling and guidance not just for economic problems but also should be given psychosocial orientation so as to help ex-combatants be more efficient. This capacity-building training should not only concentrates on credit but also focus on cultural reintegration and psychological guidance.

The Commission needs to start an urgent assessment of psychosocial problems of ex-combatants so as to understand the magnitude of mental problems throughout the country. To start with, it can be done initially by the PPO through "key informants" and start gathering basic data on cases of mental illness and "social deviants" in various villages of twelve different provinces and a professional counselor should lead the over-all work. This intervention can help the Commission to find out more about the

caseload of mental problems, their backgrounds, and the mechanisms ex-fighters have developed to cope with traumatic experiences. The aim of conducting such a study is to develop adequate support systems with relevant line ministries to put in place referral point for supporting the needy ones.

Usually the stress and problems faced by ex-combatants is rooted in their experiences gained during the war, e.g. torture, fear of persecution by the incompetent and corrupted government and the loss of friends or family members. Besides, injuries and handicapping can increase desperation and frustration. After long years of war, psycho-social problems might express themselves in the form of fear, health problems, alcoholism, anger, bitterness or end up committing suicide. They not only cause mental and physical pain; they may also prevent the activities necessary to create a decent livelihood and foster integration into the social community. The problems faced by ex-combatant might go beyond the family capacity and might not be able to cope with, and professional help is necessary in this areas. But before going for higher intervention there is a need to do proper assessment of the problem.

4.3 Economic Opportunities

The provision of a comprehensive package of assistance for ex-combatants at their initial stage of reintegration is indispensable to enable them to launch and develop viable micro and small-scale businesses. As far as the Rwandan demobilization and reintegration is concerned this is done properly.²⁹ This intervention had help ex-combatants to be independent from family or relatives and eased their embarkation on rehabilitation and development process in the short term. But, since employment opportunities in the formal sector will remain extremely limited for the foreseeable future in Rwanda, the majority of ex-combatants will be forced to engage in self-employment in agriculture and the informal sector. To prepare ex-combatants for self-employment, life skills and vocational training should be combined with other instruments of support, for example, Training, Counseling & Credit.

Furthermore, systematic follow-ups should be conducted. To reach less educated ex-combatants and entry requirements should be more flexible otherwise training will end up accommodating the “relatively elite” only. Thus the agricultural sector should be given prime importance by rendering institutional support. For example, bee keeping, poultry farm, animal fattening, horticultural activities are areas worth looking at. There is a need to look at what capacity and resource are available in the province so as to advice former combatants what opportunities exist in their respective provinces.

²⁹ For more detail read the beneficiary and VSW studies conducted by the commission in March – June 2004

But additional income support opportunities as seed money or promoting credit are important because the shortage of land limits the likelihood of farming being a viable livelihood for ex-combatants currently. Non-farm activities could include live stock rearing and off-farm- activities. In line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy of the country there is a need to conduct rural development study so as to identify employment opportunities in the country to open up the economy; stimulate private-sector development and attract in the long-run foreign investment.

Although currently it is not known how many ex-combatants are engaged in self-employment but the number ex-combatants absorbed in the informal-sector is far below the assumed potential. For example, while striving to open up their micro or small enterprises, the disabled and other vulnerable ex-combatants encounter a variety of difficulties that call for a comprehensive package based on community based assistance. The mentality of most disabled ex-combatants is that since they are war related victims, the government should cater for their livelihood. Thus it is a good idea to support disabled ex-combatants that can be exemplary in showing ex-combatants can also engage in income generating activities.

Many ex-combatants are in need of advice and guidance to find orientation in the new free-market economy. Given their experience in the bush they are unaccustomed to a life based on individual endeavor, and many lack experience in interacting with the monetary environment. Despite their high work ethic and discipline, almost all must start to develop an entrepreneurial personality that will prepare the ground for successful business ventures. Without qualified assistance geared to their mental condition, their current high self-esteem might well turn into feelings of disappointment and failure. RDRC had recruited economic and social reintegration officers in the head office but their capacity to consult the ex-combatants is limited. In the provinces where the majority of former combatants are residing referral services is non-existent.

Counseling should be offered starting from the beginning and should be done on an ongoing basis, since the small range of business ideas commonly presented by ex-combatants, combined with the limited knowledge of potential market opportunities, cause quite a few initiatives liable to become failures. At present there are very few well-established private or governmental bodies that can offer consultancy on micro and small-scale entrepreneurs. Besides, ex-combatants need to be supported in administrative matters also, since they are unfamiliar with legal and bureaucratic procedures and different prerequisites documents needed to open micro and small enterprises.

Different countries' experiences show how the poorest of the poor of any society have the best ability to repay their loans, since they are more cautious with investment and

developed astonishing business talents. There is no reason why this should not be the case in Rwanda. During field visits to the provinces it was observed that micro-credit institutions are actively working and are making a difference in the livelihood of the poor in general and single mothers or widows in particular. Developing awareness among former combatants to fully utilize the micro-credit schemes in their vicinity is advisable.

When ex-combatants were asked are they in a position to help their families or relatives nearly all are helping. When the key informants were asked to elaborate on this they pointed out nearly all source of the finance ex-combatants got as TSN or VSW is spent family or extended family members. This intervention is buying them acceptance by their families but this can not help ex-combatants in the long run for the support they are getting can not continue indefinitely. The Commission needs to see alternative mechanism to help ex-combatants that can be sustainable in the long run.

TABLE 19: FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY EX-COMBATANTS TO THEIR RELATIVES

If your response is yes, how often? *					Ex-combatants categorization				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Regularly	39.1%	33.6%	26.0%	32.9%	30.0%	33.3%	34.8%	42.9%	34.3%
Often	21.2%	20.0%	20.5%	20.6%	15.0%	18.8%	23.9%	28.6%	20.8%
Some times	39.7%	44.5%	53.4%	45.9%	55.0%	46.9%	41.3%	28.6%	44.3%
Other		1.8%		0.6%		1.0%			0.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4 Medical

The Medical Rehabilitation (MR) sub-program began its service in April 2003. The main mission entrusted to MR is to provide rehabilitation support to ex-combatants who are suffering with severe disabilities or those suffering from chronic illnesses. The MR also gives support for those ex-combatants who are living with HIV/AIDs. The projected total estimated number of beneficiaries is 8400 out of which 6000 had already been demobilized in Stage 1 and 11. Currently the Federal Government of Germany supports the medical and rehabilitation unit of the RDRC.

The MR sub project is mainly providing medical services (rehabilitation and treatment) however there are other important aspects that are yet to be fully implemented, such as vocational training, occupational therapy and psychosocial rehabilitation. But currently the MR project provides disabled combatants medical services and need vocational training educational projects and social and psychosocial rehabilitation in order for disabled ex-combatants to embark on decent livelihood. These services are outside the

MR project design. The RDRC had prepared and presented such a project to the Japanese Technical Cooperation delegation that visited Rwanda in July 2004 and awaits positive response. However, it is imperative that RDRC solicit for other sources of funding for the above mentioned aspects sooner if a successful and holistic medical rehabilitation intervention is to be realized.

The disabled ex-combatants are also assisted by the MR to find employment or to become self-sufficient through self-employment in their process of reintegration. Training will prepare disabled ex-combatant to cope physically and psychologically with their condition. Currently MR intervention is contributing positively to attitudinal change by the community towards war-disabled combatants. The war disable veterans must form their own association so that they can air their needs.

The MR has conducted a medical screening so as it can cater its meager resource for those who have severe disability and at the same time medical screening is part of preparing ex-combatants to discharge process. The purpose of this activity is to identify serious disease or impairments, which might affect the ex-combatants' capacity for economic and social reintegration. It will also indicate the specific needs for different types of rehabilitation intervention. To avoid biases and favoritism in the process of categorization of disabled and chronically sick ex-combatants only medical personnel are categorizing the disabilities of ex-combatants. The MR project had initially categorized the disability rate of combatants and is planning to provide social security for those who are severely disabled. The following table indicates the permanent disability range and the respective number of ex-combatants.

TABLE 20: CATEGORIZATION OF DISABILITY

Disability range of ex-combatants	Number	Percentage
90-100	267	4%
70-89	850	14%
50-69	1159	19%
30-49	3727	62%
Total	6002	100%

Source: Medical Rehabilitation Documentation as of June 2004

Securing a job and reintegrating disabled ex-combatants into civilian life is much harsher if conditions such as, housing, and transport and health services are not put in place. Ex-combatants usually face more problems in finding jobs compared to their colleagues because most private employers and public industries are reluctant to hire disabled ex-combatants. Job opportunities for ex-combatants decrease further when ex-combatants are in need of medical treatment and wish to stay with their families. Like the other ex-combatants, they have to tackle problems such as housing and transport,

but the disabled depend more on adequate housing and transport, especially because they usually have mobility-related problems.

Ex-combatants require additional support through training, job placement and medical and psychological assistance. Currently more than 6,000 disabled ex-combatants need economical and psychosocial support and 350 to 400 severely disabled combatants, who are residing in *Kanombe* hospital for more than 10 years, require permanent help. The implementing agencies are advised to develop integrated training opportunities so as to ease the access of the disabled to general training courses and implement a scheme for community-based rehabilitation.

After so many years of absence, most disabled ex-combatants dislike being dependent on their families because deep in their heart they feel obliged to support their parents. The parents or relatives of ex-combatants are living under difficult economic conditions and often are not able to assist disabled ex-combatants financially. Disabled ex-combatants feel frustrated for they feel they are failing to fulfill their duties as care takers. This applies particularly to those severely disabled ex-combatants. Bitter feelings are intensified by the economic situation of the demobilized combatants. While they sacrificed their youth, often their health and their savings, those who stayed behind or fled the country are now better off. They have been able to get jobs, continue their education and save money, whereas the ex-combatants have to start from scratch.

Most of the disabled ex-combatant does not need rehabilitation exclusively; majority need opportunities so as to prove their ability to hold to a job. This is particularly important because most disabled ex combatants (87% are between 25 to 35 years old. As many of the disabled are limited in their mobility, provision of mobile transport is a basic necessity. In order to design sustainable rehabilitation intervention for disabled ex-combatants there is a need to conduct a baseline survey.

“It is painful to see a person who sacrificed a lot to free this country, who probably lost a leg in the process, eking out a living working for ordinary peasants. They certainly deserve better!”

Madeleine, N., woman, resident, Cynzarwe

The Commission is keen to implement reintegration programs in an integrated approach and will not offer training support exclusively for disabled persons as it did in the first stage. Integrated education can contribute considerably to changing society's attitude towards the disabled. Rehabilitation need to be community-based and educational programs should be pursued in an integrated approach with only a few specialized schools. This can enable the disabled ex-combatants to live with their families in their community and work there and can benefit from their extended family networks.

The orthopedic workshop currently operational in the country is privately owned. When disabled ex-combatants establish their own association it is advisable to open their own orthopedic workshop so as to minimize cost for the basic disabled ex-combatants' needs. Such an intervention will also lower the cost of mobility needs of disabled ex-combatants. The staff of the medical rehabilitation unit will gain from an exposure visit to countries that are undergoing this rehabilitation intervention.

The ideal place is to arrange a visit to Eritrea or Ethiopia. In Eritrea for example, there is an Association of War Disabled Veteran combatant which was functional since 1978 and is actively working in support of disabled combatants in reintegrating them back into the Eritrean society and in their implementation process has accumulated a wealth of experience. In Eritrea, the Eritrean War Disabled orthopedic workshops fabricate and repair prostheses, crutches and wheelchairs and also offer physiotherapy and are located in all the provinces.

Ongoing vocational training for disabled ex-combatants is concentrated mainly in *Mai Habar* Vocational Training Center. The center encompasses 14 workshops, dormitories for 400 trainees, classrooms, a small library and a clinic and is worth seeing. The first six-month workshop started in February 1994. Projects that are eligible include those that involve not only limited to disabled combatants but also civil victims of the war are allowed to take a training as long as they are between 20 and 40 years old and show commitment for self-development.

The RDRC structure was not designed for the direct implementation and delivery of the reintegration assistance to ex-combatants. It was intended only to provide the policy framework, program design, maintenance of technical supervision and the co-ordination of the implementation process. The Commission therefore required a range of partnerships with agencies able to deliver services to ex-combatants especially during its transition period and at least need developing the following three forms of partnerships for program implementation:

- Contractual partners (for projects wholly financed by RDRC)
- Co-financing partners (for projects where the total costs are funded by the RDRC and another agency)
- Parallel partners (for projects funded wholly by other agencies and RDRC merely identifies the beneficiaries)

The RDRC as an institution has a vision to live behind a broad and sustained assistance to ex-combatants behind but these needs developing schemes, which rely heavily on the self-help potential of the ex-combatants. This intervention can bear fruit only if there is common understanding among the different implementing institutions on

what is demanded from them during the transition period of the demobilization and reintegration program.

On another level ex-combatants should be sufficiently informed about ongoing and planned activities of phasing-out programs and thus RDRC should organize regular meetings of ex-combatants and include them as soon as possible in planning, decision-making and implementation. In the end, there should be more emphasis on projects, which involve different target groups in order to facilitate the integration of the ex-combatants into civilian society.

PART TWO

CHAPTER FIVE: ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION

5. INTRODUCTION

Economic reintegration of ex-combatants is a continuous, long-term process that takes place at psychological, social, economic and political levels. The host community's acceptance or rejection defines the reintegration possibilities of an ex-combatant and his/her family. Economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant's household through productive and gainful employment. The central objective of RDRC programs is to support ex-combatants in their effort to integrate themselves into social and economic networks of a civilian society. The DDR program provides economic reintegration assistance and access to employment through job counseling at referral points, skills development, micro-enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion activities.

Unfortunately, in the fragile Rwandan labor market the supply is larger than the demand and employment opportunities in the formal sector are rather rare. Ex-combatants have to compete with annual school leavers, for the same limited number of jobs, not to speak of employees becoming redundant because of improvements in productivity. In the course of the civil service reform, which will attempt to streamline the inherited over-staffed and inefficient public administration and fit it into the government's revenue, a sizeable number of civil servants will be laid off and join the job seekers. Thus gainful employment of all categories is crucial to social stability and is key ingredient to peace building.

In order for ex-combatants to reintegrate economically into the mainstream of the society, they have to earn a living; be it wage employment or a farm, or by combining different sources of income, such as petty trade and off-farm earning activities. They need to be given equal opportunities of employment as any other member of the receiving community. But as pointed out in the poverty reduction paper, Rwanda is currently facing a situation of massive underemployment, both in rural and urban areas, with a large proportion of the population living below the poverty line. This under-employment is seasonal, i.e. related to the cycle of agricultural work but could be permanent, as a result of insufficient arable land and other meager job opportunities. The poverty reduction strategy paper puts the figure of under-employment at 70 percent.

Land - the main factor of production - supports a dense population and suffers from erosion, threatening its exhaustion as a resource. This trend in general, demonstrates the need to diversify rural employment (cottage industries, handicraft, infrastructure, etc.) within the framework of well-defined policies, which put integrated rural development programs in place. The significant underemployment and

unemployment constitutes not only wastage of economic and human resources, but is also the root of social degradation and may breed insecurity.

5.1 Reinsertion Package

DDR programs are difficult and expensive endeavors, which directly affect the welfare, pride, and dignity of tens of thousands of men and women. Given the subjective nature of perceptions ex-combatants could easily get frustrated if change do not occur as rapidly as they had expected it. Reinsertion pertains to the short-term period of approximately six to twelve months after demobilization. During this phase, ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household. Reintegration refers to a period of approximately two years during which ex-combatants gradually become 'normal' community members, both in social and economic terms. Upon demobilization, the ex-combatants lose their only source of (formal or informal) income.

Different experiences have also indicated that in the initial stage of reintegration demobilized ex-combatants are usually in a vulnerable financial situation until they boldly face reality, start fending for themselves and start generating income. During this critical period (the "reinsertion" phase), ex-combatants require a Transition Safety Net (TSN) to cover their families' basic material needs. The objective of this transitional assistance is to enable ex-combatants to return to their community and to sustain themselves and their families for a limited period following demobilization. Initial assistance may consist of allowance given as cash; voucher; or in-kind transfers for shelter, medical care, food and clothing over a period ranging from several months to two years.³⁰

When reinsertion support is provided by the RDRC, the payment is spread over several installments of disbursements. Ex-combatants usually complain on the allocation modalities of their benefit spread over a period of time. It is advisable to accommodate those who come up with concrete proposals. But most of them have no clue as what to do with their money; hence it makes sense to disburse the benefit in installments.

Since reinsertion assistance is not indefinite the RDRC through its tentacles in the head or provincial offices is making sure that ex-combatants understand this, starting from the discharge centers. Assistance is usually extended to family member and includes education and other basic needs. The principal target of the reinsertion assistance is the veteran household and not the individual veteran.

³⁰ World Bank publication 1999, 'The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview'.

During the first months, the veteran household is extremely vulnerable: basic needs such as shelter and a minimum level of food security need to be covered immediately on arrival in the community of settlement. Shelter and food, however, are not sufficient to enable the veteran household to commence establishing itself as a viable social and economic unit. The payment of reinsertion money is meant to help the ex-combatants start their reintegration process into the society. The transitional reintegration issues for ex-combatants should ideally be incorporated into an overarching inclusive community-based reintegration effort for all citizens affected by the war.

5.2 VSW Support

Reinsertion packages help ex-combatants and their families' to bridge the difficult period between demobilization and reintegration process.³¹ The basic needs of an ex-combatant's family could be divided into two components: household consumption and household investment. Household consumption normally includes food, clothing, health and education. Household investment can comprise shelter and household effects (agricultural or craftsman tools and kitchen utensil). Some additional assistance is required to ensure a basic level of health care that can cover family medical expenses on a level equivalent to that of its neighbors.

As per the Technical Annex (March 2002) of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP), additional support was envisaged to provided socio-economically vulnerable ex-combatants of both Stage I and Stage II through a Vulnerability Support Window (VSW). VSW assistance was provided on a grant basis at an average amount of US\$ 333, equivalent to Frw 150,000 at the time. It was estimated that 35%, i.e. 26,667 of a total of 76,192 ex-combatants, would be eligible for this support.

TABLE 21: BENEFITS RECEIVED BY EX-COMBATANTS AND THEIR CATEGORIZATION

Have you received your benefits					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	94.3%	99.7%	92.3%	95.4%	94.7%	96.4%	97.6%	85.3%	95.7%
No	5.7%	0.3%	7.7%	4.6%	5.3%	3.6%	2.4%	14.7%	4.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

When ex-combatants were asked do they receive their benefits 96 percent responded positively concurring with the Vulnerable Support Window (VSW) study commissioned by the Commission in May, 2004. The Commission had put in place

³¹ Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, Ingo Wiederhofer 2001 Disarmament, Demobilization, and the Social and Economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants: lessons and Liabilities in State Transformation.

criteria for VSW for ex-combatants who fail to make a living. The Commission had learned the following lessons from the implementation of the VSW intervention:

Lessons learned:

- In many cases, due to other engagements, it was not possible for all the screening committee members, especially the CDCs and CPAs, to be present during vulnerability assessment. As a result, the concerned ex-combatants ended up tracing them up to their offices, homes, or wherever they were to sign their VSW1 forms, which was clearly against procedure.
- In other cases, the whole screening exercise would be postponed because key members of the committees were not available. This is inconvenient for ex-combatants who had traveled long distances to the screening centers.
- Apart from a few centers, the RDRC, including the PPOs could not effectively monitor the screening because the exercise was being carried out in more than 1,500 sectors spread across the whole country at almost the same time.
- More Stage One ex-combatants are vulnerable than previously thought due to a combination of many factors, including inadequate preparation and unfavorable or uncertain conditions, to mention but a few, that prevailed in the country then.
- The value of the projects submitted for funding ranged between Frw 100,000 – 500,000 with an average of about Frw 300,000. It was, therefore, difficult to fix the amount of money for each CDC-approved sub-project. As a result the Commission had to sub-contract CRDP staff again to assess both the nature of the submitted project and an individual's level of vulnerability to determine the appropriate amount of money.

Although the VSW intervention is making difference in the livelihood of former combatants, it is advisable to revisit the VSW to maximize its impact. From field finding it was clear the VSW package was used to build house or to support family members financially which is buying them social status among their community. This is a positive trend but with little effort it can be better. If economic interventions are to attain self-sufficiency they should be developed through engaging ex-combatant's household in productive and gainful (self)-employment.

The economic reintegration services should be designed as demand-driven opportunities that demobilized combatants choose to access. In addition economic reintegration assistance and access to employment through, job counseling and referral services, skill development, micro-enterprise supports schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion activities should be thought through.

Revolving funds among members of an association, be they self-help or affiliated to religious institutions are not new to Rwanda. There are many self-help associations that use revolving fund as an occasion to associate once or twice per month. Rwandans

living in urban and rural areas form small groups and collects money and distributes it on rotational basis. The weak point of this arrangement is that it does not include a saving component. In the absence of a micro-credit scheme, the opportunity for ex-combatants to initiate income generating activities or micro-businesses is usually severely constrained. Existing self-help structures in Rwanda communities continues to provide a safety-net for local residents and is also serving as a cushion for ex-combatants.

5.3 Employment Opportunities

Unlike the TSN support, which is an entitlement, reintegration projects are opportunities that the ex-combatants choose to access. Some of these opportunities may be designed in direct response to needs assessment study which take into account the socio-economic characteristics of the ex-combatants. Others may be services or projects provided by a range of governmental entities (ministries), NGOs, banking institutions or private enterprises to the ex-combatants as members of society. All support given to ex-combatants must in the end assist them in gaining employment.

When ex-combatants were asked, "Have you a job at present?" nine out of ten said that they are not currently working. But when the question was put in another form, "Do you work the whole year through?" four out of five said that they were. This illustrates that the casual work in which ex-combatants are involved in is not counted as employment opportunity.

TABLE 22: EX COMBATANTS' EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Do you have a job at present				Ex-combatants categories						
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	17.3%	16.1%	8.8%	14.1%		34.2%	16.4%	10.7%	13.3%	15.3%
No	82.8%	83.9%	91.2%	85.9%		65.8%	83.6%	89.3%	86.7%	84.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The problem of under employment arises when the possibility of fully utilizing human resource is not in place. This significant underemployment and unemployment does not constitute only one of the wastages of economic and human resources, but is also the root of social degradation and breeds insecurity.

Unemployment, although primarily an economic issue, has dire social consequences ranging from crime to drug abuse and dependency on families who are finding it difficult themselves to survive. Unemployment will remain a major issue, especially within the context of a recovering economy. Many of the transitional issues raised above should be integrated into the National Poverty Recovery Strategy (PRS). Given

the RDRC special role and position within Rwanda, it offers an exceptional opportunity to play an advocacy role to ensure that the PRS takes into account the special circumstances of the ex-combatants.

TABLE 23: BRIDGING THE SLACK TIME (GAPS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT) OF EX-COMBATANTS

If you are not working, how you do bridge the gap?					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
By engaging in occasional jobs	36.2%	34.0%	25.9%	32.0%	12.5%	31.8%	37.3%	36.9%	33.2%
Petty trade	7.9%	10.4%	17.3%	11.9%	37.5%	11.8%	7.8%	4.6%	10.9%
Remittance from family members	10.6%	9.3%	13.6%	11.2%	4.2%	13.0%	4.1%	21.5%	10.9%
Other	45.3%	46.3%	43.2%	44.9%	45.8%	43.4%	50.7%	36.9%	45.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The PRS favors investments in rural areas for the inhabitants of this sector that are the most poverty stricken. If the rural sector is properly targeted agricultural growth can be boosted, which in turn would reinforce the financial and technical capabilities of these most disadvantaged groups. Such intervention in the rural sector has tremendous implications on the socio-economic development of the country. A labor-intensive approach is a good approach to create jobs, reduces unemployment, which is rampant in rural and urban areas, and helps to increase the revenue and purchasing power of the society in general, and ex-combatants in particular.

Successful public works if properly designed can be a vehicle to sustainable income generating and skills acquisition for former combatants. For example, the Sierra Leone Roads Authority case study is one that the Rwandan government can learn from. In the SLRA case study, the contractors were trained at both the managerial and technical level, and scope was provided for the contractors to grow their enterprises into entities, which could tender competitively.

When ex-combatants were asked, "Do you see your economic situation improving in the near future?" slightly more than seventy responded that they feel they have a good chance of getting a job in the near future. But qualitative information obtained from key informants suggests that such optimism quickly dissipated when ex-combatants were faced with the reality of the local economy. However, many still continue to be optimistic about securing employment in the near future which is a positive thing to build on.

Although the RDRC cannot ensure that all ex-combatants become economically active or are able to earn out a living, the RDRC needs to lobby and promote the inclusion of ex-combatants in the economic activities of the country. This would demand to enhance the advocacy role the RDRC is currently playing to ensure the inclusion of ex-combatants in the business sector as well as community and government development projects. Adjusting the types and range of skills training available to the remaining ex-combatants to include agricultural and office training modules can make a limited but significant impact. But unemployment will remain a major problem for foreseeable future, especially within the context of Rwanda's recovering economy.

5.4 Welfare Assessment

Attaining a sustainable livelihood entails not merely integrating the ex-combatant into productive work, but goes beyond to enabling her or him to gain a decent living and contribute to the national reconstruction and development process socially and economically. It also includes securing rights (rights of individual and common ownership, access and use), removing restrictions which hamper and harm (e.g. the removal of restrictions on urban informal activities can reduce the insecurity, anxiety and humiliation of poor people), and providing access to effective health services. A prerequisite to this is decentralization, which involves the transferring of power, increasing democratic modes of operation, diversifying and adapting to local needs and capacities.

Most of the demobilized combatants rely on their release payments and family assistance for their livelihood because a limited number of ex-combatants get income from regular employment. But the war, with its long-lasting and intense traumatic experiences for the civilian population, took its human and social toll. Economic opportunities are pivotal to the adjustment of ex-combatants to conditions of civilian life. They certainly facilitate the rate and the scope of integration. However, they alone do not suffice. To achieve integration social and psychological aspects have to be taken into consideration. The role of extended family or peer-group affiliation should play the role of a safety net.

TABLE 24: EX-COMBATANT RELATIONSHIPS' WITH THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD

As a demobilized combatant how do you qualify your relationship with your neighbors? *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Good	62.9%	58.3%	61.1%	60.8%	65.8%	54.7%	69.4%	74.3%	60.9%
Average	28.6%	34.6%	30.0%	31.1%	23.7%	35.0%	26.1%	21.6%	31.0%
Bad	8.5%	7.1%	8.9%	8.2%	10.5%	10.2%	4.5%	4.1%	8.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A little more than 60 percent rate their relation with their neighbors as good. If broken into categories ex-RDF stands at 66 percent, ex-RPA at 55 percent, ex-FAR at 70 percent and ex-AG at 74 percent. With time the relationships between ex-combatants and their wider community is growing stronger and is serving them as a cushion in their reintegration endeavor back into the society. When asked, "Do they have an intention to move from the place they are currently residing?" nearly two thirds of their response were "I have no intention of moving." If seen from the view of stages of demobilization it has increased steadily, namely stage one 61 percent, stage two 64 percent and stage three 73 percent. With time the welfare of ex-combatants is picking up.

TABLE 25: EX-COMBATANT CONTACT WITH THEIR FAMILIES

Did you have contact with your family while in military?					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	47.5%	62.5%	65.6%	58.5%	51.4%	54.7%	74.7%	10.7%	56.3%
No	52.5%	37.5%	34.4%	41.5%	48.6%	45.3%	25.3%	89.3%	43.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As can be seen in table 25 two fifths of the ex-combatants had no contact during the war. If seen from their categorization ex-AG nearly nine out of ten had no contact with their family and this shows they need support in readjusting with their new way of life. Most ex-FAR combatants are well placed and only 25% said they did not have contact with their family members.

CHAPTER SIX: SOCIAL REINTEGRATION

6. INTRODUCTION

Post conflict populations emotionally suffer the consequences of living with excessive fear and violence. Studies done by Trans-cultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO) in five developing countries shows that the rates of mood disorder (e.g. depression) vary from 19 to 40 percent; anxiety disorder from 11 to 42 percent; and PTSD from 16 to 37 percent of the population.³² Many people show symptoms for two or three disorders, which places them and their children at high risk. Many people usually overcome their problem alone, but a substantial part might continue to suffer severely from their psychological problems. This will hamper their functioning as parents and community members, and negatively influence the economic development of the country in general.

Economic reintegration entails developing a financial self-sufficiency of a demobilized soldier's household through productive and gainful (self) employment.

It can be argued that economic opportunities are pivotal in the early phases of adjustment, because they can facilitate the rate and the scope of ex-combatant's reintegration. But they are not sufficient conditions for the overall integration. Starting from the conceptualization phase, social and psychological integration needs to be seriously thought through. The social structures of the receiving society and the attitudes of its members towards ex-combatants are variables that determine the speed, the direction and level of socio-cultural reintegration.

The reintegration of ex-combatants would not be complete if it did not take into account their fears, hopes, and attitudes about adjustment or maladjustment within new environments. Adjustment refers here to the individual's (or group's) ability to live and perform various social roles and activities without suffering excessive or unbearable psychological stress. Family relations are a vital element of social cohesion and are highly valued by Rwandans of all strata of society.

The exiting from any group or social setting that has had a central meaning in one's life is often a traumatic and painful experience. It involves tension between an individual's past and present experiences, and future prospects. Identification with past social categories or roles lingers in one form or another throughout the lives of ex-combatants as they struggle to incorporate past identities into present conceptions of self.

Another characteristic that makes the ex-combatants status unique is the image that society holds of their previous roles. People in society are conscious of a person's status

³² Jong and Mehreteab 2001 Psychosocial and Mental Health Intervention for the War affected population of Eritrea

in a social structure judging them solely not on the basis of the current role they occupy but also on the basis of who the individual used to be. Life-cycle changes must also be taken into consideration when designing programs for ex-combatants.

Ex-combatants continually have to deal with society's reaction to their previous role for it can facilitate or hinder the overall process of integration. In order to grasp the complexity of the problem and to tackle it properly, the study places the integration process against the background in which the nation found itself, and in terms of the developments which have been unfolding ever since.

Social reintegration is designed to facilitate the smooth reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities, and contribute to continued social cohesion in the communities and in the society by and large. The main activities of social reintegration conducted by the Commission comprises - pre-discharge orientation; information and sensitization of the target group, implementing partners, home communities, and society at large. This intervention can be said to be a one-off, to have a more lasting impact it needs institutionalizing and proper follow up. Thus there is a dire need to support and enhance first-line counseling, peer group counseling and referral services at the district levels. In addition strengthening specialized counseling and community-based support activities is the right way to strengthening reintegration efforts.

6.1 Social Network

Integration of ex-combatants usually takes place in economic, social and cultural environments that create constraints as well as opportunities. For example, Ugandan ex-combatants were generally well received by communities in the central and south-west of the country where the National Resistance Movement had its support base, but those attempting to resettle in the east of the country initially faced community hostility. In Namibia some *Ovambo* ex-combatants who fought on the losing side faced resentment on their return to the northern part of the country (Colletta, 1996)

When it comes to activities that mark social interactions, which would be one of the indicators of the level of social integration, the focus group discussions indicated that ex-combatants participated fully in these activities. They did communal work, attended marriages, helped in emergencies, participated in rituals and funerals. They also shared drinks and food (*Gusanjyira*), which in Kinyarwanda culture is a mark of social acceptance.

Key informants also elaborate that in Rwanda most ex-combatants participate in informal social networks. They meet their former colleagues or former opponents at least occasionally to discuss their present life, work opportunities, income-generating projects, and the general economic and political situation of their country. Such informal contacts have proved helpful in facilitating their transition to civilian life. In

fact, over one third of ex-combatants cooperate in economic ventures from different armed groups.

TABLE 26: EX-COMBATANTS IN TOUCH WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES

Are you in touch with your former unit members? *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	86.7%	84.1%	84.5%	85.1%	84.2%	91.9%	80.0%	58.7%	85.4%
No	13.3%	15.9%	15.5%	14.9%	15.8%	8.1%	20.0%	41.3%	14.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Lessons from other DDR experiences show that social reintegration is a special challenge whose importance is often underestimated. The belief was that, if proper economic interventions were designed social problems would melt away. In reality, they do not go away by themselves but need to be addressed together with economic issues.³³ But in the Rwandan case the trend is different. Ex-combatants and civilians are forming an association and are actively working together. The RDRC must use this opportunity to strength the capacity of these self-help institutions.

Rwandese society has a number of positive features, including institutions of traditional social organization, which can be harnessed for the reintegration of ex-combatants against poverty.³⁴ These include:

- *Umuganda*, the tradition of work on public projects.
- *Ubudehe*, the tradition of mutual assistance.
- *Gacaca*, the tradition of communal resolution of disputes. This has been adapted to deal with the legacy of genocide cases, and might subsequently be used to help with the resolution of disputes about land.
- *Umusanzu*, the tradition of support for the needy and contribution to the achievement of a common goal.
- *Linguistic homogeneity*; the overwhelming majority speak Kinyarwanda. Two international languages, French and English, are also increasingly widely spoken, although a large proportion of people speak only Kinyarwanda.
- *High population density*, which reduces some of the costs of service provision.

³³ For more on this see Mehreteab, Amanuel 2002, Veteran Combatants do not Fade Away: A Comparative Study on Two Demobilization Exercises in Eritrea BICC paper 23

³⁴ 2002 National Poverty Reduction Program Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 'The Government of Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper'

6.2 Community Interaction

Even in homogenous societies tension can arise for variety of reasons: differences in age, sex, wealth, status ... etc. In the case of a heterogeneous society such as in communities or areas where local people had to accept the presence of former combatants, it can be the outcome of poor communication, false perceptions, or/and incompatibilities of cultural and religious practices and values, and, of course, conflicts of interest. In order to minimize misunderstanding and to iron out the differences arising from experiences a platform has to be established where these issues can be discussed.

TABLE 27: INTERACTION WITH COMMUNITY

As a demobilized combatant how do you qualify your relationship with your neighbors? *									
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Good	62.9%	58.3%	61.1%	60.8%	65.8%	54.7%	69.4%	74.3%	60.9%
Average	28.6%	34.6%	30.0%	31.1%	23.7%	35.0%	26.1%	21.6%	31.0%
Bad	8.5%	7.1%	8.9%	8.2%	10.5%	10.2%	4.5%	4.1%	8.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As seen in table 27 when asked to rate their interaction with the community after they got demobilized, three out of six ex-combatants responded positively. Three out of ten rated it average. This is a positive trend, which could help ease the reintegration problems of former combatants.

But problems faced by former combatants and members of host communities must come out into the open, so that they can help in developing a common understanding. Such process might help in developing tolerance within a society, which by itself is the sign of a healthy environment. This can in turn promote the reintegration of former combatants by breaking the barrier of misunderstanding. It should be understood that whatever money is poured into assistance programs cannot set right the misconceptions created by different experiences a specific category had undergone.

The low frequency of tensions between former combatants and members of the host society is a good indicator of the tolerance, acceptance and ultimately their reintegration. It is through interaction between groups that barriers are removed, attitudes are changed and differences ironed out. Common interests are recognized and accommodated only if interaction takes place.

Here accommodation refers to the mutual adjustment of groups that have developed their own values, norms and attitudes by participating in the armed struggle, staying in exile or by remaining in the country. Except for those who stayed behind, this meant undergoing a process of uprooting, which was followed by a similar experience when they either left for exile or joined armed forces and then returned to mainstream

society. This does not mean that the community of those who remained did not undergo changes rather they were spared the experience of uprooting.

The social consequences of uprooting for an individual might be estrangement and alienation from family, friends and close community, the loosening of kin ties, and the breaking down of support networks. In the *cellule*³⁵ from where most ex-combatants originated to which they returned the boundaries between family and the surrounding community is fluid and families are interlinked. The loss of these links and networks was usually replaced, after a period of adaptation, by the community of refugees in exile and by that of the fighters in the field.

6.3 Collective Action and Cooperation

Social structures constrain but also are enabling because they open up certain possibilities. This is precisely the case with ex-combatants, who formulate survival strategies and secure a livelihood by negotiating, and transforming the set of opportunities and constraints posed by the society and economy into which they return. The goal should be to learn to live with differences thus to understand and accommodate diversity. As harnessing relationships is central, all efforts must be guided by the three-folds of human goal that is - **hope, healing and reconciliation** - in seeking reintegration and build cohesive society.

TABLE 28: EX-COMBATANTS INVOLVED IN ASSOCIATIONS

Does your family belong to any association/organization *					Ex-combatants categorization				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	34.8%	36.2%	29.8%	33.6%	31.6%	29.0%	48.4%	28.0%	34.4%
No	65.2%	63.8%	70.2%	66.4%	68.4%	71.0%	51.6%	72.0%	65.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Informal contacts also help ex-combatants to cope up with challenges of civilian life better. Experience also shows that combatants develop strong peer relations and comradeship that was knit during military service and that could continue through into their civilian life. The RDRC recognizes and promotes this work with networks and associations established among ex-combatants and see it as a vehicle for its exit-strategy. Loose, informal networks could provide a possible vehicle for individual ex-combatant's support into their communities thus contributes to strengthening social capital at the local level. RDRC as a program encourages the formation of associations and if properly harnessed and utilized could be a cushion in the transition process from military to civilian life of former combatants.

³⁵ *Cellule (Nyumba Kumi)* each is formed of 10 houses and it is the lowest grass root administrative level

Due to land shortages and economic problems many ex-combatants are still not located in their areas of origin or choice and this creates problems for them and the communities within which they are currently residing. There are social, economic and security related reasons for this. Until the ex-combatants are located in their areas of origin or choice, and feel secure and accepted within the community, social reintegration is far from guaranteed. Mitigation interventions need to be put in place to minimize problems faced by ex-combatants.

The interventions put in place should also include giving support for ex-combatants on how to deal with the fears and anxieties of a return to their original communities. Unfortunately the capacity of the Commission on this area is limited. Efforts are currently done to enhance psychosocial support for child ex-soldiers and need to be broadened to accommodate the bigger caseload of adult ex-combatants. The donor community should help the Commission develop its capacity so as to effectively deal with the particular problems of ex-combatants and could be adapted to help the overall endeavor of rehabilitation efforts of the country in general.

TABLE 29: EX-COMBATANTS AND CIVILIAN ASSOCIATIONS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY

S/NO	PROVINCE	Number of Association
1	KIGALI-CITY	63 (41)
2	KIGALI-NGALI	90
3	GITARAMA	15
4	BYUMBA	34
5	BUTARE	28
6	GISENYI	23
7	RUHENGERI	19
8	KIBUYE	0
9	GIKONGORO	28
10	CYANGUGU	48
11	UMUTARA	15
12	KIBUNGO	169 (54)
TOTAL		

The associations currently established and which are currently operational are presented in table 29. The Rwandan experience is unique because the associations formed are composed of former combatants and civilians. This golden opportunity must be properly utilized. For example, the author conducted an in-depth interview in *Gisenyi* with an association formed by the three categories of ex-combatants (Ex-AG; ex-RPA and ex-RDF) and their civilian relatives or counterparts. The former combatants' service in their respective military groups ranged from six to 12. When asked how they formed their enterprise they elaborated as follows. The first pioneers of the restaurant were three ex-combatants who invested all their money (150,000 Frw each) and after a while another seven ex-combatants and two civilians joined them. The association has a president, deputy and financial head.

The association had benefited from the RDRC/GTZ entrepreneur's skill training. Their books are in order and the cash flow is closed on daily base. They have regulations by which they are governed. From the discussions conducted with them they have an idea to open another restaurant at another site. They had already diversified their activities to agriculture and petty shoe trade. Through an in-depth discussion the author learned that the association's rules and regulations are not properly thought through. For example, if a member wants to leave the association there are no clear rules in place as to whether he should sell his share, how the profits are to be allocated, or how the working arrangements should be settled.

Ex Combatant Association *Huguka* in Gisenyi



Photo taken by Ahrens Wolfgang (GTZ)

As beginners the enterprise is in good situation but cannot overcome any administrative shock and can easily collapse. The Commission is not in a position to give professional advice and needs to hire professional advice on contract base and make its staff aware on the formalities/procedures, both in the head office and provinces, aware of the legal issues in forming associations. It is advisable to develop a

model format for a memorandum of association and make it known to all the functioning associations.

6.4 Psychosocial Issues

Life does not always prepare us for traumatic events. Following exposure to traumatic events individuals often develop full-blown PTSD, or milder forms of this condition - with symptoms ranging from nightmares to headaches; flashbacks, withdrawing from people, profound sadness, anxiety, anger, guilt, fatigue, pessimism, sexual problems and emotional numbing.

Besides the chronically ill, or the manifestly disabled, focus group discussions brought to light what could be a profound problem

"...actually there are those who are like they are unstable, they claim of having momentary lapses...of having a 'screen' in their eyes...they are like crazy, but as long as they are not causing any harm, we just accept them the way they are"

of a psychosocial nature. In describing the behavior of ex-combatants who were finding it hard to reintegrate into the civilian life, they mentioned actions that reflect a certain psychosocial disorder that may or may not be a result of war traumas. Behavior like excessive drinking, bouts of unprovoked violence, domestic violence and periods of brooding anti-social behavior were

mentioned in this regard. Additionally the focus groups added that these ex-combatants were highly 'mobile' tending to stay not more than a couple of weeks before they moved.

TABLE 30: DIFFICULTY WITH TEMPER

Do you often have difficulty with your temper?					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	78.8%	81.9%	72.9%	77.9%	78.9%	81.5%	75.8%	69.3%	78.8%
No	21.3%	18.1%	27.1%	22.1%	21.1%	18.5%	24.2%	30.7%	21.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

There are indications that many ex-combatants might be experiencing trauma-related psychological and behavioral problems that could have longer-term social implications. When asked, "Do you often have difficulty with your temper?" four out of five responded positively. If trauma and resulting depression is not properly addressed scattered social ties can limit economic and social capacity and can become an obstacle to good communication. When ex-combatants lack self-confidence and support, they might feel isolated. This may also mark the beginning of a tendency among traumatized ex-combatants to take the law into their own hands. The consequences of this may be a

reversal of reintegration and a reduction in the prospects for creating a cohesive nation. The next most prevalent aspect in which ex-combatants' experience difficulty is dreams or as flashbacks.

When an individual is uprooted from his/her social environment and mobilized the social consequences that are encountered might include estrangement and alienation from family, friends and close community, the loosening of ties with kin and the breaking down of support networks. In the villages, from where most ex-combatants originated and to which they might return, boundaries between family and the surrounding community tend to be fluid and families are interlinked. The community of ex-combatants in the bush usually replaced the loss of family networks with that of colleagues in arm after a period of adaptation. Returning to civilian community life requires a re-establishment of lapsed or weakened family and community relations and may involve the loss of existing ones, making the initial period of reintegration a lonely and difficult experience, thus leaving the ex-combatant in a psychologically vulnerable position.

TABLE 31: EX-COMBATANTS DIFFICULTY

	Sleeping	Concentrating while working	Talking to friends	Dreams and flash back	Quarrel with family	Quarrel with neighbor
Yes	47.2	31.5	7.4	44.1	7.1	4.8
No	52.8	68.5	92.6	55.9	93.2	95.2

It must be noted, however that the majority of ex-combatants (68.5%) do not experience difficulty concentrating when working. The majority of ex-combatants (92.6%) also reported never have difficulty talking with friends and similarly a majority of ex-combatants never quarrel with family and neighbor, 93.2 percent and 95.2 percent respectively. This is a typical example –denial in which the ex-combatants answer to issues as simple or it never exists *HachiBas* (no problem).

Given that the ex-combatants do show some symptoms of PTSD or are in a psychologically vulnerable position it is imperative that the RDRC authorities should organize counseling sessions for ex-combatants to unravel these embedded problems. The purpose of these counseling sessions is to both help bridge the high expectation of ex-combatants with the reality on the ground and also to ease the feelings of hopelessness, militarism and mitigate their antisocial behavior. With social capital progressively weakened over years of civil strife, the Ugandan government clearly understood the potential problems of mistrust and fear that could derail even a well-planned demobilization exercise. In order to address the psychological condition of ex-combatants proper needs assessment should be done to put adequate support mechanisms in place.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SOCIAL CAPITAL

7. INTRODUCTION

It is the interplay of a community's physical and social capital and the ex-combatant's financial and human capital that ultimately determines the ease and success of their reintegration. Using existing community organizations and channels of communication, which enable communities to take development into their own hands and thus facilitate reintegration of ex-combatants, can strengthen social capital.

Informal networks of ex-combatants – discussion groups, veterans' associations, and joint economic ventures – are key elements for successful economic and social reintegration. Such associations can be extremely helpful when social capital has been depleted or is weakened and can serve as a cushion. A community support program that provides visible benefits to the community is a critical adjunct for ex-combatants assistance. Community sensitization and political awareness are paramount in this effort. Care is taken so ex-combatants are not stigmatized as unfit for any service or as conveyors of disease, violence, and misbehavior.



Members of two associations in Rwamagana

The association formed comprises both civilians and former combatants. When assistant chairwoman for clearing association in *Rwamagana* was asked how she is performing her response was,

“I would like to thank the veteran combatants for accepting first as a member and give me a leader position with out discriminating me as a civilian”. I am very proud to be a member of our association and am working hard to prove to be as their expectation and hope will not disappoint them.

Social cohesion can be described as the glue that bonds society together, promoting harmony, a sense of community, and a degree of commitment to promoting the common good. Beyond the social relations that bridge ethnic and religious groups, vertical linkages in which state and market institutions interact with communities and peoples can further cement the cohesiveness of a society if they are inclusive, transparent, and accountable.

The main activities of nurturing social capital in relation to RDRC programs starts with, pre-discharge orientation; information and sensitization of the target group; implementing referral services at the district or region levels; strengthening relevant specialized counseling; and support of community-based activities for reintegration. But all this activities are limited and need revisiting them so that they can be enhanced to meet the challenges the Commission is currently facing.

7.1 Trust and Solidarity

Trust and solidarity within and between communities were severely undermined during the genocide and war. People who had lived peacefully together suddenly become enemies during the conflict, sometimes the result of a deliberate choice, sometimes accidentally. Increased pressure on communities proved to be a real test on their solidarity, and in this case war/genocide they collapsed under too much pressure.

TABLE 32: EX-COMBATANTS' TRUST TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY

In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Most people who live in this neighborhood can be trusted?					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Agree strongly	13.3%	17.5%	16.6%	15.8%	21.1%	12.7%	18.4%	20.3%	15.3%
Agree somewhat	23.8%	28.5%	27.6%	26.6%	21.1%	26.7%	27.9%	20.3%	26.2%
Neither agree or disagree	10.3%	12.0%	5.5%	9.3%	5.3%	11.5%	9.0%	4.1%	9.9%
Disagree somewhat	18.5%	14.6%	15.5%	16.2%	21.1%	16.8%	15.2%	17.6%	16.6%
Disagree strongly	33.6%	27.2%	33.7%	31.5%	28.9%	31.8%	29.1%	37.8%	31.4%
don't know	0.5%	0.3%	1.1%	0.6%	2.6%	0.6%	0.4%		0.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

But at the same time the conflict created new bonds of trust and solidarity among combatants or reinforced already existing bonds. In many instances combatants and non-combatants alike, found themselves in a position that their lives depended on the extent to which others could be trusted. When ex-combatants were asked whether they trust their neighborhood 48 percent said they strongly disagree or disagree somehow. It is understandable that quite a sizeable number had lost trust and this indicates that there is a need to stress on reconciliation; key to ensuring peaceful coexistence.

The local community is both the primary resource for rehabilitation and the end result of reintegration. It is crucial to work with community to nurture trust [meaning returnees and host community]. People should be helped to help themselves so as to get over their traumatic experiences. Programs have to be geared to the real needs and priorities of the community. This requires major attitudinal change and methods of working with the community. The community must have ownership and responsibility towards the reconstruction and reconciliation so that a sustainable level of trust can develop and grow.

On the issue of interaction and relationships with communities, there appears to be increased interactions in rural areas than in urban areas. In *Kibungo* for instance, the focus group discussions indicated that those ex-combatants who had originally lived in *Kibungo* and had kinship ties in their areas were treated as ordinary relatives and had fully reintegrated in the community. In urban areas such was not the case. In *Gisenyi* for instance, the focus group discussions indicated that most of the ex-combatants in the area, were from outside *Gisenyi*. That oftentimes they were people who had done their final tour of duty in *Gisenyi* and chosen to stay there, either they could not return to their districts of origin because all their relatives had perished in the genocide or because they were people who had originated from outside the country. These ex-combatants were finding it hard to reintegrate.

When designing psychotherapy life-cycle changes of ex-combatants must be noted and remains relevant throughout the whole implementation of reintegration process. In the short term social and economic reintegration is related to acceptance of the various groups by host community and willingness to create chance for ex-combatants to reintegrate into civilian society in the long term.

TABLE 33: EX-COMBATANT'S TRUST COMPARED TO TWO YEARS AGO

Do you think that over the last two years, the level of trust in this neighborhood has gotten better, worse, or stayed about the same? *									
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Gotten better	66.4%	67.9%	58.1%	64.1%	52.6%	61.0%	75.7%	67.6%	65.2%
Gotten worse	16.9%	12.0%	17.9%	15.6%	23.7%	16.6%	12.3%	13.5%	15.5%
Stayed about the same	13.6%	17.9%	21.2%	17.6%	18.4%	18.9%	11.1%	17.6%	16.6%
I don't know	3.0%	2.3%	2.8%	2.7%	5.3%	3.6%	0.8%	1.4%	2.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When ex-combatants were asked to compare their trust of their neighborhood with that of two years ago they responded as follows. Two third said it is improving; seen according to categories of ex-combatants: ex-RDF 53%, ex-RPA 61%, ex-FAR 76% and ex-AG 68%.

A specific aim of the demobilization process is to dismantle the command structure. If mindset is not properly dealt-with, it is assumed that the disarmed combatants remain a potential security threat. It is also clear that as long as ex-combatants only stick together, reintegration process into society will be severely frustrated or not taking place at all. This delicate transition process from army life into civilian life must be scrutinized and revisited so as to nurture reintegration of former combatants.

Ex-combatants still usually have close contact with their former unit members. This also has an impact on trust. Ex-combatants trust each other compared to other members of the community because they were together through difficult times of the armed struggle, which created strong bonds among them. The close bonds and trust between ex-combatants must not be seen as negative phenomena and if it is properly utilize it can be a cushion and can serve as a safety-net.

7.2 Social cohesion and inclusion

Social reintegration is often eased by the support rendered by extended family network. Therefore Social reintegration is often eased by the support rendered by extended family network. Therefore Social reintegration is often eased by the support rendered by extended family network. Therefore, ex-combatants should be encouraged to reintegrate in the vicinity of their extended families. Informal networks of ex-combatants – discussion groups, ex-combatants associations, and joints economic ventures – are important elements to successful economic and social reintegration. But acute competition for scarce resources especially land, has tended to diminish the community's ability to help; in such cases the ex-combatant becomes a direct competitor, as the case was in *Gisenyi Rural*. The erosion of social

capital as a result of the genocide experience further worsens the situation making it difficult for ex-combatants and the community³⁶ to associate so as to promote self-help initiatives.

“If a guy went to fight to defend the rights of his family and on his return finds that his family was decimated... s/he finds it difficult to associate”

Efforts to structure assistance to ex-combatants such that communities of return benefit and can offer incentives for collaboration and acceptance, thereby strengthening social capital. Care should be taken to prevent the stigmatization of ex-combatants as unfit for military service or as conveyers of disease and violence. Community sensitization and information efforts are paramount in this regard. The fears of communities related to the return of ex-combatants should also be addressed.

TABLE 34: GRABBING JOB OPPORTUNITIES AWAY FROM EX-COMBATANT’S HOME AREA

If there were job opportunities away from your home area will go for it? *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Group 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
Yes	85.5%	85.5%	90.6%	87.2%	94.7%	85.4%	88.6%	85.1%	86.7%
No	14.5%	14.5%	9.4%	12.8%	5.3%	14.6%	11.4%	14.9%	13.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100%

Family relations are a vital element of social cohesion and are highly valued by Rwandans in all walks of life. Most ex-combatants were forced to cut all relations with their families, often for the whole time and spent the good part of their life in the field. Therefore one of the important problems faced by former fighters is the loss of ties with family or relatives leading to disorientation. For many former combatants the army had effectively replaced the family.

The finding of the community study shows similar trend. The communities said that generally they are living harmoniously with ex-combatants. They further said that on the whole ex-combatants are disciplined people, and well integrated.

“There is no problem, we live together, if we meet in a bar, we share, [drinks] if I need salt, or any help I go to him [ex-combatant] and he also comes to me when s/he has a need” Damascene R, Kirehe, Kibungo October 18 2004

When probed further, they admitted that there are a few challenges that sometimes cloud the relationships. After long years of absence and a drastic change in values

³⁶ Although this study deals with the reintegration of ex-combatants, there was evidence that even the community itself was not ‘reintegrated’ enough. Focus group discussions expressed the perception that “ex-combatants tend to be confrontational” as a result of their experiences.

and life style, it seems quite understandable that many ex-combatants felt detached from their families.

In the informal discussion conducted with former ex-combatants it was emphasized that the situation at the initial stage of demobilization the communication conducted between combatants and the community was as if they were at different wavelengths. But with time it was fine-tuned and currently a harmonious society is emerging creating a platform for reintegration. But that does not mean that there is no room for improvement.

In order to understand how well ex-combatants have assimilated with their communities, they were asked how often they quarrel with various categories of people listed in the table below. The level of acquaintance between the ex-combatants and these people shows great variation ranging from close personal relationship to little or no acquaintance.

TABLE 35: ARMY CATEGORY BY QUARRELLING WITH FRIENDS,...

Army Category	Do you often quarrel with friends?		Do you often quarrel with neighbors?		Do you often quarrel with strangers?		Do you often quarrel with Colleagues at work?		Do you often quarrel with people in authority - police army?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
RDF	1	37	1	37	10	28	1	37	2	36
	4.2	4.3	2.4	4.4	9.1	3.6	5.0	4.3	9.5	4.2
RPA	17	512	32	496	61	467	12	517	14	512
	70.8	59.4	76.2	58.9	55.5	60.3	60.0	59.8	66.7	59.5
FAR	5	239	9	234	28	216	7	237	3	239
	20.8	27.7	21.4	27.8	25.5	27.9	35.0	27.4	14.3	27.8
AG	1	74	0	75	11	64	0	74	2	73
	4.2	8.6	.0	8.9	10.0	8.3	.0	8.6	9.5	8.5

It appears from this data that levels of aggression are very low amongst ex-combatants as in all cases the majority said that they never fight with any of the people identified in the questionnaire. According to these results, ex-combatants are least likely to quarrel with strangers (14%) and people in authority (3%). The group of people that ex-combatants are most likely to sometimes quarrel with stranger (13%) and this is followed by their family (8%). A small percentage of ex-combatants (3%) say that they quarrel with their friends.

The reintegration of ex-combatants would not be complete if it does not take into account ex-combatant's fears, hopes, and attitudes about adjustment or maladjustment within their new environments. Adjustment refers here to the individual's (or group's) ability to live and perform various social roles and activities without suffering

excessive or unbearable psychological stress. Before we consider the issue of social reconstruction following the post-conflict stage of any country, it is necessary to broaden our view of war and its social consequences.

7.3 Information and Communication

Information, counseling and referral services can assist ex-combatants to assess their livelihood options and find employment. Micro-projects can help ex-combatants secure their economic independence and self-employment. Apprenticeships in the informal sector combine the benefit of vocational training and employment. The creation of viable long-term employment opportunities for ex-combatants is closely linked to private sector growth and associated employment generation. It should be noted that ex-combatants themselves could provide a significant human resource contribution to the civilian economy if their resourcefulness is properly utilized. Most veteran ex-combatants usually will not be able to decide in which way they can best become economically active or prepare themselves for economic activities. Opportunities might not be clear to ex-combatants due to the absence of other ex-combatants from the area in which they will settle.

First, referral counseling will provide answers to questions about access to reintegration assistance and other general issues, guidance on job-seeking strategies and training, and advice on micro-project identification, preparation and implementation. Second, it will also offer a means of linking ex-combatants to such opportunities, thereby integrating education; training and employment activities of the program. Importantly the service will also refer ex-combatants to labor-intensive public works or other rehabilitation and development projects. It would provide critical psychosocial support during transition phase.

7.4 Empowerment and Political Action

War may have dramatic implications for long-term development. The social and cultural disintegration of a war-torn society has a dramatic impact on its economy. In the absence of political stability, mutual trust, respect for property, and the rule of law, economic relations break down. This disintegration may also negatively affect domestic production and income. Most human misery and deaths in poor countries are not a result of direct violence, but of the more general effects of protracted conflict on economic and administrative structures, such as the collapse of basic public services, famine and large-scale forced migration.

Reintegration of ex-combatants' families is a continuous, long-term process that takes place at psychological, social, economic and political levels. The host community defines reintegration as social and political acceptance of an ex-combatant and his/her family. Economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant's household through productive and gainful employment. The central objective of reintegration programs is to support ex-combatants in their effort to integrate themselves into social and economic networks of a civilian society.

Since reintegration constitutes an integral part of the overall transformation from a 'war-torn' to a reconstructed country, the process which is unfolding in a country creates opportunities/constraints to create cohesive society. It presents chances for ex-combatants to succeed, but post-conflict country experiences show that successful reintegration is still more an exception than a rule, thus reintegration proves to be a complex process with many pitfalls.

Once ex-combatants are settled the process of reintegration within the host community slowly follows. The reintegration component of the RDRP is aimed at the economic and social reintegration of demobilized combatants into social and economic landscape. As indicated in table 35 ex-combatants are slowly catching up in involving themselves in all walks of life. More than one third of the combatants are members of an organization or association and the majority of the ones (67%) are members of self-help organization. Information collected from anecdotes elaborate that the status of ex-combatants is slowly growing among the local population. It is now common to see a former combatant being selected in *Gaccaca* (local courts) or in different administrative structures, which handle the common good of the society.

TABLE 36: BELONGING TO ASSOCIATION OR ORGANIZATION

Do you or your family belong to any association/organization *					Ex-combatants categorization				
	Group 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Group 2 (2002) n=310	Group 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	34.8%	36.2%	29.8%	33.6%	31.6%	29.0%	48.4%	28.0%	34.4%
No	65.2%	63.8%	70.2%	66.4%	68.4%	71.0%	51.6%	72.0%	65.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Reintegration has to be considered as a complex process; involving different but interlinked aspects of reintegration: social, political and economic, that must be addressed as distinct issues. The reintegration of ex-combatants is an essential component in the consolidation of a post-conflict society and in overall nation building process.

Conceptualizing reintegration, as a process has proven indispensable to take into account the complex process needed to re-establish the political, social and economic stability of a country, which is usually neglected by post-conflict countries. Political integration refers to the process through which the ex-combatants and his/her family become full part of the decision-making process. Economic integration is the process through which the returnee's household builds up its livelihood through production and other types of gainful employment. Social reintegration denotes a situation in which host and ex-combatants communities are able to coexist with no more mutual conflict than that which already exists within the host community.

When ex-combatants return, they are not returning to a vacuum, they are returning to a place, which is most probably markedly different from the area they left, even if it is in the same physical location. Their environment needs to be reconstructed physically, socially, and culturally. They are also returning to a place where people have remained and lived throughout the conflict.³⁷

For many long-term ex-combatants demobilization does not necessarily mean, 'going home.' Instead, they are returning to places or social environments that are different or appear to have changed, or alternatively, where the resident population regards the ex-combatants as strangers because of differing customs and beliefs that they have acquired during their time in the bush.

³⁷ Mehreteab Amanuel, 2003 Wake Up Hanna, Reintegration and Reconstruction Challenges for Post-War Eritrea (forth coming).

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

8. CONTEXT

War-torn countries are characterized by fragmented societies. The society of ex-combatant has usually grown apart from the civilian society, and the reintegration of these entities constitutes an important dimension within one territory. In most cases the reintegration process takes a number of years and involves not only combatants, but also their family unit and returning refugees and sometimes internally displaced population. Social reintegration is a process through which ex-combatants and their families feel part of and are accepted by the community. One should not only consider attitude of the ex-combatant and their families, but should focus on community's perception towards the returnees. People in society are conscious of a person's status in a social structure not on the basis of his/her current role occupancy alone but also on the basis of whom the individual used to be.

Reintegration of ex-combatants and their families thus is a continuous, long-term process that takes place at psychological, social, economic and political levels. The social reintegration concept defines reintegration as social and political acceptance of ex-combatant and his/her family by the community. Economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant's household through productive and gainful employment. The central objective of reintegration programs is to support ex-combatants in their effort to reintegrate themselves into social and economic networks of a civilian society.

8.1 *Conclusion*

In Rwandan societies, reintegration is taking place within the framework of the reconstruction process in re-building of a cohesive country. On the day of their demobilization, ex-combatants received certificate of patriotism, which represents at least symbolic recognition of their sacrifices. As other cases had shown, such gesture is contributing positively in avoiding ex-combatants feeling of being forgotten or abandoned in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Ex-combatants in Rwanda are respected by the community and slowly their status is picking-up and as a result they are well represented in the hierarchal structure. For example, in Rural Kigali the former combatants are actively working in the following structures:

- Provincial level 4 out of 48
- District level 22 out of 50
- Sector level 300 out of 1390
- *Akagari* (Cellule) level 3678 out of 12260

Ex-combatants enjoy a good amount of goodwill by the community and this is serving as a cushion to their reintegration process thus is easing their hardship.

More than three fourth ex-combatants had settled permanently and is a sign of reintegrating back into the community. More than fifty percent of the ex-combatants own a house of their own and this is a testimony that they are slowly catching-up. Thus former combatants slowly but surly are reintegrating to the main stream of the society. Saying this referral services in the province are still weak and needs to be strengthened. The Commission offices are only stationed in the capitals of the provinces and same are new only recruited in May 2004 and often are not well informed about all ongoing activities.

It is highly appreciated that steering committees is discussing major projects during TCC meetings to build common understanding. Experience and exchange of information must not be limited mainly at the top level but other staff members should be informed about the responsibilities and working procedures of other partner institutions. Precondition for the success of the reintegration programs is an intensive co-ordination and co-operation with the Line Ministries and during the transition period of the program memorandum of understanding should be put in place to guide the process of exit strategy.

Nevertheless some ex-combatants are still facing unsure economic future and social disorientation thus suffer from traumatic experiences during the war. Nearly half former ex-combatants need counseling in terms of social support. Getting adequate information and practical guidance is vital during the time of transition. Yet, little data is available about the extent of the stress ex-combatants face and this gap of information should be filled.

Reintegration programs in Rwanda are stimulating the postwar economy, enabling ex-combatants to find economic opportunities other than those advantages gained through conducting warfare. Former ex-combatants are actively participating in the common good endeavors of the community as vanguard and are highly visible in it and their role is highly appreciated by their fellow country men/women.

Given the low level of skills of ex-combatants who are ill equipped to find gainful employment in the formal sector life skills training is needed by ex-combatants. In order to avoid unrealistic expectations, rumors, and possibly negative misinformation about the program information is disseminated to both the ex-combatants and society by and large. What has been done so far is good but there is a room for improvement for example by actively supplying adequate information at the referral places on continuous base.

The support mechanism put by the Commission to ease the reintegration process of ex-combatants is still weak and needs enhancement. The medical rehabilitation so far offered by MR is limited only to health service but need to be extended to occupational

therapy and psycho-social rehabilitation and designing skills training that can cater the disabled ex-combatant's needs.

The counseling and guidance offered by the Commission in support with Line Ministries is just starting and needs revisiting by professional to make it adequate and efficient. The counseling training should start with the Commission's staff so as to make them aware on the seriousness of the psycho-social issues. Proper tackling of a problem can start only after understanding the issue. The Commission should do a lot of effort on this problem initially by hiring a qualified expert so as to be advised properly.

The Commission should hire the services of institutional builder to strength the capacity of the associations so as to live a viable structure behind to help initially ex-combatants and vulnerable groups in the community in the long run. The ex-combatant's association is built on self-help mechanisms [economic/social] already existing in the country. In order to minimize pitfalls proper assessment should be done on the rules and regulations of associations from institutional point of views.

The survey findings show that significant social reintegration is occurring. However, there are indications that many ex-combatants experience trauma related psycho-social and behavioral problems that could have longer-term social implications. Although such problems cut across gender and all the age-cohorts in all the areas, they seem particularly pronounced amongst the younger ex-combatants. Furthermore, although traditional ceremonies and mechanisms are being promoted, there is a need to plan psycho-social interventions and generate activities/information that are community sensitive and inclusive and are not based on "western" values and standards. Use should be made of traditional values and systems, but still ensuring that structured and appropriate community-based psychological assistance is put in place.

Social and economic reintegration must not only focus on ex-combatants but should galvanize the whole society in a new post-crisis context to kick start development. Currently the commission is in a stage whereby targeted assistance is winding up and community base reintegration is taking over. In such a situation a multiplicity of interventions are required. It is immediately necessary to meet needs by putting in place systems, support structures that allow the country and its people to define their ongoing requirements to development concurrently. It must always be remembered that development assistance only reinforces capabilities but never substitute for recipients' own recovery efforts.

8.2 *Recommendation*

It is advisable to involve beneficiaries in the planning process of the projects. Including them in planning, decision-making and implementation is the most appropriate way to nurture ownership and achieve effective sustainable projects, since the participants are the only ones who know their potential and their specific needs best.

- The Commission should strengthen the offices at the provincial level by providing them with regular information, discretionary power in budget allocation and equip them with basic needs such as computer, photocopier.
- Policy framework for the exit-strategy for the reintegration program should be elaborated in partnership with the Line Ministries and private sector and must be known by all stakeholders.
- The exit-strategy should be developed in harmony with the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Commission as well as with the donors and other stakeholders to have some understanding
- To prepare ex-combatants for better self-employment, vocational training should be combined with other instruments of support; for example, a package of "Training & Counseling Credit" should be available.
- To reach more of the less educated ex-combatants, entry requirements should be more flexible so as not to limit the ones with low education.

The RDRC must revise its strategies to deal with the transitional issues and the national recovery effort. The revision of the strategy must take into account the following:

- Enhancement sensitization to boost the return of armed group;
- Design phasing out of targeted assistance for the Commission and entry point for both the Line Ministries and Commission to community based support;
- Setting modalities for transitional issues and defining a time-limited advocacy role;
- The public works programs and community based works programs should be enhanced with the support of the Line Ministries;
- Job creation projects in line with Poverty Reduction Strategy of the country should be enhanced;
- RDRC should improve coordination and integration of projects, resources and activities with partners and revive the sub-working groups;
- Bridge the rural-urban drift by focusing intervention towards rural area so as to limit its pull effect of urban area which is the current trend; and
- Ensure that ex-combatants have sufficient access to psycho-social counseling throughout the country with partnership of Line Ministries.

Recommendations on broader areas:

- A transition strategy needed to be initiated as soon as possible and carried out in consultation with potential partners – particularly the MINALOC,
- Increase the capacity of implementing partners and the provision of services,
- Fast track disbursement and procurement,
- Design and coordinate the implementation of training and business development service,
- Provide post training support, and
- Monitor quality and impact of support given so far

Facilitation of access to land requires government policies that show leniency to accommodate ex-combatant's demand and local authorities should be sensitized to pay special attention on these issues. In post-conflict Rwanda with returning of displaced populations, competition for land is a bone of contention and need to be addressed creatively. Implementers should be aware of preferential treatment of ex-combatants could create conflict potentially but must pay attention of the opposite scenario in which ex-combatants could be marginalized and increasingly become disenfranchised, and join the urban poor. In urban settings support measures for economic reintegration generally needs to be more diverse, key elements of economic reintegration support to ex-combatants includes:

- Support to complete interrupted education (mostly secondary and tertiary)
- Labor intensive public works providing immediate employment for unskilled ex-combatants (especially in war-to-peace transitions)
- Demand driven vocational training
- Job creation programs in collaboration with the private sector
- Apprenticeships in the informal sector
- Rudimentary business training and counseling

8.3 Documents Assessed

The following documents were reviewed.

- The Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) 2001, which gathers data on households' living conditions and use of public services;
- The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2000, which gathers data on women's fertility and health and the health of their children;
- The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2001, which gathers data on further aspects of the education, water supply and nutrition of a subset of the households included in the DHS;
- The Household Living Conditions Survey 2001 (EICV), which gathers a comprehensive set of information on a large sample of households, covering consumption, income, education, health and other dimensions;

- The Food Security Survey 2000/01, which gathers detailed information on crop production from a sub-sample of households from the sample used for the EICV, and is related to surveys conducted earlier during the 1980s and 1990s;
- The Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) 2001, which examines the flow of funds to services in the health and education sectors;
- The national consultations conducted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in 2000;
- Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs. *'Labor-Intensive Local Development Program,'* November 2003.
- Rapid Assessment of socio-economic status
- Vulnerable Support Window Assessment
- Beneficiary Assessment
- 1st Independent Program Evaluation

Many of the transitional issues raised above could be integrated into the National Recovery Strategy. Although the role of the NCDDR is clearly set out in the strategy, it mainly focuses on the completion of opportunities for the remaining ex-combatants. While the NCDDR carries out this function, it should simultaneously find the points of insertion and integration of the remaining issue of the ex-combatants within the strategy, especially as it is being implemented. Given the NCDDR special role and position within Sierra Leone it offers an exceptional opportunity to play an advocacy role to ensure that the National Recovery Strategy takes account of the special circumstances of the ex-combatants.

The following studies must be done so that the Commission can design the exit option efficiently.

- Tracer Survey for child ex-combatants
- Tracer Survey of female ex-combatants
- Base Line Study for disabled combatants
- Study that assess the opportunities available in the Rural sector
- Study that assess the magnitude of psychosocial problems faced by ex-combatants
- Study that assess the training capacity (on the job training) in the public and private sector of the country.

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Annex 1 Questionnaire

Tracer Survey questionnaire for former combatants Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Tracer Survey questionnaire for former combatants

Questionnaire No _____ Demobilization No _____

Province _____

District _____

Sector _____

Bank _____

Profile

____ PRO.01 Full Name _____

____ PRO.02 Full Mother's Name _____

____ PRO.03 Full Father's Name _____

____ PRO.04 Sex Male ____ (1) Female ____ (2)

____ PRO.05 Origin Urban ____ (1) Semi-urban ____ (2) Rural ____ (3)

____ PRO.06 Present Location Urban ____ (1) Semi-urban ____ (2) Rural ____ (3)

Marital Status and Children

____ PRO.07 Marital status Single ____ (1) Married ____ (2) Widow ____ (3) Separated ____ (4) Divorced ____ (5) Cohabiting ____ (6) Living with some one else ____ (7)

____ PRO.08 If married how many Times? Once ____ (1) Twice ____ (2) Three times ____ (3) More than 3 ____ (4)

____ PRO.09 what is the status of your spouse? Refugee ____ (1) Combatant ____ (2) Civilian ____ (3)

____ PRO.10 Number of children? None ____ (1) One ____ (2) Two ____ (3) Three ____ (4) Four ____ (5) More than four ____ (6)

Education and Skill

____ PRO.11 Can you read and write without any problem? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2) [if no go to 16]

____ PRO.12 What was your level of education at demobilization (left the military)? Can read and write ____ (1) Primary ____ (2) Lower Secondary ____ (3) Higher Secondary ____ (4) Tertiary ____ (5) University ____ (6)

____ PRO.13 When did you get education? Before combat ____ (1) In Army ____ (2) After Demobilization ____ (3)

____ PRO.14 Are you continuing your studies? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2) [if no go to 16]

____ PRO.15 If yes, what kind? Formal academic education ____ (1) Vocational training ____ (2) Apprenticeship ____ (3) Other ____ (4) Specify _____

____ PRO.16 Did you get skill training after demobilization? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2) [if no go to 18]

____ PRO.17 If yes, What Kind? Craftsmanship ____ (1) bicycle repair ____ (2) Crop/Animal Husbandry ____ (3) Carpentry ____ (4) Builder ____ (5) Driver ____ (6) Trade ____ (7) Poultry ____ (8) Teacher ____ (9) Other ____ (10) Specify _____

____ PRO.18 Do you have skill? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2) [if no go to 21]

____ PRO.19 Where did you acquire your skill? Before joining combat ____ (1) During Combat

____ (2) After Demobilization _____ (3)
 ____ PRO.20 Since finishing training was you able to get a job? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)

Age and Experience

____ PRO.21 How old is you? _____
 ____ PRO.22 Rank; Colonel ____ (1) Lt. Colonel ____ (2) Major ____ (3) Captain ____ (4) Lt.
 _____ (5) 2Lt ____ (6) WO1 ____ (7) WOII ____ (8) SM ____ (9) S/SGT ____ (10) SGT ____
 (11) CPL ____ (12) L/CPL ____ (13) Private ____ (14).
 ____ PRP.23 Did you have non-combat occupation in army. Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
 (If no, go to 25)
 ____ PRO.24 Non-combat occupation in army; Logistic ____ (1) Health ____ (2) Security ____ (3)
 Teacher ____ (4) Public administration ____ (5) Communication ____ (6) Social
 affairs ____ (7) Others ____ (8) specify _____
 ____ PRO.25 For how many years did you stay in the army? Less than one-year ____ (1) one
 year ____ (2) Two years ____ (2) Three years ____ (3) four years ____ (4) Five
 years ____ (5) Six years ____ (6) 7-10 Years ____ (7) More than 10 years ____ (8)

Demobilization and its effect

____ DEF.01 Which phase were you demobilized? _____
 ____ DEF.02 Do you have any income? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
 ____ DEF.03 If yes, what is your level of income? Good ____ (1) Average ____ (2) Bad ____ (3)
 ____ DEF.04 If your answer is bad, why? _____
 ____ DEF.05 If your answer is good, why? _____
 ____ DEF.06 If your answer is average, why? _____
 ____ DEF.07 Were you expecting Demobilization? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
 (If no, go to 09)
 ____ DEF.08 If yes, then; I was happy ____ (1) I had expected it ____ (2) I was relieved ____ (3) I was
 eagerly waiting for it ____ (4) Other ____ (5) Specify _____
 ____ DEF.09 If no. It was unexpected ____ (1) I had panicked ____ (2) I was disillusioned ____ (3)
 I was confused ____ (4) Other ____ (5) Specify _____
 ____ DEF.10 After demobilization did your expectation match reality? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
 ____ DEF.11 If not, elaborate. _____
 ____ DEF.12 If yes, elaborate. _____

Living Condition

____ LCN.01 What type of house are you living in? Mud house ____ (1) Permanent ____ (2)
 Tent ____ (3) Others ____ (4) Specify _____ (if homeless go 09)
 ____ LCN.02 How big is your house? One room ____ (1) Two rooms ____ (2) Three rooms ____ (3) Four
 rooms ____ (4) More than four rooms ____ (5)
 ____ LCN.03 How do you rate your housing situation to the one you had before joining combat?
 The same ____ (1) Now, it is better ____ (2) It was better before ____ (3) Other ____ (4)
 Specify _____
 ____ LCN.04 Who owns the house you are currently living in? My parents ____ (1) Landlord ____ (2) My
 friend ____ (3) It is owned by my relatives ____ (4) Government owned ____ (5) I own it
 ____ (6) Other ____ (7) specify _____
 ____ LCN.05 If you rent the house, how much do you pay/month? _____
 ____ LCN.06 How do you rate your living condition to that of your neighbors? Better ____ (1) Same
 ____ (2) Worse ____ (3)
 ____ LCN.07 If it is better why? _____

___ LCN.08 If it is the same why? _____

___ LCN.09 If it is worse why? _____

___ LCN.10 What are your living arrangements? Same family members as before joining combat
 ___ (1) Same family members but different to that before joining combat ___ (2) With
 Friends but in a family structure ___ (3) With friends ___ (4) Alone ___ (5) Other
 ___ (6) Specify _____

Life During combat and after

___ LDC.01 Why did you join the military? Caught in the middle of the war ___ (1)
 Following friend or relative who had joined ___ (2) To avoid atrocities ___ (3) For a
 living ___ (4) Political persecution ___ (5) Cross-border incursions ___ (6) For
 military profession ___ (7) displaced from one's place (8) Other ___ (9) Specify ___
(Select only one)

___ LDC.02 If to avoid atrocity can you elaborate? _____

___ LDC.03 How was life during combat/war situation? Good ___ (1) Average ___ (2) Bad ___ (3)

___ LDC.04 If good elaborate. _____

___ LDC.05 If average elaborate. _____

___ LCD.06 If bad elaborate. _____

___ LDC.07 What were you doing before the war? Student ___ (1) Housewife ___ (2) Unemployed
 ___ (3) Farming ___ (4) Self employed ___ (5) employed ___ (6) Civil-servant ___ (7)
 House-boy/girl ___ (8) Was in the army ___ (9) Other ___ (10) Specify _____

LDC.08 Which armed group or Front did you join? RDF ___ (1) RPA ___ (2) FAR ___ (3)
 Armed Group ___ (4)

___ LDC.09 Why did you choose to join the specific front? _____

___ LDC.10 Where you aware what combat life/armed resistance demand? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) [**if
 no go to 12]**

___ LDC.11 If you answer yes what was your source of information? A friend ___ (1) A family
 member ___ (2) Media ___ (3) Hearsay ___ (4) from member of the resistance group
 ___ (5) Others ___ (6) Specify _____

___ LDC.12 Did your attitude towards life changed because you joined combat/military? Yes ___
 (1) No ___

___ LDC.13 If yes, elaborate. _____

___ LDC.14 If not, elaborate. _____

___ LDC.15 Are you in touch with your former unit members? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) (**if no go to
 17**)

___ LDC.16 If yes (**Chose only one**). It easy to communicate with (understand each other) ___ (1)
 We were like family ___ (2) Because I get support from them ___ (3) For I get
 information and advice ___ (4) They are everything to me ___ (5) Other ___ (6)
 Specify _____

___ LDC.17 If your response is no (**Chose only one**) I don't have spare time ___ (1) It is useless ___
 (2) I don't want to remember them ___ (3) The respect I had for them had deteriorated
 ___ (4) Now we do not have anything in common ___ (5) Other ___ (6)
 Specify _____

___ LDC.18 Did your relationship (family/relative) change after demobilization? Yes ___ (1) No
 ___ (2) (**if no go to 20**)

___ LDC.19 If yes, how? _____

___ LDC.20 If no, Why? _____

___ LDC.21 As demobilized combatants how do you qualify your relationship with your

- neighbors? Good ___ (1) Average ___ (2) Bad ___ (3)
- ___ LDC.22 If your response is bad the main reason is because I fought on the wrong side ___ (1) I returned to share the meager resource ___ (2) Because my livelihood depends on them ___ (3) Perception/Attitude toward combatant is negative ___ (4) Other ___ (5) Specify ___ (6)
- ___ LDC.23 If your response is good it is because we are sons and daughters of them ___ (1) They respect our contribution towards peace and stability ___ (2) Because of us there is peace ___ (3) They need helping hands ___ (4) Other ___ (5) Specify _____
- ___ LDC.24 If your response is average, why? _____
- ___ LDC.25 Did you have contact with your family while in the military? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ LDC.26 If your response is yes, how often? In between 1-12 month ___ (1) Yearly ___ (2) Once in two years ___ (3) Once in three years ___ (4) Once in four years ___ (5) More than four years ___ (6) Other ___ (7) Specify _____
- ___ LDC.27 After getting demobilized, have you ever visited the area/s you stayed as a combatant? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ LDC.28 After you got demobilized did you encounter adjustment problem/s? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ LDC.29 If your response is yes (**Select only one**) Land Problem ___ (1) Lack of skill ___ (2) Shelter ___ (3) Lack of fund ___ (4) Lack of family support ___ (5) Health related problem ___ (6) Family or relative acceptance ___ (7) Child-care ___ (8) Other ___ (9) Specify _____
- ___ LDC.30 Did you change your home address after demobilization? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ LDC.31 If yes; In search of job ___ (1) In search of training ___ (2) In search of land ___ (3) Because I was not accepted by the community ___ (4) Health problem ___ (5) Other ___ (6) Specify _____
- ___ LDC.32 Number of times you had changed site of settlement. Once ___ (1) Two times ___ (2) Three times ___ (3) Four times ___ (4) More than four times ___ (5)
- ___ LDC.33 How long do you intend to stay in your present home area? I have no intention of staying here at all ___ (1) I have no intention of moving ___ (2) Until I have enough money to return to my indigenous place ___ (3) I had selected this area as my residence place ___ (4) Other ___ (5) Specify _____
- ___ LDC.34. If you intend to move; then it is because of economic problem/s ___ (1) Family problem ___ (2) Administration problem ___ (3) Service or facilities shortage ___ (4) Health problem

Economic Aspect

- ___ ECA.01 Have you received your benefits? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
(If no, go to 04)
- ___ ECA.02 If yes how much? _____
- ___ ECA.03 How do you spend it? To sustain my livelihood (1) To help family ___ (2) I invest it in income generating activity) ___ (3) I put it in the bank ___ (4) squandered it ___ (5) got married with it ___ (6) I lend it ___ (7) Other ___ (8) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.04 Did you get any support to enable you to carry out your present activity? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) (If no go to 06).
- ___ ECA.05 If your response is yes, who helped you? Family ___ (1) Friends ___ (2) Community leaders ___ (3) Administration ___ (4) Demobilization commission ___ (5) Others ___ (6) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.06 Are you in a position to support your family financially? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
[If no, go to 08].
- ___ ECA.07 If your response is yes, how often? Regularly ___ (1) Often ___ (2) Some times ___ (3) Other ___ (4) Specify _____

- ___ ECA.08 Do you have a job at present? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) **[if no go to 10]**.
- ___ ECA.09 Are you working the whole year through Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) **[if no go to 10]**.
- ___ ECA.10 If you are not working, how do you bridge the gap? By engaging in occasional jobs

- ___ ECA.11 If you are currently unemployed how long have you been out of work? Three month
_____ (1) From 4 to 6 month ___ (2) One year ___ (3) Two Year ___ (4) Three years
_____ (5)
More than Three years ___ (6) Other ___ (7) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.12 Why do you think you are unemployed? I do not know ___ (1) Lack of work
opportunity ___ (2) Lack of marketable skills ___ (3) No Patron ___ (4) Financial
problem/s (lack of credit window) ___ (5) Other ___ (6) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.13 Can you specify how you spend your monthly expenditure? Food ___ (1) House rent
___ (2) Land rent ___ (3) Medicine ___ (4) House utensils ___ (5) Miscellaneous
expenditures _____
- ___ ECA.14 Did you get any training after demobilization? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) **[if yes go to
19]**
- ___ ECA.15 If yes, are you using the skill you were trained in? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ ECA.16 Did you receive tools after training? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ ECA.17 If yes, are you using it? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ ECA.18 If no, why? _____
- ___ ECA.19 did you get grant support? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) **(If no, go to 17)**.
- ___ ECA.20 If yes was it enough? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ ECA.21 If there was job opportunities away from your home area will you goes for it?
Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2) **(If no, go to 23)**.
- ___ ECA.22 If yes the main reason could be; for more money ___ (1) To live elsewhere ___ (2)
For greater experience ___ (3) For better working condition ___ (4) Other ___ (5)
Specify _____
- ___ ECA.23 If no the main reason could be; My ancestors are buried here ___ (1)
Family/community Commitment ___ (2) Fear of change ___ (3) Here I am well
connected ___ (4) Lack of information ___ (5) Other ___ (6) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.24 Why do you think former combatants find it hard to get job? They are lazy ___ (1)
They have no skill ___ (2) Lack of extended family network ___ (3) Lack of support
from the government ___ (4) Lack of work ethic (not disciplined) ___ (5) I do not
know ___ (6) Other ___ (7) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.25 Do you see your economic situation improving in the near future? Yes, ___ (1) No ___
(2)
- ___ ECA.26 If your response is yes elaborate. _____
- ___ ECA.27 If your response is no elaborate. _____
- ___ ECA.28 Do you have a saving account in any bank? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ ECA.29 What do you think will improve your economic situation _____
- ___ ECA.30 What property do you own _____
- ___ ECA.31 If you encounter an economic problem to who does you turn for help? Family ___ (1)
Friends ___ (2) Community leaders ___ (3) Church organization ___ (4)
Administration ___ (5) Our association ___ (6) No one ___ (7) Colleagues who
Were in the army with me ___ (8) Other ___ (9) Specify _____
- ___ ECA.32 Have you applied for credit? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
- ___ ECA.33 If your response is yes did you get it? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)

___ ECA.34 If your answer is no can you elaborate on it. _____

___ ECA.35 If yes, what do you think will improve your economic performance? _____

Social Aspect

___ SOC.01 How do you spend your spare time? At home ___ (1) visit family or friends ___ (2)
 Social obligation ___ (3) I don't have time for socialization ___ (4) Other ___ (5)
 Specify _____

___ SOC.02 Does you family belong to an association/organization? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)
(If no, go to 04)

___ SOC.03 If yes what type? Religious ___ (1) Self-help organization ___ (2) Reconciliation
 committee ___ (3) Village organization ___ (4) Political organization ___ (5)
 Other ___ (6) Specify _____

___ SOC.04 Do you have your own household? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)

___ SOC.05 If your response is yes, who are the members? **(Please put X in the blank space)**
 Husband ___ (1) Wife ___ (2) Children ___ (3) Parents in laws ___ (4) Dependents
 ___ (5) Others ___ (6) Specify _____

___ SOC.06 Do you visit family members? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)

___ SOC.07 If yes how often? Rarely ___ (1) Often ___ (2) At least once a year
 ___ (3) Other ___ (4) Specify _____

___ SOC.08 If not why? _____

___ SOC.09 How many social groups do you or any member of your household belongs to? One ___
 (1) Two ___ (2) Three ___ (3) Four ___ (4)

___ SOC.10 Compared to two years ago, do members of your household participate in more or
 fewer groups or organizations? More ___ (1) Same number ___ (2) Fewer
 ___ (3)

___ SOC.11 How many times in the past six month did any member of your household participate
 in this group's activities, e.g. attending meeting or doing group work? Once ___ (1)
 Twice (2) Three times ___ (3) Four times ___ (4) Nearly every week ___ (5) Nearly
 every month ___ (6) Other ___ (7) Specify _____

___ SOC.12 How many days of work did your household give to this group in the last six months?
 Put the number of days

___ SOC.13 What benefit do you or your household gets by joining this group(s)?

___ SOC.14 Does the group help your household get access to education/training? Yes ___ (1) No ___
 (2)

___ SOC.15 Does the group help your household get access to health services? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)

___ SOC.16 Does it help your household get access to water supply/sanitation? Yes ___ (1) No ___
 (2)

___ SOC.17 Does the group help your household get access to credit or savings? Yes ___ (1) No ___
 (2)

___ SOC.18 Does the group help your household get access to other? Yes ___ (1) No ___
 (2)

___ SOC.19 Are members of the group of same neighborhood? Yes ___ (1) No ___
 (2)

___ SOC.20 Are members of the group of same religion? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)

___ SOC.21 Are members of the group of same gender? Yes ___ (1) No ___
 (2)

___ SOC.22 Are members of the group of same age? Yes ___ (1) No ___ (2)

- ___SOC.23 Are most of the group ex-combatants? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.24 Are most of the group of the some occupation? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.25 Are some members richer or poorer than others, or do they all have the same income level? Most of them have some income _____ (1) Mixed (rich/poor) _____ (2)
- ___SOC.26 How does one become a member of this group? Born into the group _____ (1)
Requires Joining ____ (2) Volunteer ____ (3) Need acceptance or invitation ____ (4)
Need support from community elders ____ (5) Other ____ (6) Specify _____
- ___SOC.27 Do you have some one you can share your heart with or call for help and will be always around to help or comfort? Yes _____ No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.28 If you suddenly faced a long-term emergency such as the death of a breadwinner or job loss how many people beyond your immediate household could you turn to for assistance? No one ____ (1) one to two people ____ (2) Three to Four people ____ (3)
More than five people _____ (4)
- ___SOC.29 In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Most people who live in this neighborhood can be trusted. Agree strongly ____ (1) Agree somewhat ____ (2) Neither agree nor disagree ____ (3) Disagree somewhat ____ (4) Disagree strongly ____ (5)
- ___SOC.30 Do you think that over the last two years, the level of trust in this neighborhood has gotten better, worse, or stayed about the same? Gotten better ____ (1) Gotten worse ____ (2) Stayed about the same _____ (3)
- ___SOC.31 Do you often quarrel/misunderstand with family? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.32 Do you often quarrel/misunderstand with friends? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.33 Do you often quarrel/misunderstand with neighbors? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.34 Do you often quarrel/misunderstand with Colleagues at work? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
- ___SOC.35 Do you often quarrel/misunderstand with strangers? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.36 Do you often quarrel/misunderstand with people in authority - police army? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
- ___SOC.37 Do you think relation between ex-combatants and the community, by and large, are improving or deteriorating over the time? Improving ____ (1) Deteriorating _____ (2)
- ___SOC.38 If it is increasing then elaborate _____

- ___SOC.39 If it is decreasing then elaborate _____

- ___SOC.40 Do you often have difficulty in sleeping? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.41 Do you often have difficulty concentrating while working? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
- ___SOC.42 Do you often have difficulty talking with your friends? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)
- ___SOC.43 Do you often have difficulty with dreams/flashback? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.44 Do you often have difficulty with your temper? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.45 Do you often get nervous easily? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)
- ___SOC.46 Do you often have difficulty listening to people talking? Yes ____ (1) No ____ (2)

THANK YOU

<p>ENUMERATOR CODE</p>  <p>Date of completion</p> <p>___ / ___ /2004</p> <p>dd mm yy</p>	<p>FIELD MANAGER CODE</p>  <p>Date of quality control</p> <p>___ / ___ /2004</p> <p>dd mm yy</p>	<p>DATA CODERS CODE</p>  <p>Date of quality coding</p> <p>___ / ___ /2004</p> <p>dd mm yy</p>	<p>DATA CAPTURER CODE</p>  <p>Date of data entry</p> <p>___ / ___ /2004</p> <p>dd mm yy</p>
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Annex 2: Tabulation tables used to produce the tracer document

Table 1: Level of education

What was your level of education at demobilization (left the military)?					Ex-combatants categories					
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total	n=892
Can read and write	5.6%	7.0%	6.1%	6.2%	13.3%	7.7%	2.1%	7.3%	6.2%	
Primary	52.2%	54.1%	57.8%	54.7%	36.7%	56.9%	48.1%	63.6%	53.9%	
Lower Secondary	22.6%	23.7%	22.4%	22.9%	20.0%	22.9%	25.3%	14.5%	22.9%	
Higher Secondary	12.8%	6.6%	5.4%	8.3%	23.3%	8.6%	8.9%	10.9%	9.4%	
Vocational	6.7%	7.8%	6.1%	6.9%	6.7%	3.4%	15.2%		6.9%	
University		0.8%	2.0%	0.9%		0.5%	0.4%	3.6%	0.7%	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 2: Skill level

If yes, What Kind (skill)?					Ex-combatants categories					
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total	n=892
Craftsmanship	5.4%	6.1%	9.1%	6.9%		8.3%	1.8%	5.3%	6.3%	
Mechanic	11.5%	11.0%	4.5%	9.0%		11.8%	9.1%		9.8%	
Crop/Animal Husbandry	23.8%	36.6%	43.2%	34.5%	41.7%	25.4%	40.0%	52.6%	31.4%	
Carpentry	4.6%	7.3%	4.5%	5.5%		5.3%	9.1%		5.5%	
Builder	7.7%	6.1%	11.4%	8.4%		7.1%	12.7%	5.3%	7.8%	
Driver	12.3%	9.8%	2.3%	8.1%	25.0%	10.7%	7.3%		9.8%	
Trade	8.5%	4.9%	13.6%	9.0%	16.7%	8.9%	1.8%	15.8%	8.2%	
Teacher	2.3%	1.2%	2.3%	1.9%		1.8%	3.6%		2.0%	
Blacksmith	1.5%	1.2%		0.9%		1.8%			1.2%	
Other	22.3%	15.9%	9.1%	15.8%	16.7%	18.9%	14.5%	21.1%	18.0%	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 3: When was the skill acquired?

When did you acquire your skill?					Ex-combatants categories					
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total	n=892
Before joining combat	31.1%	47.3%	39.7%	39.4%	35.3%	30.9%	48.0%	51.9%	37.9%	
During Combat	18.0%	14.5%	17.2%	16.6%	11.8%	15.2%	23.0%	7.4%	16.7%	
After Demobilization	50.9%	38.2%	43.1%	44.1%	52.9%	53.9%	29.0%	40.7%	45.4%	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 4: Got job after training

	Since finishing training were you able to get a job?				Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	48.5%	44.0%	41.1%	44.5%	70.6%	47.6%	37.4%	51.9%	46.1%
No	51.5%	56.0%	58.9%	55.5%	29.4%	52.4%	62.6%	48.1%	53.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5: Housing situation

	How do you rate your housing situation to the one you had before joining combat?				Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
The same	11.3%	12.8%	16.2%	13.4%	13.9%	11.1%	13.8%	21.6%	12.8%
Now, it is better	25.9%	37.8%	33.5%	32.4%	44.4%	25.5%	40.8%	36.5%	31.5%
It was better before	57.2%	46.4%	46.2%	49.9%	30.6%	60.1%	40.0%	36.5%	51.3%
Other	5.6%	3.0%	4.0%	4.2%	11.1%	3.3%	5.4%	5.4%	4.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	-1,400.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6: Why join the army

	Why did you join the military?				Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Caught in the middle of the war	4.8%	4.2%	6.6%	5.2%	7.9%	3.2%	4.1%	18.7%	5.0%
Following friend or relative who had joined	3.8%	4.5%	3.3%	3.9%	10.5%	3.0%	4.1%	6.7%	3.9%
To avoid persecution	18.5%	13.9%	15.5%	15.9%	18.4%	23.7%	4.5%	1.3%	16.3%
For a living	5.5%	4.5%	5.0%	5.0%	5.3%	1.1%	10.7%	16.0%	5.2%
Political persecution	11.3%	11.9%	14.4%	12.5%	5.3%	17.1%	4.1%	5.3%	12.0%
Cross-Border incursions	3.5%	1.6%	3.3%	2.8%	10.5%	2.8%	1.6%	2.7%	2.8%
For military profession	16.0%	21.0%	13.8%	16.9%	5.3%	7.5%	40.6%	16.0%	17.2%
Displaced from one's place	11.0%	11.3%	8.3%	10.2%	2.6%	13.0%	4.5%	16.0%	10.5%
Other reason	25.8%	27.1%	29.8%	27.6%	34.2%	28.4%	25.8%	17.3%	27.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 7 : Life during combat

	How was life during combat/war situation?			Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories				Total n=892
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
Good	22.8%	31.1%	31.6%	28.5%	36.8%	29.9%	26.0%	9.3%	27.3%
Average	30.2%	31.8%	33.3%	31.8%	31.6%	34.5%	30.6%	12.0%	31.4%
Bad	47.0%	37.1%	35.0%	39.7%	31.6%	35.6%	43.4%	78.7%	41.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 8: What were ex-combatants doing before the war

	What were you doing before the war?			Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories				Total n=892
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
Student	37.2%	27.5%	33.1%	32.6%	34.2%	32.6%	33.9%	32.0%	33.0%
Housewife	0.2%	0.6%	1.7%	0.9%		0.9%		1.3%	0.7%
Unemployed	2.5%	1.9%	3.3%	2.6%	5.3%	2.1%	2.4%	4.0%	2.5%
Farming	35.9%	43.7%	43.1%	40.9%	36.8%	40.0%	39.6%	41.3%	39.9%
Self employed	9.7%	10.4%	10.5%	10.2%	13.2%	12.8%	4.1%	9.3%	10.1%
Employed	3.5%	3.2%	2.2%	3.0%	2.6%	2.8%	4.1%	2.7%	3.2%
Civil-servant	1.2%	1.9%	0.6%	1.2%		0.9%	2.4%	2.7%	1.5%
House boy/girl	0.5%	1.0%		0.5%		0.4%	0.4%	2.7%	0.6%
Was in the army	4.2%	2.9%	2.2%	3.1%		0.9%	10.2%		3.4%
Other reason	5.0%	6.8%	3.3%	5.0%	7.9%	6.4%	2.9%	4.0%	5.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 9: Reason for having contact with former colleagues in arm

	If yes why?			Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories				Total n=892
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
It easy to communicate with (understand each other)	26.9%	24.6%	27.0%	26.2%	25.0%	25.4%	27.0%	31.8%	26.2%
We were like family	35.8%	40.8%	36.8%	37.8%	46.9%	41.5%	28.6%	31.8%	37.8%
Because I get support from them	5.5%	4.6%	3.9%	4.7%	3.1%	5.0%	4.1%	6.8%	4.8%
For I get information and advice	17.6%	15.4%	13.8%	15.6%	9.4%	15.9%	17.3%	15.9%	16.0%
They are everything to me	3.8%	1.9%	4.6%	3.4%	6.3%	3.1%	3.1%	4.5%	3.3%
Other reason	10.4%	12.7%	13.8%	12.3%	9.4%	9.1%	19.9%	9.1%	11.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 10: Reason for not having contact with former colleagues in arm

	If your response is no (Chose only one)				Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
I don't have spare time	20.0%	22.9%	10.7%	17.9%	20.0%	36.6%	10.4%	6.5%	18.4%
It is useless	12.0%	14.6%	17.9%	14.8%	20.0%	4.9%	14.6%	25.8%	14.4%
I don't want to remember them	2.0%			0.7%			2.1%		0.8%
The respect I had for them had deteriorated	20.0%	8.3%	7.1%	11.8%	20.0%	2.4%	18.8%	19.4%	13.6%
Now we do not have anything in common	10.0%	8.3%	14.3%	10.9%		4.9%	12.5%	16.1%	10.4%
Other reason	36.0%	45.8%	50.0%	43.9%	40.0%	51.2%	41.7%	32.3%	42.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 11: Change of settlement by ex-combatants

	Number of times you had changed site of settlement *				Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Once	58.9%	74.4%	75.9%	69.7%	85.7%	59.4%	82.6%	100.0%	67.1%
Two times	19.2%	11.6%	17.2%	16.0%		18.9%	17.4%		16.4%
Three times	16.4%	11.6%	6.9%	11.7%	14.3%	17.0%			13.0%
Four times	2.7%			0.9%		1.9%			1.4%
More than four times	2.7%	2.3%		1.7%		2.8%			2.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 12: reason for not being accepted by the community

	If your response is bad the main reason is because -				Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997- 2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Because I fought on the wrong side	14.7%	9.1%	6.3%	10.0%		11.1%	18.2%		11.1%
I returned to share the meager resource	8.8%	45.5%	68.8%	41.0%	25.0%	29.6%	63.6%		33.3%
Because my livelihood depends on them	5.9%			2.0%		3.7%			2.8%
Perception/Attitude toward peace and stability	8.8%	4.5%		4.5%		5.6%		33.3%	5.6%
Other reason	61.8%	40.9%	25.0%	42.6%	75.0%	50.0%	18.2%	66.7%	47.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 13: Reason for being accepted by the community
If your response is good it is because? *

	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories					
					RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total	n=892
We are sons and daughters of them	10.1%	6.9%	14.2%	10.4%		9.2%	13.0%	9.3%		9.9%
They respect our contribution towards peace and stability	33.6%	43.9%	24.5%	34.0%	44.0%	38.0%	30.4%	29.6%		35.1%
Because of us there is peace	5.7%	2.9%	2.8%	3.8%	8.0%	5.3%	3.1%			4.2%
They need helping hands	27.9%	24.9%	29.2%	27.3%	20.0%	23.6%	31.1%	37.0%		27.1%
Other reason	22.7%	21.4%	29.2%	24.4%	28.0%	23.9%	22.4%	24.1%		23.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%

Table 14: reason for changing address
If yes (change home address) *

	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories					
					RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total	n=892
In search of job	28.8%	38.6%	20.0%	29.1%	37.5%	30.8%	30.4%	20.0%		30.4%
In search of training	1.4%		3.3%	1.6%			4.3%	10.0%		1.4%
In search of land	11.0%	22.7%	20.0%	17.9%	12.5%	12.1%	30.4%	30.0%		16.2%
Because I was not accepted by the community	5.5%		3.3%	2.9%	12.5%	2.8%	4.3%			3.4%
Health problem	21.9%	22.7%	26.7%	23.8%		28.0%	13.0%	10.0%		23.0%
Other	31.5%	15.9%	26.7%	24.7%	37.5%	26.2%	17.4%	30.0%		25.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%

Table 15: Reason for moving from your current settlement area
If you intend to move; then it is... *

	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories					
					RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total	n=892
Economic problem/s	52.4%	52.9%	58.1%	54.4%	57.1%	50.0%	70.3%	40.0%		53.4%
Family problem	5.8%	10.0%	6.5%	7.4%		8.0%	8.1%			7.4%
Administration problem	3.9%	2.9%		2.2%		3.3%	2.7%			2.9%
Service or facilities shortage	5.8%	4.3%		3.4%		6.0%				4.4%
Health problem	15.5%	14.3%	12.9%	14.2%		16.0%	10.8%	20.0%		14.7%
Other	16.5%	15.7%	22.6%	18.3%	42.9%	16.7%	8.1%	40.0%		17.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%

Table 16 : Did you visit the areas you were working after you got demobilized

	After getting demobilized, have you ever visited the area/s *			Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories				Total n=892
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
Yes	35.8%	28.7%	25.7%	30.1%	36.8%	35.0%	29.8%	8.1%	31.4%
No	64.2%	71.3%	74.3%	69.9%	63.2%	65.0%	70.2%	91.9%	68.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 17: How do you spend your spare time

	How do you spend it? *			Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories				Total n=892
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
To sustain my livelihood	39.3%	40.1%	40.6%	40.0%	27.8%	41.5%	39.9%	31.7%	39.7%
To help family	21.0%	16.5%	17.0%	18.1%	25.0%	18.0%	18.9%	19.0%	18.6%
I invest it in income generating activity	10.6%	13.9%	12.7%	12.4%	16.7%	11.4%	13.4%	11.1%	12.1%
I put it in the bank	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%		0.4%	0.4%	3.2%	0.6%
I squandered it	0.3%			0.1%		0.2%			0.1%
I got married with it	6.4%	6.1%	4.2%	5.6%	8.3%	5.9%	4.6%	9.5%	5.9%
I lent it	0.5%			0.2%		0.4%			0.2%
Other	21.5%	22.7%	24.8%	23.0%	22.2%	22.3%	22.7%	25.4%	22.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 18: Who helped you to start business?

	If your response is yes, who helped you? *			Total n=892	Ex-combatants categories				Total n=892
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181		RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	
Family	0.7%	7.7%		2.8%		0.7%	7.7%		1.2%
Friends	1.4%			0.5%		0.7%	7.7%		1.2%
Community leaders	0.7%		33.3%	11.3%		1.4%			1.2%
Administration	2.1%			0.7%		2.1%			1.9%
Demobilization commission	95.2%	92.3%	66.7%	84.7%	100.0%	95.1%	84.6%	100.0%	94.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 19: Capability of supporting your family financially
Are you in a position to support your family financially?

					Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=889
Yes	38.4%	36.7%	40.9%	38.7%	52.6%	37.2%	38.5%	37.3%	38.2%
No	61.6%	63.3%	59.1%	61.3%	47.4%	62.8%	61.5%	62.7%	61.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 20: Since when were you unemployed?

If you are currently unemployed, how long have you been out? *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Three months	2.7%	2.0%	7.5%	4.0%		3.7%	1.4%	10.8%	3.5%
From 4 to 6 months	2.7%	2.7%	36.0%	13.8%	20.8%	11.0%	4.2%	18.5%	10.0%
One year	2.7%	2.4%	8.1%	4.4%	4.2%	3.4%	3.7%	6.2%	3.8%
Two years	15.1%	20.0%	25.5%	20.2%	37.5%	17.2%	15.3%	10.8%	16.7%
Three years	24.3%	45.1%	3.7%	24.4%	16.7%	25.0%	31.9%	26.2%	26.9%
More than three years	47.4%	22.4%	14.3%	28.0%	4.2%	33.5%	33.8%	24.6%	31.8%
Other	5.0%	5.5%	5.0%	5.2%	16.7%	6.2%	9.7%	3.1%	7.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 21: Future economic situation of ex-combatants

Do you see your economic situation improving in the near future? *									
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003-2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
Yes	69.9%	71.2%	73.0%	71.4%	71.1%	73.2%	64.6%	73.3%	70.8%
No	30.1%	28.8%	27.0%	28.6%	28.9%	26.8%	35.4%	26.7%	29.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 22: reasons for not getting employment

Why do you think you are unemployed *					Ex-combatants categories				
	Stage 1 (1997-2001) n=401	Stage 2 (2002) n=310	Stage 3 (2003- 2004) n=181	Total n=892	RDF n=38	RPA n=531	FAR n=245	Ex-AG n=75	Total n=892
I do not know	3.9%	4.3%	5.6%	4.6%	4.2%	3.4%	5.6%	7.7%	4.4%
Lack of work opportunity	13.0%	14.3%	18.0%	15.1%	25.0%	11.4%	19.0%	18.5%	14.6%
Lack of marketable skills	42.7%	43.8%	42.2%	42.9%	45.8%	44.8%	38.9%	43.1%	43.0%
No patron	15.5%	12.0%	11.2%	12.9%	12.5%	14.8%	12.5%	6.2%	13.3%
Financial problems (lack of credit window)	7.3%	8.1%	5.0%	6.8%		6.4%	9.7%	6.2%	7.1%
Other	17.6%	17.4%	18.0%	17.7%	12.5%	19.3%	14.4%	18.5%	17.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%