The Arab Congregation and
the Ideology of Genocide in Darfur, Sudan
By: Abdullahi
Osman El-Tom, Ph.D.
Abstract:
This article presents
a number of documents bearing the name of the Arab Congregation of Western
Sudan (Darfur and Kordofan). It argues
that attempts to annihilate indigenous Darfurians and appropriate their land
are backed by Arab supremacist ideology that has been nursed over several
decades. The article further argues that
the Arab Congregation operates in close alliance with both national and
regional circles that seek to expand what is defined as Arab belt deeper into
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Introduction:
This article
presents 6 documents related to Al Tajamu Al Arabi, loosely translated here as
the Arab Congregation. Other
translations are: the Arab Coalition, Arab Gathering, Arab Alliance and Arab
Congress.
The Arab
Congregation was probably formed in the early 1980s but gained momentum in
latter years of the same decade. Darfur
has been a major site of operation of the Arab Congregation. This basic fact
disguises broader aim and geographic spread of the organisation. Within Sudan, the Arab Congregation aims at
displacing / controlling indigenous populations of the entire country though
modestly starting with the six States of the western regions / provinces of
Kordofan and Darfur.
At the broader
regional level of Sub-Saharan Africa, tentacles of the Arab Congregation spread
as far as Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger and possibly
beyond. The geographical spread of the
organisation indicates that the Arab Congregation of Western Sudan is mere
small cog within a wider network of national and regional dimensions. At the national level, the Arab Congregation
of western Sudan is sponsored and operates as conduit for Kayan Al Shamal and
hence KASH or the Northern Entity in English (El-Tom 2006). Kash was formed in the 1976 when the
government of dictator Nimeiri was nearly toppled by a Kordofan army officer
and who is in today’s language in the Sudan be classed as “black” and
non-Arab. KASH was then formed to ensure
that irrespective of the ideology behind the government of Khartoum,
democratic, fascist, military, socialist, religious fanatic or otherwise, the
leadership remains the hands of the Northern Region. But KASH is an exclusive club, open only for
the three elite ethnic groups of the Northern Region. This is what various circles including the
Arab Congregation referred to as Al Thalooth, i.e. the Tripartite
Coalition. The tripartite Coalition, and
which has been ruling the Sudan since independence, encompasses barely three
ethnic groups: the Shaigiya Ex-President Sir Alkhatim, current Vice President
Taha), the Jallayeen (President Albashir) and the Danagla (Ex-President
Nimeiri, Ex-Prime Minister Almahdi and Ex-Vice President Alzibair). For the last forty years of so, KASH has
spearheaded the project of Arab-Islamisation of the Sudan and in their pursuit
of their project, they needed foot soldiers supplied by various bodies
including the Arab Congregation. The hegemony of the Northern Region over Sudan
is so clear-cut and requires no rerun in this article (see JEM 2004, El-Tom
2003 and Ibrahim 2004).
The might of the
geopolitical dimension of the Arab Congregation was chillingly demonstrated in
Darfur in the early 1980s. Following collapse of Nimeiri’s regime, Khartoum
government connived with Gaddafi and his disastrous gamble in Chad to turn
Darfur into one of their daring crusade to push the so-called Islamic belt into
Black Africa. Having been kicked out of
Chad Gaddafi proceeded to locate his Islamic Legion under the command of
Acheikh Ibn Omar in the Massalit land, western Darfur. The Legion, whose
recruits were sourced in Chad, Mali and Niger but equally as far away as
Mauritania, devastated the area and its indigenous inhabitants. Settlers of the Islamic Legion in Darfur were
later to play prominent role as Janjaweed, effectively executing Musa Hilal’s
call: “change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes” (Flint
and de Waal 2005, see also Flint and De Waal 2006). Attempts to change demography of Darfur are
still going on to this day. As recently
as July 2007, Bloomfield accused the government of Sudan of “cynically trying
to change the demography of the whole region”.
Monitoring the Chadian-Sudanese borders, Bloomfield wrote:
“An internal UN report, obtained by the
Independent, show that up to 30,000 Arabs have crossed the border in the past
three months. Most arrived with all their belongings and large flocks. They were greeted by Sudanese Arabs who took
them to empty villages cleared by the government and Janjaweed forces. ….
further 45,000 Arabs from Niger have also crossed over” (Bloomfield 2007).
At least three
conclusions can be drawn so far, each of which connects with a general
misconception about the current conflict in Darfur. Firstly, Darfur conflict cannot be reduced to
a strife that is internal to Darfur and as an outcome of environmentally
generated scarcity of resources. Rather,
the conflict is part and parcel of national and regional dynamics as well as
aspirations.
Secondly, the
Janjaweed are not a by-product of the present Darfur conflict. Their current involvement in Darfur war is a
mere culmination of decades of atrocities in the region as well as in other
parts of the Sudan, such as Abeye in southern Sudan.
Thirdly, the
reading that Khartoum government unleashed the Janjaweed following rebellion in
Darfur is factually incorrect. On the
contrary, Darfur rebellion took place due to several reasons including
atrocities of the Janjaweed against indigenous Darfurians.
The Documents:
In the following pages,
I will present several documents, all of them translated by myself. Notes made by the author on the text are
placed between pointed brackets while official translation of Qur’anic verses
is used throughout. Some of these
documents have been commented upon in English in other sources but they have
never been made available in their entirety to the English reader. Therefore,
the value of this article lies in the inclusion of the documents and not in my
own analysis as such.
Document No.1
“Arab Coalition
Foundation
Statement / Bian Assasi
<October 1987>
‘In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. – (Holy Qur’an)’
Sayed <[title= Mr>
Prime Minister <Sadiq Almahdi>
The Arab race known today as Arab tribes in Darfur
entered the Sudan together with the Arab waves that arrived in the 15th
century. Despite their division into
numerous groups, these tribes belong to one origin.
These tribes settled in two areas in Darfur Region. One faction settled in an area constituting
88% of the Province of South Darfur. The
other faction settled in the Province of North Darfur; namely, the greatest
part of its northern, middle, eastern and western territories. In the Province of North Darfur, Arab
settlement constitutes 55% of the Province.
The Arab tribes now form more than 70% of the population of Darfur
Region.
Over the centuries that followed their entry into Sudan
and their settlement in Darfur, these Arab tribes have played a pivotal role in
the formation of the identity of the Region.
In this part of the nation, Darfur Arabs have been the makers of
civilization that formed the real and actual existence of this Region. That they have done through their involvement
in politics religion and language and in a manner that led to the moulding of
present Sudan.
Darfur Arabs have also been instrumental in the Mahdist
Revolution, having fought, excelled and died in defence of Sudan. Throughout other periods, Darfur Arabs have
contributed to political, economic, social, civilisational and cultural advancement
of Darfur in particular and Sudan in general.
We reaffirm that we have defended and we will continue to
defend the unity of Sudan, and with utmost belief and strength. We will remain
united and avoid any fragmentation and guard the wholeness of Sudan at all
times.
Sayed Prime Minister:
Scholars of political systems define regional governance
in different ways. However, they all
concur that regional governance calls for handing over power to the people of
the concerned region to undertake political, administrative and economic
reforms. Regional governance stipulates
that the tribes of the region take over the running of the region and manage
their affairs using their available capable cadres. In this regard we state with regret that we
have been deprived of our right of leadership, representation and participation
in decision-making in this region. We
have become a majority but with no weight and subjects but not citizens. This has been the case despite the following:
Mr Prime Minister:
All that we have said confirms the political, social and
economic weight of Darfur Arab tribes. We therefore demand to be represented at
a minimum of 50% in the regional constitutional posts and in the regional
representation to the central government.
We are worried that should the neglect of representation
of the Arab race prevails, things may go out of control and matters may pass
the hands of the wise to the ignorant.
Consequences of that will be unpalatable. Injustice visited by a kin is more painful
than a stab of a sword.
Finally, we assure every Sudanese citizen that we are not
callers for fragmentation and disunity.
We are callers for justice and equality.
Long live Sudan, united and under freedom and democracy.
Interim Committee, Mandated by the Arab Congregation:
Signed: 1. Abdalla Masar; 2. Sharif Ali Jagar; 3. Ibrahim
Yagoub; 4. Hesain Hasan Basha; 5. Nazir Hanid Beito; 6. Tajeldin Ahmed Alhilo;
7. Ayoub El Baloula; 8. Mohamed Khawif Alshitali; 9. Zakaria Ibrahim Abu Lehao;
10. Mohamed Zakaria Daldoum; 11. Nazir Alhadi Eisa Dabaka; 12. Altayib Abu
Shama; 13. Sindika Dawood; 14. Haroun Ali Sanusi; 15. Dr. Omer Abdel Jabbar;
16. Abdalla Yahia; 17. Sulaiman Jabir Abbaker; 18. Nazir Mohamed Yagoub Alumda;
19. Hamid Mohamed Kheiralla; 20. Mohamed Aldouma Omer; 21. Abdelrahman Ali
Abdelnabi; 22. Ahmed Shahata Ahmed; 23. Abubaker Abbo Amin; 24. Jabir Ahmed Alreyyah; <End of text>”.
Document No. 2
<Document undated; possibly 1987; de Waal says
98/99?>
“Qoreish
2
Extremely Confidential.
‘In the Name of
God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.
Say: O God!
Lord of Power
To whom Thou pleasest
And Thou strippest off Power
From whom Thou pleasest:
Thou enduest with honour
Whom Thou pleasest,
And Thou bringest low
Whom Thou pleasest:
In Thy hand is all Good.
Verily, over all things
Thou hast power’ (Qur’an- Ali 1983:129)
God, the Almighty is Most Truthful.
In Qoreish 1, we have covered the birth of the new
Qoreish and some of its programmes.
However, new political realities, with internal and external dimensions,
necessitate taking a moment of reflection to recall objectives, review plans
and consolidate achievements for realization of your noble aims. As you know, the Jaalyeen, the Danagla and
the Shaygiya have prevented us ruling Sudan for almost a century. Despite their adopted Arab cloak, these three
ethnic groups are nothing but a hybrid, both racially and culturally and are
part and parcel of the Nubian Egyptian fabric.
These groups intend to cling to power forever. As we have just learnt, these groups have
vowed to retain power and rotate it among themselves.
Qoreish is currently passing through a difficult
period. All of us, and especially the
two partners in Kordofan and Darfur are requested to rise above opinionated and
sectarian divisions so that we can achieve our noble objectives and retain
gains that have been realized to date.
To achieve our objectives, it is necessary to hold fast to the
following:
1.
Internal
to Sudan Recommendations:
- Giving special attention to education, both
vertically and horizontally; and preparation of highly qualified cadre in all specializations
including politics, economics, media, security and military profession.
- Establishment of an economic institution/
foundation.
- Enlightened recruitment into the army and
security apparatus.
- Continuation of the plan of pretentious cooperation
with the current regime.
- Retention of established working relations
with some of the central figures who belong to the ruling tripartite coalition
- <Jaalyeen, Danagla and Shaygiya>.
- Coordination with our cousins in central and
eastern Sudan.
- Affirmation
of the tribes of the north-south intersection zone, their support, armament and
training; making use of Popular Defence Force <at the time, pro-government
militias>, Mujahideen and Peace Forces.
- Encouragement of all those who are able to
fight to join Sudan Peace Force
- Retention of channels of communication with
the Dinka
- Complete commitment to principles enshrined in
Shaheen Operation of south Kordofan.
- Containment of friction between Nuhood and
Alfula townships (Kordofan) and urging of relatives across the nation to avoid
internal strife, which depletes energy.
- Avoidance of raising the Oil issue before its
actual extraction
- Containment of consequences of Nyala
inter-Arab conflict as far as possible and working for release of detained –
Arab – cavalries
- Securing of stuffiest pastures for nomads in
Sudan, Chad and Central Africa.
- Fighting traditions of land rights like hawakeer
(indigenous traditional titles to land) and Dar (tribal land), by all
means.
- Projection of our strife against non-Arab
tribes in the west as a national defence against extension of southern
rebellion into the west.
- Widening the gap and demolition of trust
between the centre and the non-Arab tribes. That can be done by pushing leaders
of the non-Arab groups to the extreme in expressing their grievances regarding
injustice of the central government in the west (Darfur and Kordofan) and by
enlightened collaboration with them in their racist and regionalist tendencies.
- Working for an increase of our constitutional
posts in the centre and in the States.
- Securing of achievements of Jamous (Bafalo)
Programme in western Darfur with all its calculated consequences.
- Continuation of Teraifi 1 and Reraifi 2 in
their aim of entrenching members of Qoreish in Darfur.
- Adequate preparation for elections in the six
Western States.
- Remaining vigilant regarding discipline and
avoiding callous behaviour like talking about the Nation of the Baggara.
- Payment of attention to positive media by our
leaders.
- Necessity of upgrading financial performance
of Qoreish.
- Prominent leaders of Qoreish shall remain
within the National Congress, three from Qoreish <?> and making decisions
as necessitated by daily events.
2.
External
Recommendations:
- Strengthening of coordination and consultation
with members of Qoreish in neighbouring countries.
- Promotion of strategic thinking as founded by
Albaqalani Aseel and Sheikh Ibn Omer.
- Promotion of Camel Race Programme and using it
to strengthen relations with Arab brothers in the Countries of the Arab-Gulf,
and with the help of God we will succeed.
‘And We wished to be
Gracious to those who were
Being depressed in the land
To make them leaders (in
faith)
And make them heirs
To establish a firm place
For them in the land,
And to show Pharaoh, Haman,
And their hosts, at their
hands,
The very things against which
They were taking precautions’
(Qur’an; Ali 1983:1002-1003)
God, the Almighty is Most
Truthful.
<End of text>”.
“The Arab Congregation
‘In the Name of
God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.
And hold fast,
All together, by
the Rope
Which God
(stretches out
For you), and be
not divided
Among yourselves;’
… (Qur’an; Ali
1983:149).
All corporate members who have taken oath under
leadership of the Arab Congregation are instructed to convene intensive
meetings in order to embark on execution of all commitments/ resolutions that
have been made and implemented by leadership of the Executive Committee. First
meetings shall include all Arab tribes that reside near the areas designated
for extermination / ibada and burning. Umdas and Sheikhs are to commit
their subjects under oath of secrecy so that the matter remains completely
confidential. Following initial
contacts, general meetings shall be convened to include Arab and non-Arab
tribes and volunteers from other groups.
Assistance of non-Arab tribes like the Zaghawa shall be commissioned,
thus, making use of them in war procedures, military training, and geographical
knowledge < original word: studies> of the area. In this way, the matter will not be evident
for those targeted for extermination / ibada.
The following Recommendations have been endorsed:
All under oath members are hereby instructed to firmly
commit themselves to all agreed resolutions until we achieve victory. You are to know that our enemies are drawing
on the support of the unbelievers and that is why we assigned our forces to
different locations and in a way that fits the military situation.
Committee of Arab Congregation in the Region
Administration of Military Operations, 1992.
<End of text>”.
“<This document appeared in a circular letter format
intended to be sent to several officials. No date was affixed to the document,
possibly 1993?>
The Arab Congregation
Strictly Confidential
Mr. ……………………….
The Executive Committee of the Arab Congregation held a
meeting for the purpose of evaluation of activities of all members and for
reviewing the situation following appointment of Ministers of Regional
Government from among the Zurga / black population. The meeting agreed that we never obtain a
position in Darfur without recourse to – armed – struggle and unity among
ourselves. This is difficult and
critical time and can only be endured by determined men. To achieve objectives
of the Congregation, the Supreme Committee of the Arab Congregation made the
following decisions:
-
Committed members of the Congregation and who
are under oath are to:
a) Ensure
concentration of public services in areas of influence of the Arab
Congregation.
b) Not
to appoint children of the Zurga in important posts and at the same time work
as opportune as possible to obstruct work of the members of black community who
occupy executive and administrative positions.
c) Work
by all ways and means to disrupt stability of schools in areas of the black/
zurga; <End of Text>”.
“The Arab Congregation
Coordination Council of the Arab Congregation
Political Committee
Date: 15/11/2003
Subject: Report on visits of Political Committee to the
localities of Buram, Tulus, Reheid Albirdi and Iddalfursan.
The Committee left for Buram, Monday 10/11/03 and reached
its destination at 10.30pm. The
Committee started its work immediately by holding meetings with relevant
community and local administration /tribal leaders, politicians, executive
officials and notables.
Members of the committee started the meeting clarifying
mission and objectives of the visit.
Exploration of views of hosts followed.
Host speakers relayed their satisfaction with the visit and affirmed
their agreement with the mission even though the initiative was somewhat late.
Discussion focused on ambiguous issues that needed some
clarification by the Committee members.
The Committee was able to make all necessary clarifications.
The following recommendations and points were agreed
upon:
On the following day, the
Committee paid a visit to Nazir Salah Ali Alghali to explain the concept in
detail and to which he was fully in agreement.
The Committee also paid a
visit to the house/also Head Quarters of the Commissioner of the Local Council
who gave the project his absolute support. The Commissioner was asked to assist
the Secretary of the National Congress in the collection of signatures and in
provision of transport for members of the Consultative Commission, whenever requested.
On 11/11/2003, the Committee visited Tullus Fallata
Nazirite and held a meeting with tribal administration, politicians and
government executive officials. The Commissioner addressed the meeting,
thanking the Coordination Council represented by the visiting Committee. He further elaborated on the dangerous state
of affairs and the necessity for unification before presenting the Committee
members to the meeting. After elaborate
deliberations, the following recommendations were agreed upon:
Umda [Mayor] Yousif Omer Khatir was appointed Coordinator
for Tullus Local Council. The Secretary
of the National Congress was nominated to collect signatures of the members of
Consultative Commission [Shura] and send them to Nyala as soon as
possible. The Commissioner of Tullus was
urged to provide transport for the Consultative Commission members whenever
demanded. The Committee then met with
Nazir Ahmed Alsammani Albasher who affirmed the unity project but added further
recommendations:
On 12/11/2003, the Committee visited Reheid Albirdi
Locality where they met with tribal leaders, politicians and notables. The hosts pledged their unanimous support to
the unity project and affirmed their willingness to work for its full
realization. The following
recommendations were made in the meeting:
After taking oath, Brother Yousif Mohamed Yousif was
elected to act as a coordinator for the Locality, while the Secretary of the
National Congress in the area was nominated to collect signatures of the
Consultative Commission and send them to Nyala.
It is worth noting that the meeting was attended by all – Arab- families
and clans, especially the Salamat who reside in Reheid Albirdi.
On Thursday 13/11/2003, the Committee held a meeting with
tribal leaders, notables and politicians in Iddalfursan. After explaining the purpose of the visit,
the Committee listened attentively to views of their hosts. The following recommendations were then made
in the meeting:
This was followed by taking oath and by nomination of
Dabaka Isa Dabaka to act as Coordinator for the Locality. The Secretary of the National Congress to the
Locality was asked to collect signatures of members of the Consultative Council
and send them to Nyala; <end of text>”.
“The Light, the Fast and the Fearful Forces
<Top left is a stamp bearing name “The Light (El-Khafifa),
the Fast (El-Sariya) and the Fearful (El-Muriya) Forces,
28/8/2004; Top right is a stamp with government official emblem [Head of a
bird?], inscription not legible and no date>.
In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
Subject: Intelligence Report No. 310
Sayed (Mr) Head of
Intelligence and Security Department.
Greetings of peace and Allah’s blessings.
Reference to your message marked “top secret”, dated
6/8/2004 and concerning removal of 9 mass graves (maqabir jammaiya) in
Darfur States; killing of any who poses a threat to content of this
instruction; and possibility of giving evidence to UN, EU and AU delegates
coming to investigate mass graves, we hereby inform your Excellency of the
following:
-
8 mass graves have been unearthed, removed
and completely burnt under supervision of a committee of the National Security
System, Arab Congregation committee and the Secretary General of the State of
North Darfur. The operation was
conducted under protection of our forces and for whom nothing under the sun is
impossible.
-
We have not been able to reach the ninth
designated mass grave in Wadi Salih, State of West Darfur. We appeal to your Excellency to address
Administration of Military Operations to approve an airplane so that we can
remove Wadi Salih mass gave, possibly containing 1200 – one thousand two
hundred- remains <extra word illegible>.
-
We salute your Excellency, the National
Salvation Revolution and the Arab Congregation.
<Repeat of Military Stamp
as above left- no date inscribed; Signed on left corner as follows>:
Lieutenant: Hajaj Ahmed Rabih
<Signature left of name>
Head of Field Division of the
Light, the Fast and the Fearful Forces, and member of Implementation Mechanism
of the Arab Congregation.
<On the bottom right hand
margin, a commentary with different handwriting reads>:
For information of Military
and Security Intelligence Instructions:
Graves in Wadi Salih have been
unearthed within 24 hours using a plane, Nyala Airport to Wadi Salih. Relocation and burning shall proceed under
utmost secrecy and shall not include … <two words not legible>.
Intelligence Division, 29th
August <Signature follows, exact name not legible;
End of Document>”.
Discussion:
The question of authenticity must arise in handling
clandestine documents such as those presented in this article. Document 1 which
appeared in a form of a letter addressed to the Prime Minster Almahdi went
public and was published in national newspapers. All other documents are meant to be secret
and were marked so. More often than not,
participants in the meetings were sworn on the Qur’an to ensure just that.
It is hard to doubt the authenticity of the presented
documents. Excellent, though brief,
comments on some of them appeared in Flint and de Waal, 2005. Harir and Sulaiman have also referred to
some of them, although the latter writer relegated his comments to footnotes of
his publication (Harir 1993, Sulaiman 2000).
It is difficult to discern consensus of the Arab
Coalition on these Documents, particularly the inflammatory and racist
Documents 2, 3, 4 and 5. While it is
obvious that these Documents reflect the work of supremacist sector of the Arab
Coalition, it is not easy to comprehend the conspicuous absence of their public
condemnation among Arab groups.
Moreover, racist principles contained in most of these documents seemed
to have enjoyed wide support in the current Darfur conflict and are well in
tune with the perception of black people in the Arab culture of northern Sudan
(see Mukhtar 2006 and Ibrahim 2005). I
will return to this issue after some comments on the documents.
The appointment
of Dreige as a Governor for Darfur during Nimeiri’s rule in 1983 caused a stir
among the Arabs of Darfur. As Dreige
belongs to the Fur, the ethnic group that gave the region its name, the Arabs
of Darfur saw that as a setback of their dream of dominating the region. Clandestine inflammatory cassettes circulated
among members of Darfur Arabs, some of them were blatantly militant and
racists. But the Arab groups were yet to organise into a coherent political
force. That came later during Almahdi’s
presidency later in the decade.
In October 1987,
a coalition of 27 Arab Groups sent an open letter to Prime Minister Almahdi,
addressing him as one of their own and who had in some way betrayed them. The letter which was signed by 27 people,
with three names later withdrawn, referred clearly to the background where the
Arabs have assisted Khartoum government in its war against the south, only to
be let down by passing over Darfur
governorship to their opponents under leadership of Tigani Seise. The letter stated that the Arabs constituted
70% majority in Darfur and demands control over the region, together with
adequate representation in the central government. The Arab Groups ended their letter with a
clear warning that should their demands be ignored, matters might pass from the
wise to the ignorant and with dire consequences.
In some ways,
Document 1 can be said to have marked official inauguration of the Arab
Congregation. Exaggeration of the number
of Arab population is very clear. If the
Arabs constituted 70% of Darfur population they would have simply controlled
the region through the same election that had given power to Almahdi . Ibrahim, a formidable scholar who has
monitored Darfur people over several decades reverses the figures, giving the
Arabs 30% as opposed to 70% of African ethnic groups (Ibrahim 2005:11). But what is more ominous is that the letter
indicated a worrying sense of superiority, divine right to monopolize power and
readiness to use all methods to achieve stated objective. Moreover, the letter implied that support of
riverine Sudan had been secured but was not delivered (see also Qoreish 2 in
Document 2).
Since its letter
to Amahdi, the Arab Congregation went from strength to strength but has since
passed its leadership to the “ignorant” if we are to use the Congregation’s own
expression. Subsequent communications of
the Arab Congregation became steeped into a discourse of racial purity, a term
that has long been relegated to the dustbin of history. Remarkably, and despite its intellectual
inaccuracy, race has become central to understanding of Darfur conflict. In his thoughtful article on Darfur, Lumamba
challenges analysts not to avoid the issue of race like a plague and face the
ultimate truth that although race is a social construction and has no
biological bases, it has been the backbone of the ideology that underpinned the
conflict in Darfur and Sudan. Both, the
Arab Congregation and their surrogate parents, the riverine Arabs, share this
ideology (Lumamba 2007).
At a different
level, Almahdi’s second democracy (1986-1989) shattered the Congregation’s
dream in a different way. Their claim to
constitute a clear majority in Darfur was falsified and did not translate into
parliamentary seats. To add insult to injury, Almahdi proceeded to appoint a
non-Arab Darfurian (Seise) to the governorship of Darfur. Although organized attacks of members of the
Arab Congregation was reported as early as 1982, they became more incessant
during the late 1980s (Flint and de Waal 200652). At the same time, the Arab Congregation
intensified release of its edicts that provided ideological backing to their
violence. This period also witnessed
renewed emphases on Arab racial purity coupled by lumping together all
indigenous Darfurians under the rubric of “Zurga” (black). So intense was the campaign of the Arab
Congregation in this regard that non-Arab Darfuris began to see themselves as
an undifferentiated mass of Zurga. The
hybridity of race that was once alluded to by many indigenous people was
finally laid to rest.
The ideological
campaign of violence of the Arab Congregation became less of clandestine work
using available technology of cassettes, photocopying and faxes. As the
documents show, the edicts regularly called for destruction of public services
aimed at the Zurga, killing of Zurga elites, mobilisation of Arab militias and
occupation of land and inciting conflict.
At the
organisational level, the Arab Congregation elected its offices in the guise of
High Councils, Executive, Political and Military Committees. Moreover, links began to be forged among all
Arabs of western Sudan (Kordofan and Darfur), within Sudan at large and at the
geopolitical stage spanning neighbouring countries, North Africa and the Middle
East. This is chillingly demonstrated in
what has come to be called Qoreish 2, released in the early 1990s (?), to
follow Qoreish 1, which the author has not been able to track down.
Qoreish 2
subscribes to Arab purity that is now exclusively a preserve of components of
the Arab Congregation. Riverine allies,
and who championed the project of Arab-Islamisation of the Sudan are dismissed
in the edict as no more than hybrid Nubians and Egyptians. Much worse, they are guilty of depriving the
Qoreishi and true descendents of prophet Mohamed of legitimately ruling the
Sudan. In fact, the relationship between
the Arab Congregation and particularly the Tripartite Coalition has constituted
a marriage of convenience characterised by love and hate. The Tripartite Coalition sees its members as
the civilised heir of the colonial project of modernisation and for which the
Arab Congregation is badly suited. In
its most recent form, government propaganda code-named this project “the
Civilisational Orientation”. In the
eyes of the Tripartite Coalition, the Arab Congregation is no more than a bunch
of nomads, steeped in savagery and only fit for use as foot soldiers. Nonetheless, they are indispensibe in
carrying out full implementation of the Arab-Islamic project. If phase one of this project has been
torpedoed by western powers / international community in the Christain south of
the Sudan, the Darfur phase two of it must succeed. It will be accomplished, even if it takes considerable
delaying manoeuvres or to use Condalisa Rice’s term “Khartoum’s cat and mouse tactics” with the international
community.
In a recent
development, Hamdi, guru economist and Albashir’s ex-Minister for Economy and
Finance advised that future investment and development in the Sudan should
by-pass Darfur and focus on the northern Dongola- Sennar – Kordofan axis. Hamdi
concluded that this triangle represents the hard-core of historic and future
Arab-Islamic Sudan. Following segregation of the south, taken as given by
Hamdi, this triangle guarantees power for the National congress party of
Albashir in future democratic Sudan. The
Arabs of Darfur have a lot to contemplate about in their alliance with the
riverine people of Sudan (Hamdi 2005).
In examining
these documents, one must avoid the temptation of treating them as work of a
lunatic fringe that has little impact on what has happened and still happening
in Darfur. For any nation to be able to
massacre anything between 200,000 to 550,000 people, mostly non-combatants and
in just over four to five years, it requires a sustained ideology and discourse
capable of turning a substantial sector of its population into conniving
killers. It is within this context that
we should read these documents. And as
long as the carnage in Darfur has called in the interference of the
International Criminal Court, it is futile to waste time debating whether we
have genocide at hand or not. What is pertinent is that these documents have
been part and parcel of a culture that is favourable of committal of genocide.
Comparing Darfur
situation with other countries that witnessed genocides, crimes against
humanities and other heinous atrocities, one finds similar edicts that were
central to formation of an ideology that sustained the killing. Rwanda, Bosnia, Holocaust Germany, and the
Anfal of Iraq, were, all accompanied by similar campaigns. For the purpose of this article I will
restrict myself to Rwanda and whose Hutu ideology mimics, though with some
differences, the contents of Arab Congregation Documents. The Hutu ideology that had led to Rwandan
genocide was enshrined in what was publicised as “Ten Commandments of the
Hutu”. Below are the points of
convergence between the Congregation documents and the Ten Commandments:
1. Hutu Ten Commandments:
Point 5 of the Commandments
reads:
-
All
strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, and military and
security should be entrusted to Hutu.
The Arab Congregation documents read:
-
Enlightened
recruitment into the army and security apparatus (Doc 1, point 1.3)
-
Encouragement
of those who are able to fight to join Popular Defence Force, Mujahideen Force
and Peace Force (Doc 1, point 1.8.
-
Not
to appoint children of the Zurga in important posts and at the same time ..
(Doc 4, point ‘b’)
-
Encourage
the sons of the Arab tribes to get recruited into the armed forces, police and
security bodies (Doc 5, 13)
2. Hutu Ten Commandments:
Point 6 reads:
-
The
education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu
The Arab Congregation documents read:
-
Giving
special attention to education, both vertically and horizontally ... (Doc 1,
1.1).
-
Work
to paralyse delivery of public services in the areas of the Black population
(Doc 4, point 3)
-
Ensure
concentration of public services in the areas of influence of the Arab
Congregation (Doc 4, point ‘a’)
-
Work
by all ways and means to disrupt stability of schools in areas of the black/
Zurga (Doc 4, point ‘c’)
3. Hutu Ten Commandment:
Passages in point 9 reads:
-The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be
concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers
- The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends
and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers
The Arab Congregations documents read:
-
Coordination
with our cousins in central and eastern Sudan
-
Strengthening
of coordination and consultation with members of Qoreish in neighbouring
countries (Doc 2, point 2.1)
-
Promotion
of Camel Race Programme and using it to strengthen relations with Arab brothers
in the Gulf countries (Doc 2, point 2.3)
-
Working
to speedily overcome inter-tribal conflicts among the Arabs (Doc 5, 4)
-
...
under oath to work together for the success of the unification project (Doc5,
point 11).
-
All
agreed on the idea of the unification project and necessity of its
implementation
-
Advertise
the unity to the – Arab- public since it is a noble project ... Give a clear
name for the unity (Doc 5, points 1 and 4)
4. Hutu Ten Commandments:
Point 10 reads:
-.. the Hutu ideology must be taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely
Documents of the Arab Congregation read:
-
Propagating
the thought across Sudan (Doc 5, point 6)
-
Spreading
the idea among university students (Doc 5, point 4)
-
There
is a need to bring together all Arab leaders, expose them to the idea of unity
and commit them to its implementation (Doc 5, point 1)
5. Finally, the Hutu Commandment restricts its
call for having no mercy on the Tutsi. The Arab documents are much more explicit,
referring to killings, assassinations and extermination.
Darfur crisis: From culturecide to genocide:
The Arab
documents contained in this article did not appear out of a vacuum. Rather, they are part of a discourse that has
characterised the formation of Sudan’s nationhood. The very constitution of Sudan as an
Arab-Islamic entity presupposes that all other cultures, indigenous or
otherwise, have to give way to Arab Islamic cultures and in the way defined by
the hegemonic power in the country. Genocides
are not new to Sudan. Ignoring distant history, they featured in the Mahdia
rule (Berber), in the south of Sudan, the Nuba Mountains the conflictual zone
of Abyie and now in Darfur. While
genocides in the Sudan have been intermittent, the destruction of African
cultures (culturecide) has accompanied the formation of Sudan since the
colonial time. The British rule
protected the south of the Sudan against Arab-Muslim encroachment of north but
did not extend same guardianship to other indigenous African cultures.
As far as other
parts of the Sudan including Darfur were concerned, they were simply handed
over to riverine Sudan to oversee the destruction of their cultures. If the European and the Islamic Arab World
agree on one thing in Africa, it is their conviction that black African
cultures have nothing to offer, do not merit survival and the sooner they
vanish the better. Leaving the European
aside, Sudan’s Arab-Islamic project has its regional dimension that transcends
national borders. Black Africa, south of
the Sahara is all too familiar with the incessant expansion of Arab-Islamic
cultures, at the expense of its indigenous counterparts. What is more
perplexing is that this process has gone unchallenged for so long. Much worse,
it has been taken as inevitable, desirable and has commanded support of
national and Arab leaders. Writing in
this respect, Prunier writes:
“.. in the 1980s,
Colonel Gaddafi and Prime Minster Sadiq al-Mahdi gave an answer: Darfur was
poor and backward because it was insufficiently arabized. It had missed out in
the great adhesion to the Muslim Umma because its Islam was primitive and
insufficiently Arabic” (Prunier 2005:162; Quoted in Lumamba 2007).
Flawed as it is,
this vision also finds support from far a field. Both Mazrui and Mamdani,
otherwise respectable writers glorify de-Africanisation of Africa in favour of
Arab Islamic culture. In a clearly
racist view that admires Arabisation of Black Africans, Mazrui declares in a
Janjaweed style: “ .. under genealogical system of the Arab World [they] become
subject to upward genealogical mobility.
They were co-opted upward” (Lumamba 2007). One would wonder whether
Mazrui would also include reproduction through mass rape in Darfur within his
process of upward mobility.
As Darfur is
entirely Muslim, it is the Arabisation of its populations that occupied the
minds of Khartoum rulers. Let us leave
the alleged inferiority of Darfur Islam aside and focus on Arabisation. The machinery of the state was used for that
purpose: the school, the judicial system, the media, and the mosque and of
course the market. All these
institutions played their roles in disseminating Arab Islamic culture while at
the same time denigrating its rival, the indigenous cultures. Even the
landscape itself did not escape this cultural onslaught. Towns had to be
renamed to please riverine Arab-Islamic taste. Thus Id al-Ghanam became, Id al
Fursan, the town Broosh became Uroosh, Kattal became Dar Alsalam, Khoor Mareesa
became Zamzam and so forth and. The fact
that these towns acquired their names for historical and cultural reasons is
immaterial. Part of the process is of course to rewrite history and obliterate
local heritage. If the indigenous people
needed any history, they can look beyond the Red sea and retrieve it from the
early Islamic period in the Middle East or the like. Not surprisingly, schools and class rooms
came to be known as A-Zahra, Omer, Osman, Abubakar, Safa, Marwa, Alhumeira and
so forth; names that make these establishments indistinguishable from any
school nomenclature in the Saudi Arabia.
While there is nothing wrong in drawing on Islamic symbols, it is their
exclusivity that makes a mockery of local history.
In looking at
symbolic nomenclature, Arabism often transcends Islam. This is bellied by the
very fact that the plight of the Muslims in Darfur attracted little sympathy in
the Arab Islamic world. Running the risk
of blaming the victim, the locals too have participated in pillaging their
culture, a common feature of oppressed groups. Arab politics provided a rich
source of names for boys in Darfur but also for Sudan at large, sometimes
commensurate with eras in which Arab rulers and dictators lived. Thus Faisal (Saudi), Najeeb, Jamal, Anwar
(Egypt), Sabah (Kuwait) and Gaddafi are now common names in Darfur. As for girls in Darfur, they are not
fortunate. Male chauvinist gender
relations offer them scant opportunity.
Arab soap operas, mostly Egyptian stand ready to fill this void. Hence you have new popular names for girls like
Rania, Hanan, Sameera, Shahr Zad and Nabeela, all uplifted from Egyptian movie
stars. These new names rarely feature among older generations in Darfur – more
likely to be Khadija, Fatna, Ashsha, Mariam, Zeinab and Kaltuma and their
derivatives. The former category is
Arabic while the latter is distinctively Islamic. Those whose names depicts Darfur accent also
have to oblige. Thus Abbaker became Abu
Bakr, Isakha turned into Ishag and Adoama retuned to read Adam.
The Genocide connection:
The connection
between the Arab documents and the Janjaweed genocide actions in Darfur is
unmistakably evident. In sociological
terms, genocide can be defined as:
“a
form of violent social conflict, or war, between armed power and organisations
that aim to destroy, in part or in whole, social groups and those groups and
other actors who resist this destruction” (adapted from Shaw 2007:154).
In Lemkin’s
format, genocide involved destruction of social groups, a fact that challenges
popular perception of mass killing as an essential component of genocide. As Shaw explains, destruction is aimed at
uprooting essential foundations of life of such social groups (Shaw 2005:19,
Lemkin 1944). Without exhausting social
fields expounded by Lemkin, the assault includes political, economic,
social/cultural/ and moral aspects of targeted social groups.
At the political
level, the Arab documents were very clear in the intention of the group to
destroy the political system of their enemies. To begin with, the target groups
were stripped of their legitimacy to rule themselves. The right to rule the region/s is a divine
outcome of the “biological” descent of the Arab groups; the descent that
connects them directly with the prophet.
The right of the Arab groups for political domination is further
asserted by alleged majority status and by having migrated into the area when
it was empty of indigenous population. Both of these claims are factually
incorrect. As practical steps towards effecting political control, members of
the Arab Congregation are called in the documents to enrol on mass in all
relevant strategic institutions like the army, police, Popular Defence and
Peace Force, Security, etc.
At a different level,
the documents call for assassination of leaders of the target groups, not to
appoint their members in high offices and setting them against each other as
well as against the government. All these measures are likely to destroy
political viability of the indigenous population.
In the economic
field, the target groups are to be attacked at various levels. As the documents show, there is a clear
mobilisation for seizing properties of the Zurga, appropriating their land,
disrupting public services and creating instability that makes economic
advancement impossible.
In the social and
cultural fields, the Documents are again instructive regarding destruction of
the non-Arab populations. Many of the
points raised above already point to that direction, i.e. social and cultural
disruption of the target population.
Denial of political and economic autonomy poses a formidable threat to
the social and cultural survival of these groups. Furthermore, the documents
call for setting Zurga communities in conflict against each other, killing
their leaders, wrecking their educational system and reducing their populations
to a state of utter dependency in the guise of landless refugees and IDPs. In
short, the aim of the document is to ensure that the Zurga no longer constitute
functioning communities.
Those who see
mass killings as an essential defining feature of genocide can turn to
Documents 3 and 6. The term “Ibada”,
accurately translated as “annihilation”, “extermination” or “eradication”
occurs twice in Document 3. It is
noteworthy that the first time the term Ibada (extermination) appeared in the
Arab Congregation communication was in 1992, Document 3. Document 6 refers to a desperate attempt to
hide evidence of mass killings prior to visit of international investigators.
Interestingly, international institutions and western governments have often
been accused of doing so little to protect people of Darfur. Document 6 shows their actions, no matter how
feeble, have thrown Darfur genocidaires into panic. As such, it is possible to conclude that
international intervention must have reduced genocide actions and saved human
lives.
In reading
through the documents, one is struck by the paramountcy given to secrecy. In
fact, these Documents were nothing but secret.
Coordination of the work with government security, army and political
machinery made it difficult for these Documents and their contents to remain
confidential. Evil as it may be,
destruction of villages and depopulation of entire areas were openly discussed
by both government officials and members of the Arab Congregation. The case of
Attal Mannan, ex-governor of South Darfur is revealing in this regard. Attal Mannan is also reputed to be the head
of KASH (Northern Entity), referred to earlier in the article. At the height of Darfur war, 2005, the then
Governor roared in a public rally in Sheiryia town: “the Zaghawa have to look
for another planet to live on”. His
speech came in an open support for attempts of Arab Janjaweed to drive the
Zaghawa out of the area.
Actions and
movements of the Arab Congregation cannot be kept secret for another
reason. The intensity of security
surveillance in Darfur makes it impossible for the Arab Congregation to operate
behind government eyes. As allies in
Darfur war at least, the need for coordination makes secrecy unnecessary if not
totally counterproductive.
Concluding Remarks:
This article examines a number of documents issued by the Arab Congregation and its branches over the last two decades. While these documents are available in Arabic, this article presents them to the English reader in their entirety. This is where the value of this article resides. Hence, the article does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of the documents. That job is left to the reader as well as for a different work in a different space.
Documents
contained in this article should be read as complementary to Sudan’s discourse
of genocide. They provided an ideology
that made Darfur genocide possible. At
the same, ideology underlining these documents is not a recent phenomenon. Rather it has been set in motion ever since
Sudan was declared an Arab-Islamic state.
Moreover, Sudan’s project is part of continental project that seeks to
expand Arab influence, expressed as Arab Belt further south into Sub-Saharan
Africa.
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(Abdullahi Osman El-Tom is
in Charge of the Bureau for Training and Strategic Planning of JEM. He teaches anthropology at NUIM,
Ireland. Email: Abdullahi.eltom@nuim.ie)